Blue Book Midseason

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***Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.***

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CASE SUMMARIES FOR MIDSEASON

REFORMING NATO's AFGHAN MISSION

This case argues that NATO's mission in Afghanistan is critical, both for the alliance and for international security, but NATO is making some mistakes in the way it is carrying out the mission. Very briefly, the mistakes are these: 1) Lack of focus on rebuilding roads and infrastructure; 2) Caveats on troop activity; 3) Troop rotation times that are too short (staying in Afghanistan for only four or six months at a time); and 4) Not enough troops deployed to Afghanistan. The advantages of the case include improved Afghan government stability and more effective military deployments in combat against insurgents and Taliban, leading to mission success. This plan could be described as a "pseudo-AJAC" case. It deals with one main topic -- the NATO mission in Afghanistan -- but it uses multiple mandates that could stand independently of each other. This means the Affirmative could possibly claim victory from the surviving advantages even if one or two of them don't make it all the way through the round.

AFGHAN PRISONERS

The Status Quo has two problems with the treatment of prisoners captured by NATO's ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Official NATO policy is that they should be turned over to the Afghan government. Canadian troops, for example, are doing that today, but it's a bad policy: The Afghan judicial system is corrupt and abusive. The prisoners are either abused or released after paying bribes. But the alternative, which US ISAF forces follow, is no better: indefinite detainment in US-run camps that violate the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention Against Torture. The solution is for Canada and the Netherlands, two countries with good records on human rights, to build a joint detention facility to which all NATO-captured prisoners in Afghanistan will be sent, until such time as the Afghan government builds a functioning and fair judicial system.

CAVEAT REMOVAL

In Blue Book, we featured a case for removal of caveats, those restrictions that nations place on their troops when they are sent on NATO missions, blocking them from performing certain functions. Caveats are frequently denounced by NATO leaders as being extremely harmful to NATO missions, with attention focused most recently on their detrimental effects on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The MSB updated Caveat Removal case uses evidence during and after NATO's November 2006 Riga Summit, where they were the topic of much discussion and where many thought that they would be solved. Unfortunately, Riga didn't do nearly enough about removing caveats, and NATO leaders are once again complaining that caveats are hurting the Afghan mission. This case removes them once and for all.

DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM

Defense planning is the process governments use to decide what military capabilities they should fund and build in the years ahead as they are planning their weapons systems and troop training policies and submitting their defense budget requests. "Threat-based" planning is a policy that says: "What countries are threatening us?" and then defines a policy to respond to those countries and their threats. "Capabilities-based" planning is a policy that says: "What are the kinds of attacks (capabilities to attack) that we could face and how do we counter them?" Threat-based planning focuses on defeating the Soviet Union, for example, while Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) focuses on defeating a biological attack (regardless of who performs it).

NATO is currently trying to transition to CBP but is not succeeding. Current planning guidance doesn't have a clear vision of what NATO's priorities are, and it's impossible to plan what military budgets should be if we don't know what the goal is. Also, many allies are not fully engaged in the process, instead letting the big countries define the planning process while they sit on the sidelines and wonder what's happening. The plan sets clear, prioritized goals for what NATO's defense priorities should be and then forms the kind of joint working group needed to get CBP off the ground and successfully implemented.

GLADIO ACCOUNTABILITY

During World War II, in some countries that were overtaken by the German invasion (France and Yugoslavia, for example), resistance groups secretly formed for the purpose of sabotaging the foreign oppressors, and they were often quite successful at disrupting German operations. NATO learned a lesson from that experience and set up "stay-behind teams" in many West European nations. These teams had hidden supplies of weapons, training, and equipment to carry out resistance operations in the event their countries were overrun by Soviet forces if another war broke out. They even covertly set up teams in countries that were not members of NATO (Switzerland, for example).

In many cases these teams did nothing but wait for the Soviet invasion that never came. But in a few cases, the teams were not content to sit and wait. They decided to intervene with covert tactics designed to influence the political direction of some NATO countries away from socialism/communism. Unfortunately, these tactics involved law-breaking, violence, terrorism and even overthrowing the government in some cases.

The most well known of these groups was the "Gladio" (Latin for "sword") team in Italy, which carried out bombings in the 1970s disguised to look like the work of Italian communists, in order to discredit and reduce the popularity of leftist political parties and influence Italian politics to move to the right. The Prime Minister of Italy admitted the existence of this nefarious activity in an address to the Italian Senate, and the European Parliament in 1990 passed a resolution demanding that NATO disclose and give some accountability for its "stay-behind" plans that went astray. Italy, Belgium and Switzerland have conducted investigations, but the US and Britain have blocked a full NATO inquiry into the matter. This plan provides that long-awaited accountability.

ENHANCED MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

NATO expansion by itself is not the problem addressed by this case, but rather too-rapid expansion into countries that are not ready to be productive contributors to the alliance. In some cases, new countries join without really having the support of their populations for being part of NATO, and this lack of popular support hurts their ability to effectively participate in NATO operations. In other cases, countries say they are going to reform and improve their military capabilities -- only to backslide on their plans once they achieve the irrevocable prize of NATO membership, since they now have no incentive to improve because membership cannot be taken away from them. This plan adds a requirement for a national referendum by any new candidate member nation (to ensure their population will support NATO membership), mandatory 2% GDP defense spending, and a 10-year probationary period in which their military capabilities will be evaluated yearly to validate that they are indeed improving their capabilities.

NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION

Things are not going well between NATO and Russia today. The Status Quo has the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), in which all 26 NATO members plus Russia meet as a group and manage some issues on a consensus basis. Russia is not a member of NATO and this plan is not about giving them membership. However, maintaining a good relationship with Russia is essential for stability in Europe, and the limited scope of the NRC will not successfully achieve that goal. NATO has a habit of ignoring and provoking Russia with its missions and policies. To prevent that in the future, this plan expands the power of the NRC by giving them the decision-making power over more aspects of what NATO does (except Article 5 self-defense) and by including Russia in other aspects of NATO such as the NRF. Offering these opportunities to Russia will reduce Russia's hostility towards NATO and truly include them as a partner rather than an adversary.

FROM THE GROUND UP: REFORMING NATO'S AFGHANISTAN MISSION

NATO has taken on one of the most important missions in the world today: Rebuilding Afghanistan. The stakes are high and the daily lives of millions in that country are affected, in addition to millions worldwide affected by terrorism and illegal drugs. We will show you today that multiple advantages could be achieved by reforming NATO's approach to the Afghan mission, as we affirm that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

**OBSERVATION 1: We offer the following DEFINITIONS**

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" <http://www.nato.int/home.htm#>)

Significant: "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org)*)*

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: "NATO has been expanding its presence in Afghanistan via the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). These are teams of international civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to extend the authority of the central government and to provide a safer and more secure envinment in which reconstruction can take place." (*NATO Public Policy Division, Jan 2005, NATO BRIEFING, "Helping secure Afghanistan's future," p. 1-2)*

OBSERVATION 2: Understanding the Status Quo

A. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is a critical contribution to international security

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 Oct 2006, NATO TOPICS, "NATO in Afghanistan," <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>

NATO is a key component of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. *“This is one of the most challenging tasks NATO has ever taken on, but it is a critical contribution to international security”* - NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Secretary General of NATO), quoted by NATO Public Policy Division, Jan 2005, NATO BRIEFING, "Helping secure Afghanistan's future," p. 1-2

Afghanistan is a top priority for NATO. Our own security is closely linked to the future of Afghanistan as a stable, secure country where citizens can rebuild their lives after decades of war.

B. NATO is expanding its role in Afghanistan

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (official web site), 29 Sept 2006, NATO UPDATE, "NATO agrees to ISAF expansion across Afghanistan" <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0928a.htm>

On 28 September, the North Atlantic Council gave final authorisation for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) to expand its area of operations to 14 additional provinces in the east of Afghanistan, boosting NATO’s presence and role in the country.

OBSERVATION 3. The Status Quo is missing several key opportunities for improvement in the Afghan mission

FAILURE 1. More focus on roads and infrastructure are needed for Afghan recovery

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-20 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf) (ellipses in original, brackets added)

Officials in allied governments repeatedly point to the need for more road building to extend the reach of Kabul and to provide the infrastructure to diversify and strengthen the economy of a country lacking the capacity to develop enduring market practices. General [Karl] Eikenberry [commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan] , when asked by a congressional committee what he needed to build a stable society, responded, “Would I prefer to have another infantry battalion on the ground of 600 U.S. soldiers or would I prefer to have $50 million for roads, I’d say... $50 million for roads.” His view has been echoed by calls from the NATO Secretary General for allies and international institutions to provide more funds for reconstruction.

FAILURE 2. National restrictions reduce PRT effectiveness and increase risk of insurgent activity

US Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (USJFCOM) and the US State Department, June 2006, PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN - AN INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT, p. 13 (brackets added)

The Italian PRT in Herat and the German PRT at Konduz have significantly more soldiers and civilians than U.S. PRTs. However, ISAF PRTs often operate under “national restraints” that restrict the range of security-related measures that can be undertaken or restrict specific reconstruction activities. For example, national restraints initially limited the ability of some ISAF PRTs to conduct extended presence patrols, support GOA [government of Afghanistan] actions, or rapidly respond to local security incidents. The inability to reinforce GOA operations and actions could lead to increased insurgent or tribal challenges to an expanding but nascent national government authority.

FAILURE 3. Troop rotation policies hurt community relations and mission effectiveness

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-19 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The United States has made an evident effort through its PRTs to engage local Afghan leaders and the general population to convince them of the worth of ISAF’s mission. While some progress has clearly been made, several U.S. officials have noted that Afghanistan is a society where personal contact and developed relationships are critical in building trust and in persuading Afghans to pursue better governance. The six-month rotations of U.S. forces have impeded this effort, for example, as have the four-month rotations of Dutch forces.

FAILURE 4. Shortage of troops increases risk of Afghanistan collapse

Human Rights Watch, July 2006, "Lessons in Terror Attacks on Education in Afghanistan - V. The Inadequate Response of the Afghan Government and its International Supporters to Attacks on Education" [www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm)

How is it, then, that Afghanistan is near collapse once again? To put it briefly, what has gone wrong has been the invasion of Iraq: Washington's refusal to take state-building in Afghanistan seriously and instead waging a fruitless war in Iraq. For Afghanistan the results have been too few Western troops, too little money, and a lack of coherent strategy and sustained policy initiatives on the part of Western and Afghan leaders.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following PLAN to be implemented by any necessary legal means:

**Plank 1: Agency.** The North Atlantic Council and all NATO member governments.

**Plank 2: Mandates.**

1. NATO will allocate $100 million per year in additional funding dedicated to road and irrigation projects through Afghanistan PRTs.
2. All national caveats on PRTs in Afghanistan will be removed.
3. All NATO allies will use 2-year troop rotations for PRT missions in Afghanistan
4. NATO will add 2500 new troops to the Afghan mission dedicated to a reserve batallion for reconstruction and development. The troops will be obtained by reducing the size of the NATO Response Force.

Plank 3: Funding. Donations from the US federal government derived from cuts in the National Institute on Aging and the Center of Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law

Plank 4: Enforcement. NATO member governments and military commanders. Any government official not in compliance with the mandates shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: Timeline. This plan takes effect 10 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: Legislative Intent. The Affirmative reserves the right to clarify the plan in later speeches.

OBSERVATION 5. This plan produces several ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1: Roads and infrastructure focus helps Afghan government stability and counter-narcotics efforts

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963> (brackets added)

[British] Gen [David] Richards [NATO commander in Afghanistan] in particular underlined the importance of setting developmental priorities and creating a seamless web between security and development efforts. Security and development efforts are currently not sufficiently synchronized but they must become so to ensure lasting success. He strongly suggested to provide more focus to the ongoing reconstruction: priority should be given to projects in the sectors of irrigation, roads and energy supply. Significant improvements in those areas would allow farmers to grow viable crops other than opium poppies and transport them to market. By focusing on irrigation and roads, the international community could make a stronger contribution to basic infrastructure that would improve the reach of the central government and make it possible to have a sustained counter-narcotics programme.

ADVANTAGE 2: Removal of remaining national caveats will increase mission effectiveness

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963> (brackets added)

The military commanders emphasised the importance of Stage 3 in which NATO takes control of operations in the south of Afghanistan. With this step, NATO is taking on the most demanding operation in its history. Military commanders underlined that this is a combat operation and the larger number of troops in that troubled region would only be useful if they could be used robustly. Gen. [David] Richards [NATO commander in Afghanistan] in particular was adamant about the need for flexible forces that can be used for a range of missions. The General and others informed the delegation that national caveats have further been eliminated, but that further improvements in this area are required.

ADVANTAGE 3: Two-year troop rotations gain better confidence of the local population

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-19 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

Some allied governments, however, are now sending troops into Afghanistan for two-year rotations, which provide a better opportunity to gain the confidence of the population.

ADVANTAGE 4: Adding more troops now will take advantage of recent wins over the Taliban

Associated Press, 8 Oct 2006, CBS NEWS online, "NATO: Afghanistan At A Tipping Point," <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/08/terror/main2072505.shtml>

The British general [David Richards] said he'd like to have about 2,500 additional troops to form a reserve battalion to help speed up reconstruction and development efforts. The south of the country, where NATO troops have fought their most intense battles this year, has been "broadly stabilized," Richards said. "We have created an opportunity" following intense fighting that left over 500 militants dead in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, he said. "If we do not take advantage of this, then you can pour an additional 10,000 troops next year and we would not succeed because we would have lost by then the consent of the people."

2A EVIDENCE: AFGHANISTAN MISSION REFORM

HARMS

Caveat restrictions stop NATO forces from fighting Taliban forces in Afghanistan

Robert McMahon (masters degree in International Relations, has covered foreign affairs since 1990 for the Associated Press, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), 4 Oct 2006, NATO Official Says Counternarcotics Strategy Needed to Stabilize Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/11600/nato\_official\_says\_counternarcotics\_strategy\_needed\_to\_stabilize\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11600/nato_official_says_counternarcotics_strategy_needed_to_stabilize_afghanistan.html) (brackets added)

But [NATO Supreme Commander General James] Jones did add that he remained concerned about the number of restrictions NATO members place on their forces, limiting their engagement in Afghanistan. One country, he said, had restricted its troops from directly fighting Taliban forces, for example.

Caveats block rescue of NGOs in emergency situations in Afghanistan

Barbara J. Stapleton (Advocacy & Policy Coordinator, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, spent time in Afghanistan working on reconstruction efforts), 20 June 2005, Copenhagen Seminar on Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations, "Presentation on Afghanistan," p. 4 [NGO=non-governmental organizations, such as charities and non-profit aid groups; "in extremis" = in extreme situations]

In this regard, NGOs have already witnessed two examples of a failure to respond from the German -led PRT in the North. Given the multi-national makeup of PRTs, who has ultimate authority in crisis situations? We do not know, but the answer has important implications for NGOs as different nations take different PRT approaches to in extremis situations. And we anticipate that the utilization and scope of national caveats will only intensify with Phase 3 of NATO's expansion to the South.

PRTs need clear authority to respond to emergency situations (i.e., remove caveats so they can)

Barbara J. Stapleton (Advocacy & Policy Coordinator, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, spent time in Afghanistan working on reconstruction efforts), 20 June 2005, Copenhagen Seminar on Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations, "Presentation on Afghanistan," p. 4 ["in extremis" = emergency situations; NGO=non-governmental organizations, such as charities and non-profit aid groups]

The PRT mandate should also detail the operation of lines of command especially for in extremis situations. As NATO gradually takes over authority from the coalition, and given mounting political pressures associated with the holding of Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, there will be more emergency situations involving NGO staff. In this regard, NGOs have already witnesses two examples of a failure to respond from the German-led PRT in the North.

Lack of troops are causing collapse of Afghanistan again

Human Rights Watch, July 2006, "Lessons in Terror Attacks on Education in Afghanistan - V. The Inadequate Response of the Afghan Government and its International Supporters to Attacks on Education" [www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm)

How is it, then, that Afghanistan is near collapse once again? To put it briefly, what has gone wrong has been the invasion of Iraq: Washington's refusal to take state-building in Afghanistan seriously and instead waging a fruitless war in Iraq. For Afghanistan the results have been too few Western troops, too little money, and a lack of coherent strategy and sustained policy initiatives on the part of Western and Afghan leaders. The Bonn conference created the scaffolding to build the new Afghan structure, but what was consistently missing were the bricks and running water. Inside the scaffolding there is still only the barest shell.

NATO mission is in trouble in Afghanistan today

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-2 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

Afghanistan presents a growing challenge to NATO. Recently, Taliban attacks appear to be increasing in scope and number, and Taliban fighters are adopting some of the tactics, such as roadside bombs, used by insurgents in Iraq. The Karzai government in Afghanistan is coming under international criticism, and its public support has diminished, due to corruption and an inability to improve living conditions. Some warlords continue to exert influence, and the narcotics industry remains an entrenched threat to the country’s political health. The allies are not in full agreement how to counter these problems, but allied officials say that they need a strong and reliable Afghan government to provide reasonable services and competence to the population if NATO is to succeed.

Afghan mission is in trouble but reform can save it

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 14 Nov 2006, Québec, Canada - NATO’S AFGHANISTAN MISSION IS IN TROUBLE [PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ], [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?CAT2=0&CAT1=0&CAT0=578&SHORTCUT=1052](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?CAT2=0&CAT1=0&CAT0=578&SHORTCUT=1052)

Mr Bert Koenders, a member of the Dutch parliament, told a meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) the mission was in trouble but could still be saved. "The overall security situation has deteriorated significantly. Insurgents' attacks in the southern and eastern regions that border Pakistan led this summer to be the bloodiest since the fall of the Taliban," he told a meeting of the NATO-PA's Political Committee. "Moreover terrorist activities including suicide bombings which were previously unseen in Afghanistan have increased significantly," he added. He noted that 3,700 people had been killed since January 2006 and that although many of these were insurgents the "frequency of terrorist attacks had increased four fold". Mr Koenders, one of the NATO-PA's four Vice-Presidents, called for all NATO countries to meet in full all promised force contributions and to make greater efforts to win "hearts and minds" with priority projects in the areas of irrigation, roads and energy supplies.

INHERENCY

Many NATO countries still have caveats on troops in Afghanistan

Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), 5 Oct 2006, "How to keep NATO relevant," International Herald Tribune <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11615/how_to_keep_nato_relevant.html>

In Afghanistan, many national contingents operate under caveats that restrict the types of missions in which they participate, enabling them to opt out of the most dangerous operations in the country’s south.

Only 15% of caveats have been removed in Afghanistan

Canadian Press, 28 Nov 2006, EDMONTON SUN (Canadian newspaper), "Reluctant allies offer minor concessions," <http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/World/2006/11/28/2531437.html>

U.S. Gen. James Jones — the supreme allied commander — said progress had been made over the last few days in removing roughly 15 per cent of the overall combat restrictions, which fill a secret telephone-book-sized binder at NATO headquarters.

Troop strength is still not high enough in Afghanistan

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added)

Afghanistan is the alliance's first deployment outside Europe. [US Afghan force commander Lt. Gen. Karl] Eikenberry is worried about the caveats and about NATO's troops strength, which is at 90% of the level NATO says is required. "The objective has got to be to get to the 100% level," he said.

NATO divided over sending more troops to Afghanistan

William J. Kole, Associated Press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO Seeks More Troops in Afghanistan," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801247.html>

NATO was divided at its summit Tuesday on deploying more troops to Afghanistan's volatile south, with Germany resisting any permanently expanded presence and Canada complaining of bearing the brunt of an increasingly bloody mission.

Allies not contributing enough forces to Afghan mission

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-17 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

NATO leaders have at times had difficulty in persuading allies to contribute forces to ISAF. Of equal and perhaps greater difficulty today is the effort to persuade governments to contribute the money necessary to rebuild Afghanistan. Key allied governments say that they are committed to staying for a period of years to stabilize the country. Some EU officials believe that five years or more will be necessary to build a market economy and proficient governance.

Security burden shifting to NATO in Afghanistan

Congressional Research Service, 23 Aug 2006, "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," <http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL30588>

Approximately 23,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban-led insurgency, but the United States is shifting much of the security burden to NATO during 2006. That transition accelerated on July 31, 2006 with the security leadership takeover in southern Afghanistan by forces from Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands.

Riga Summit troop commitments were not enough

BBC News, 29 Nov 2006, "Nato hails shift on Afghan combat," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6195102.stm>

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair told the BBC the summit had made significant progress towards generating enough force to defeat the Taleban, but they still "need to make those last remaining steps". But a foreign office minister was more critical of the effort. "This view seems to say it's all right for British soldiers to die in defence of the West but it's not all right for other soldiers," Kim Howells said.

More troops needed - lifting caveats by itself would not be not enough

Canadian Press, 28 Nov 2006, EDMONTON SUN (Canadian newspaper), "Reluctant allies offer minor concessions," <http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/World/2006/11/28/2531437.html> (brackets added)

But he [Canada Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay] also made it clear that the removal of so-called national caveats — restrictions that prevent some countries from taking part in fighting Taliban insurgents — was not enough and more troops were needed. “Clearly we want more robust capacity in the south to face the Taliban,” MacKay told reporters.

SOLVENCY

2500 more troops would reduce risk and speed up victory over the Taliban

Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson (Washington Post Foreign Service), 18 Sept 2006, WASHINGTON POST, "NATO Faces Growing Hurdle As Call for Troops Falls Short," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/17/AR2006091700570.html>

Although NATO troops in recent days have ousted Taliban fighters from positions near a vital transportation route west of Kandahar, officials said the battle could have been fought more quickly and with less risk to NATO forces with more troops and equipment -- particularly airlift capacity. NATO commanders are seeking about 2,500 additional troops, a squadron of about 18 attack helicopters and three C-130 transport planes.

Roads and irrigation are needed to solve the opium problem

NATO Parliamentary Assembly (an official NATO organization), May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963>

The counter-narcotics effort stands out as one area where all efforts so far have not generated positive change. To some extent the problem may be intractable until it is possible to create viable alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers. Until irrigation systems are repaired and roads are constructed to allow farmers to get crops to the market, opium will remain one of the few viable crops in many regions.

Roads are needed in Afghanistan

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added)

Close to wrapping up an 18-month tour as U.S. commander in Afghanistan, [US Afghan force commander Lt. Gen. Karl] Eikenberry also said Afghanistan's broken-down infrastructure -- particularly its roads -- needed more repair than the United States and its allies realized after ousting the Taliban regime in late 2001.

AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: CASE FOR AFGHAN PRISONER REFORMS

The Status Quo has two problems with prisoners captured in NATO operations in Afghanistan: First, when they follow their stated policy of how to handle prisoners; and second, when they don't follow it. To bring NATO into compliance with global expectations for humane treatment of captives, not only in Afghanistan but for all future missions, my partner and I are happy to affirm that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

**OBSERVATION 1: We offer the following DEFINITIONS**

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Significant: "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org)*)*

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform)

ISAF: "NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed its takeover of international military operations in Afghanistan with the October 5 transfer of authority over 14 remaining eastern provinces from U.S.-led coalition forces." (*David McKeeby, Staff Writer, US State Department, International Information Programs, 5 Oct 2006, "NATO Commanding International Security Operations in Afghanistan,"* [*http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=October&x=20061005175423idybeekcm0.4493524*](http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=October&x=20061005175423idybeekcm0.4493524) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY:

A. NATO's policy is to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities within 96 hours

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, DG Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for Internaional Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p. 21 (parentheses in original)

In Afghanistan, ISAF may, in principle, not hold detainees longer than 96 hours and aims to transfer detainees to the Afghan authorities within this time (see below on the transfer) and ISAF will respect applicable international law during its detention.

B. The US is not in compliance with this policy

Ron Synovitz (journalist), 3 Oct 2006, RADIO LIBERTY/RADIO FREE EUROPE, "U.S./Afghanistan: Detainees Still In Legal Limbo Despite New Law," [www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm)

Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman Zmary Bashari told RFE/RL that despite promises by U.S. officials in the past year that Afghan detainees at Bagram would be turned over to authorities in Kabul, the ministry is not aware of any progress on that issue. "Now we don't have enough information about that to offer it to you," Bashari says. "But next time, we will inform ourselves and let you know what is going on." But Rahul Bedi, a journalist who covers Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India for "Jane's Defense Weekly," says he thinks U.S. military officials are reluctant to turn over suspected terrorists to be dealt with by Afghanistan's fledgling legal system.

Now please pay careful attention to our

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS -- where we will show you that the Status Quo is stuck in a dilemma. This is because both policies -- turning prisoners over to Afghan authorities, and NOT turning them over to Afghan authorities, are bad policies.

HARM 1: Torture: 1/3 of prisoners turned over to Afghan authorities are abused

Sue Bailey (Canadian Press reporter in Ottawa) and Bob Weber (CP reporter embedded with troops in Afghanistan), Canadian Press, "Canada's top general defends handling of Afghan prisoners as torture reported," 3 June 2006, <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=4b76326e-58bf-40a7-b8d2-46315eeaf25a&k=41477> (brackets added)

It [Kandahar office of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission] estimates that about one in three prisoners handed over by Canadians are beaten or even tortured in local jails. Spokesman Abdul Noorzai says his organization has photos of victims who were repeatedly hit in custody, sometimes for hours. He estimates there are about 200 Taliban suspects in Afghan jails.

HARM 2: Justice denied: The Afghan legal system is incompetent

Ron Synovitz, 3 Oct 2006, RADIO LIBERTY/RADIO FREE EUROPE, "U.S./Afghanistan: Detainees Still In Legal Limbo Despite New Law," [www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm) (first brackets added, second brackets in original, third brackets added)

"The problem in Afghanistan is that once they are turned over to the Afghan authorities, there is a problem of trial and the legal system in Afghanistan -- which by all accounts, is very, very basic and embryonic, virtually to the point of nonexistence," [Jane's Defense Weekly journalist Rahul] Bedi says. "So I think we can safely assume that of the several hundred arrested, nobody is likely to be charged [by the Afghan courts] or imprisoned or even executed, should the death penalty [be] exercised. So really, it's an exercise in futility."

But now let's look at what happens when prisoners remain in US custody and are not turned over to the Afghan government, as we see in:

HARM 3: Hundreds of US prisoners in Afghanistan are denied rights guaranteed by the UN Convention Against Torture

Amnesty International EU Office (international human rights advocacy organization), 6 June 2006, "Amnesty International recommendations to the EU," EU-US Summit, p. 4

Amnesty International is seriously concerned that the US authorities are routinely breaching their obligations under the Convention against Torture. In addition to those detainees at Guantánamo, the USA continues to hold thousands of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and undisclosed locations in conditions which facilitate torture or ill-treatment. These include denial of access to courts, prolonged incommunicado detention, and detention in secret locations amounting to enforced ‘disappearances’. Such conditions can in themselves amount to torture or ill-treatment. The EU should also take the opportunity of the upcoming summit to call for an end to such detentions. Hundreds of detainees continue to be held in US custody in Afghanistan, with no recourse to due legal process or human rights protections. Some have been detained without charge or trial at Bagram US airbase for two or three years, yet have no access to lawyers, relatives or the courts.

OBSERVATION 4: To fix these problems and to create a better system that upholds human rights, we offer the following PLAN, to be implemented by any necessary legal means

**Plank 1: Agency:** The North Atlantic Council and any necessary NATO member governments

Plank 2: **Mandates:**

1. Canada and the Netherlands will jointly create a detention facility, to be known as the Canadian-Dutch Detention Camp (CDDC), in Afghanistan. All prisoners captured in NATO-controlled areas in Afghanistan will be turned over to the new facility, including those currently in US custody.
2. CDDC will comply with all aspects of the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention against Torture for all prisoners.
3. CDDC will be open to inspection at all times by any agency of the UN, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Afghan Reconciliation Commission, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Committee of the Red Cross or Red Crescent.
4. All prisoners shall have the right to legal representation and be provided with details of the charges against them. CDDC will cooperate with international investigations into prisoners' status.
5. No prisoners shall be turned over to Afghan authorities until a complete NATO investigation of the Afghan judicial system certifies that Afghanistan is capable of holding fair trials and upholds human rights in its jails.
6. These mandates shall be codified into a permanent policy that shall govern all future NATO missions with regard to captured prisoners.

Plank 3: **Funding** shall come from donations from the US Federal Government obtained by cutting the National Institute on Aging and the Dept. of Education.

Plank 4: **Enforcement** shall be through the agencies mentioned in Mandate 3 and through NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance shall be removed from office. Anyone violating the Geneva Convention or the UN Convension Against Torture shall be tried by an international war crimes tribunal.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: The Affirmative reserves the right to clarify the plan in future speeches as needed.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1: Respect for international law by refusing to hand over prisoners to abusers

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm> (parentheses in original)

International law is clear: torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (hereinafter “ill-treatment”) are prohibited absolutely, in all situations and at all times, as is the transfer of any person under any circumstances to a place where he or she would be at risk of such abuse.

ADVANTAGE 2: A Canadian-Netherlands facility would better protect detainees

Prof. Michael Byers (expert in international law, full professor at the University of British Columbia, Canada, has written about international law governing military force in a number of peer-reviewed international journals) , 7 Apr 2006, GLOBAL ISSUES, "Legal Opinion on the December 18, 2005 —Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Force," p.5

The Canada-Afghanistan Arrangement, by failing to safeguard Canada‘s obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1984 UN Torture Convention and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, is an inadequate basis for the transfer of detainees to the custody of Afghanistan. In these circumstances, Canada should, at a minimum, renegotiate the Arrangement to include all the protections found in The Netherlands-Afghanistan Memorandum. A better approach would be for Canada to build its own detention facility in Afghanistan, perhaps in conjunction with The Netherlands or some other country which wishes to maintain its soldiers in Afghanistan while adhering to the requirements of international law.

ADVANTAGE 3: Investigation and monitoring of detention facilities prevents future abuses

Baltimore Sun, 23 May 2005, "U.N. seeks access to U.S. base holding Afghan prisoners," [www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.afghan23may23,0,5675531.story?coll=bal-iraq-utility](http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.afghan23may23,0,5675531.story?coll=bal-iraq-utility)

The United Nations has called for Afghan human rights investigators to be allowed into Bagram, the main U.S. base in Afghanistan, after reports that poorly trained U.S. soldiers there had repeatedly abused prisoners. Richard Provencher, U.N. spokesman in Afghanistan, said yesterday that abusers should be punished and that investigators from the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission should have access to detainees and be allowed to monitor their cases.

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, Directorate General Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for International Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p.22 (brackets added)

It is submitted that visits by the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and competent human rights bodies, such as this one [the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment], can be an important safeguard against arbitrary detention and abuse. Secret detention must be avoided and can only create an impression that there is something to hide.

2A EVIDENCE: AFGHAN PRISONERS

HARMS

Prisoners held by the US in Afghanistan are denied basic rights

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

The estimated 500 detainees still held by U.S. forces at Bagram are thought to include Arabs, Pakistanis, and some Central Asians. But most are Afghans. Their heads are shaved and they wear the same orange jumpsuits as detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. But at Bagram, they lack even the limited legal rights granted to Guantanamo inmates -- such as the right to appear at military hearings to assess whether they pose a security threat.

Many prisoners in secret US detention are denied rights and wrongly accused

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

Hundreds of Afghans have passed through secretive U.S. detention centers set up in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime. All became entangled in a system where they had no legal protections or rights. Rahul Bedi, a correspondent for "Jane's Defence Weekly" who covers Afghanistan, tells RFE/RL that many Afghan detainees have been wrongly labeled Taliban or terrorists by local rivals who use the U.S. military to settle old disputes.

Prisoners held in Afghanistan without knowing the charges against them

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

Amanullah says the accusations led to his arrest at his home in Wardak Province during a nighttime raid by U.S. forces in early 2004. He says he spent nearly a year in solitary confinement at Bagram before being transferred to a cage shared by 16 other Afghans who were forbidden to look at each other or talk. From Logar Province, where he now resides, Amanullah told RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that he still doesn't know the specific accusations against him -- or who provided that information to the U.S. military.

Afghan legal system is corrupt and needs to be fixed

Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, 5 Oct 2006, "Expanded NATO Role in Afghanistan to Boost Counterterrorism Fight" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-afps04.htm> (brackets added)

And, corruption in Afghanistan’s judicial system continues to poison efforts to administer justice in the courts, [NATO Supreme Commander Gen. James] Jones said. Afghan prosecutors who earn only about $65 a month are susceptible to corruption, he pointed out, noting that UN interpreters make almost 10 times that amount. “There’s something backwards there, and somebody needs to fix that,” the general said.

Afghan police take bribes to release prisoners

Scott Baldauf, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, 14 Feb 2006, "Mounting concern over Afghanistan," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0214/p01s02-wosc.html>

"The villagers know when someone has come from Pakistan, they know whose house they're sitting in," says Mr. Qaderi, the counternarcotics minister. "But they don't trust the police. They don't trust the government. They will hand them over, and then a few days later, someone will pay money and the police will release them."

Obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva Convention when transferring prisoners to another State

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, Directorate General Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for Internaional Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p.18

Transfer of such detainees to another State would be subject to the human rights restraints set out above for POWs. While there appears to be no explicit requirement that requires the transferring State to check compliance with GC IV for these persons, this obligation arguably results from the said obligations in conjunction with the obligation under article 1 GC IV to respect and ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances.

Captured civilians are abused and denied legal rights – US is out of compliance with Geneva Convention

Human Rights Watch, 31 Dec 2005, HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW, "Essential Background: Overview of human rights issues in Afghanistan," <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/afghan12266.htm>

U.S. and coalition forces active in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom since November 2001, continue to arbitrarily detain civilians and use excessive force during arrests of non-combatants. Ordinary civilians arrested in military operations are unable to challenge the legal basis for their detention or obtain hearings before an adjudicative body. They have no access to legal counsel. Generally, the United States does not comply with legal standards applicable to its operations in Afghanistan, including the Geneva Conventions and other applicable standards of international human rights law. At least six detainees in U.S. custody in Afghanistan have been killed since 2002. U.S. Department of Defense documents show that five of the six deaths were homicides.

Canada violates Geneva Convention by transferring prisoners to abusive Afghan government

Michael Byers (expert in international law, full professor at the University of British Columbia, Canada, has written about international law governing military force in a number of peer-reviewed international journals) , 7 Apr 2006, GLOBAL ISSUES, "Legal Opinion on the December 18, 2005 —Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Force," p. 3

Canada, by transferring detainees to Afghanistan in circumstances where they might well end up being transferred onwards to face torture or other mistreatment at the hands of a third country, risks violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Arrangement, by failing to guard against this possibility, is seriously inadequate.

Canadian soldiers might face war crimes charges under Status Quo prisoner transfer policies

Michael Byers (expert in international law, full professor at the University of British Columbia, Canada, has written about international law governing military force in a number of peer-reviewed international journals) , 7 Apr 2006, GLOBAL ISSUES, "Legal Opinion on the December 18, 2005 —Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Force," p.5

The Arrangement, by allowing the onward transfer of detainees into the custody of a third country where they might be tortured or otherwise abused, fails to prevent the possibility that Canadian soldiers might transfer detainees to Afghanistan knowing or suspecting that this would in fact happen. It thus fails to protect against possible violations of the Rome Statute, and thus the possibility that Canadian soldiers–including commanders who order transfers–might one day face charges of war crimes in The Hague.

Innocent Afghan prisoners cannot clear their names

Associated Press, 17 Sept 2006, "14,000 Held In Overseas U.S. Prisons" [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/17/terror/main2015715.shtml](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/17/terror/main2015715.shtml) (parentheses in original)

"If you, God forbid, are an innocent Afghan who gets sold down the river by some warlord rival, you can end up at (Bagram prison, Afghanistan) and you have absolutely no way of clearing your name," said John Sifton of Human Rights Watch in New York.

US and many NATO countries have ratified UN Convention Against Torture

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm>

One-hundred and thirty nine states have ratified the Convention against Torture, including all of the states referenced in this report as sending states: Austria, Canada, Georgia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The Convention against Torture has also been ratified by all the countries referenced herein to which people have been transferred or have been threatened with transfer, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Morocco, Russia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

UN Convention Against Torture gives legal definition of torture

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm> (brackets in original)

The generally accepted definition of torture appears at article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture): [T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain is inflicted by or at the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Violates UN Convention Against Torture to send a prisoner to a country where he will be tortured

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm> (brackets added)

Under the [UN] convention [Against Torture], it is expressly prohibited to transfer a person to a country where he or she would be at risk of torture. The ban thus maintains logical consistency: states cannot torture and cannot circumvent this obligation by sending people to governments that will.

Torture and transferring prisoners to someone else who will torture them are both absolutely wrong, no exceptions

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm>

Far less public discussion has been dedicated to the concomitant and equally absolute prohibition against returning or transferring a person to a place where he or she would be at risk of torture and ill-treatment. The prohibition against torture and ill-treatment, including the ban on such transfers, is absolute and permits no exceptions. The ban applies to every person, in times of armed conflict, disturbances, emergencies, or peace, no matter what past or current military or personal status obtains or what crimes or activities a person is suspected of having committed. States cannot derogate from or “opt out” of this obligation.

Prisoners held by US in Afghanistan can be held indefinitely without being charged with a crime

Ron Synovitz, 3 Oct 2006, RADIO LIBERTY/RADIO FREE EUROPE, "U.S./Afghanistan: Detainees Still In Legal Limbo Despite New Law," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm>

Zarifi also notes that detainees at Bagram and other U.S. military installations will lose their right to file a petition of habeas corpus. That means they can be detained for as long as U.S. officials deem necessary without being formally charged with a crime -- and they are unable to legally challenge their detention.

US treatment of Afghan prisoners is degrading and outrageous

Prof. Joan Fitzpatrick (Law Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law), March 2003, “THE TORTURER IS THE ENEMY OF ALL MANKIND” <http://globaltexts.blogspot.com/2003_03_02_globaltexts_archive.html>

The "interrogation" techniques described in "U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody" (March 4, 2003, A14) violate basic norms of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions require humane treatment of all prisoners, whether POWs or "unlawful combatants," and regardless of the nature of the conflict. All acts of violence or intimidation, outrages upon personal dignity, and humiliating and degrading treatment are strictly forbidden. Does the Department of Defense argue that chaining naked prisoners to the ceiling, in freezing weather, and kicking them to keep them awake for days on end, are practices consistent with the Geneva Conventions?

Dutch government criticizes US handling of prisoners

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-12 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The Dutch government was the most publicly critical of U.S. handling of prisoners taken in the conflict against terrorism. Dutch government spokesmen and opposition leaders criticized U.S. handling of prisoners who had been sent to Guantanamo and called for treatment of detainees to meet the strictures of “international law.”

Dutch reluctant to cooperate with US in Afghanistan because of prisoner abuse

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-12 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The Abu Ghraib prison scandal and U.S. treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo are important issues in the Dutch debate over Afghanistan. Dutch officials say that “the rules of the road in fighting terrorism” are not clearly agreed upon in the alliance. For this reason, Dutch officials are reluctant to have their forces closely associated with U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

NATO allies criticize US abuse of Afghan prisoners

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-8 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

There was a contentious debate among the allies over the December 2005 final communiqué guiding NATO operations in Afghanistan. Most of the allies were critical of U.S. abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; they extended this criticism to the U.S. detention policy at Guantanamo Bay, where some prisoners captured in Afghanistan have been sent since 2001. These allies contended that the Bush Administration was ignoring the Geneva Convention governing treatment of prisoners taken in combat, and that the issue was a significant one among their publics and in their domestic political debates.

INHERENCY

NATO policy is to hand over prisoners to Afghan authorities

CARLOTTA GALL, 4 May 2006, NEW YORK TIMES, "Britain Takes Lead of NATO Force in Afghanistan," <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/world/europe/04cnd-afghanistan.html?ex=1304395200&en=58276851cbec09ef&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>

NATO does plan to do some things differently, General Richards said. At a news briefing after the ceremony, he said NATO would not hold detainees, nor would it hand them over to American detention facilities, but would pass them to the Afghan law enforcement agencies under a carefully monitored system.

Other allies hand prisoners over to Afghan government

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-9 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The allies also agreed that prisoners taken by ISAF should be turned over to the Afghan government. Some allied governments reportedly told the Afghan government that they did not wish such prisoners to then be transferred to the United States government. The Afghan government reportedly insisted upon its sovereign right to determine the disposition of prisoners in its custody. General Richards, the ISAF commander since May 2006, said that he would not follow U.S. practices in treatment of prisoners.

Nothing is being done about abuses at Bagram + US plans to hand over prisoners to Afghan government in summer 2007

Matthew Pennington, Associated Press, 2 Oct 2006, "Bagram prisoners suffer in silence" <http://www.newsobserver.com/672/story/493473.html>

"There's been a silence about Bagram, and much less political discussion about it," said Richard Bennett, the chief U.N. human rights officer in Afghanistan. Originally intended as a short-term holding pen for al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects later shipped to Guantanamo, Bagram has expanded and acquired its own notoriety over abuse allegations though attracting much less international attention than the U.S. detention facility in Cuba. The U.S. plans to turn over the Afghan nationals in its custody to the Afghan government by next summer. But non-Afghans currently held at Bagram will stay in U.S. custody, officials say.

Getting assurances from the torturing nation is not enough to justify sending prisoners to them

Human Rights Watch, March 2005, "The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment," <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/3.htm> (brackets added)

The current [UN] special rapporteur on torture, Manfred Nowak, echoed van Boven’s conclusion against the use of assurances for returns to countries where torture is systematic in one of his first public statements on the issue:

"In the situation that there’s a country where there’s a systematic practice of torture, no such assurances would be possible, because that is absolutely prohibited by international law, so in any case the government would deny that torture is actually systematic in that country, and could easily actually give these diplomatic assurances, but the practice then shows that they are not complied with. And there’s then no way or very, very little possibility of the sending country to actually—as soon as the person is in the other country—to make sure that this type of diplomatic assurances are complied with." Nowak’s statement not only categorically rejects the use of assurances to countries where torture is systematic, it highlights some of the most obvious flaws inherent in enforcing such guarantees in any case where they might be used, including perfunctory denials by the receiving state and the inability of the sending state to monitor effectively for torture after a person is transferred to an abusive state.

Bush Administration claims “enemy/unlawful combatants” have no Geneva Convention rights

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, DG Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for Internaional Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p. 16

The current US Administration has claimed that there exists a category of detainees which are neither POWs nor civilians under the LOAC and therefore enjoy (almost) no protection under the LOAC and has labeled these detainees as ‘enemy combatants’ (initially, other terms appear to have been used too, including ‘unlawful combatants’). For instance, a 2005 draft of a Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations inter alia stated that “Following the events of September 11, 2001, a new category of detainee, enemy combatant (EC), was created for personnel who are not granted or entitled to the privileges of the Geneva Convention” and defines EC as “Any person that US or allied forces could properly detain under the laws and customs of war. For purposes of the war on terror an enemy combatant includes, but is not necessarily limited to, a member or agent of Al Qaeda, Taliban, or another international terrorist organization against which United States is engaged in an armed conflict.

Geneva Conventions guarantee basic rights even for unlawful combatants

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, DG Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for Internaional Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p.. 18 (brackets added)

However, even if and to the extent that such a category ["enemy combatants" or "unlawful combatants"] exists, the persons belonging thereto do have some rights under the LOAC in the context of an international armed conflict, including part II of GC IV and the rules laid down in article 75 AP I (the latter also as customary international law for non-Parties). These rights include the right to be informed of the reason for detention, the right to a fair trial and protection from torture and humiliating and degrading treatment. Likewise, in the case of armed conflicts not of an international character, minimum guarantees are provided for by article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, articles 4 and 5 AP II and article 8(2) (c)-(f) ICC Statute. Moreover, they also have rights under international human rights law, including protection from arbitrary detention and from torture and humiliating and degrading treatment.

It’s not just Bagram: Other detention facilities need to be opened to inspection

Ron Synovitz, 3 Oct 2006, RADIO LIBERTY/RADIO FREE EUROPE, "U.S./Afghanistan: Detainees Still In Legal Limbo Despite New Law," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/10/sec-061003-rferl01.htm>

"Human Rights Watch's chief concern right now is about what is going on, not in Bagram, but in other facilities that the U.S. runs -- what are called 'forward operating bases.' These are military facilities that the U.S. has been running -- some of them for the last five years. But the Red Cross doesn't have any access to them. Afghan authorities don't have any access to them. It's in those places where we fear Afghans are still subject to abuse and mistreatment."

New US prisoner legislation does not help Bagram prisoners

Matthew Pennington, Associated Press, 2 Oct 2006, "Bagram prisoners suffer in silence" <http://www.newsobserver.com/672/story/493473.html>

New legislation would extend anti-torture protections to all prisoners in U.S. custody. But only those hand-picked by the president or the military would get rights to legal representation and a hearing. So far, that has been accorded to only a handful of men at Guantanamo and none held at Bagram or in Iraq, where more than 13,000 are in U.S. custody without charge.

New US prisoner law eliminates rights and authorizes harsh interrogations

Associated Press, 17 Oct 2006, CNN online, " Bush signs bill to interrogate, prosecute terror suspects," <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/17/bush.terrorism.ap/index.html>

Some of the most notorious names in the war on terror are headed toward prosecution after President Bush signed a law Tuesday authorizing military trials of terrorism suspects. The legislation also eliminates some of the rights defendants are usually guaranteed under U.S. law, and it authorizes continued harsh interrogations of terror suspects, a provision Bush had said was vital.

New US law authorizes prisoner interrogations that violate international law

Associated Press, 17 Oct 2006, CNN online, " Bush signs bill to interrogate, prosecute terror suspects," <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/17/bush.terrorism.ap/index.html>

The legislation says the president can "interpret the meaning and application" of international standards for prisoner treatment, a provision intended to allow him to authorize aggressive interrogation methods that might otherwise be seen as illegal by international courts.

Afghan government is not fixing the judicial system

Gen. James L. Jones (NATO Supreme Commander), 4 Oct 2006, "NATO’s Role in Afghanistan," Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos\_role\_in\_afghanistan\_rush\_transcript\_federal\_news\_service.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos_role_in_afghanistan_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html)

The other two pillars that need to be—need some attention that has to happen almost sequentially or simultaneously, I should say, are the judicial reform. Corruption is a big problem in Afghanistan. On that score, the results in the last three years have been, in my view, singularly unimpressive.

SOLVENCY

UN says Afghan investigators should be allowed access to prisoners

Baltimore Sun, 23 May 2005, "U.N. seeks access to U.S. base holding Afghan prisoners," [www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.afghan23may23,0,5675531.story?coll=bal-iraq-utility](http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.afghan23may23,0,5675531.story?coll=bal-iraq-utility)

The United Nations has called for Afghan human rights investigators to be allowed into Bagram, the main U.S. base in Afghanistan, after reports that poorly trained U.S. soldiers there had repeatedly abused prisoners. Richard Provencher, U.N. spokesman in Afghanistan, said yesterday that abusers should be punished and that investigators from the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission should have access to detainees and be allowed to monitor their cases.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Damage to America from violating human rights outweighs intelligence gained from prisoner abuse

Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Anthony Lake, Distinguished Professor in Practice of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 13 May 2004, "Transfer Power in Iraq to UN and NATO," GLOBAL POLITICS, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/daalder/20040513.htm>

Who can now seriously argue that the resulting damage to America's position is outweighed by any intelligence that may have been gathered through these brutal acts? It [the Bush Administration] must ensure that everyone, whether in America, Guantanamo, Iraq or Afghanistan, is accorded the full protection that the US constitution and international law are supposed to provide.

Moral harm of torture outweighs: The torturer is the enemy of all mankind

Prof. Joan Fitzpatrick (Law Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law), March 2003, “THE TORTURER IS THE ENEMY OF ALL MANKIND” <http://globaltexts.blogspot.com/2003_03_02_globaltexts_archive.html>

These practices also violate human rights treaties to which the United States is a party, specifically the prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The United States may not transfer Al Qaeda suspects to other states to facilitate their torture; that too is a violation. Moreover, there is no state on earth "that does not have legal restrictions against torture"("Questioning of Accused Expected to Be Human, Legal and Aggressive", March 4, 2003, A13). The prohibition on torture is a peremptory norm of customary international law binding on all nations. The torturer is the enemy of all mankind.

NO STRINGS ATTACHED II: NEW & IMPROVED CASE FOR REMOVING CAVEATS

You can't study NATO very long before you come across a problem that's been plaguing NATO for years. Everyone's complaining about it: The commander of US forces in Afghanistan; NATO's Supreme Commander and NATO's Secretary General. And it isn't that hard to fix. All it takes is summoning the political will to do it, and that's why my partner and I stand resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

Significant: "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, http://dictionary.cambridge.org)*

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform) *)*

Caveat: A Latin word meaning "let him beware,""caveat" has a specific meaning in the context of NATO, as explained by Ahto Lobjakas in February 2006: "NATO officials use the term caveat to describe restrictions that different countries place on military action by their forces" *(Ahto Lobjakas, 13 Feb 2006, "Afghanistan: ISAF Expands And Prepares For Long-Term Stay," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* [*www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html*](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html)*)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: Caveats won't go away as Afghanistan teeters on the brink

A. The Afghan mission has a web of restrictions

Jim Michaels, 28 Sept 2006, USA TODAY, "Nations limit use of NATO forces" [www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats_x.htm)

Countries sending their troops to Afghanistan have placed a web of restrictions on how they can be used, creating headaches for combat commanders and hurting the coalition's ability to fight a resurgent Taliban. The restrictions, also called caveats, vary and are imposed by governments who fear casualties or don't agree with all parts of the mission.

B. Caveats continue despite NATO's efforts at the Riga Summit

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added)

At a summit last week in the Latvian capital, Riga, the NATO countries operating in Afghanistan agreed to come to each other's aid in an emergency, ignoring any caveats. The NATO commander in Afghanistan defines what constitutes an emergency. [US Afghan force commander Lt. Gen. Karl] Eikenberry's comments indicate caveats remain a worry as NATO has assumed a larger role in Afghanistan.

C. The Afghan mission is on the brink of failure

David Common (journalist, CBC News correspondent in France, has travelled to Afghanistan several times), 24 Nov 2006, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., AFGHANISTAN DIARY, "Afghanistan rages while NATO deals in caveats," [www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html)

Jones acknowledged NATO could fail in Afghanistan. Not the usual acknowledgement you expect from a military man. He said the enemy forces in Afghanistan — some 'Taliban' (the definition is fluid), the rest being warlords and farmers connected with the drug trade — were fighting a war of attrition. Their strategy was to continue with hit and run attacks, disrupt anything that might cause the local population to trust NATO (such as reconstruction projects) and, essentially, wait for the people in the NATO nations to lose patience with the mission and call their troops home. This same strategy worked in Afghanistan against the Russians in the 1980s and early '90s; to some degree against the British a century early — perhaps even going all the way back to Genghis Khan! By that measure, those "enemy forces" may already be winning. Support for the Afghan mission in Canada, at least, has dropped as more soldiers die and the violence continues.

OBSERVATION 3. Caveats are poison

HARM 1: Reduced strength of troop deployments

Judy Dempsey (journalist), 5 Nov 2006, "NATO calls for overhaul of Afghanistan strategy," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, [www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/05/news/afghan.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/05/news/afghan.php) (brackets added)

NATO now has more than 31,000 troops under its command, with 8,000 located in the south. [NATO Secretary General Jaap] De Hoop Scheffer said that in theory this number should be sufficient, but in practice the alliance's top military commander in Afghanistan, General David Richards, did not have unrestricted access to either the troops or their military capabilities. He said one of the biggest problems facing NATO in Afghanistan was "national caveats." Almost all of the 37 countries contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan have set restrictions on their troops or the use of their equipment, de Hoop Scheffer said. "The caveats are poison," he said. "They significantly reduce the amount of forces a commander really has at his disposal."

HARM 2: Increased risk of harm to troops

Gen. James L. Jones (NATO Supreme Commander), 4 Oct 2006, "NATO’s Role in Afghanistan," Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos\_role\_in\_afghanistan\_rush\_transcript\_federal\_news\_service.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos_role_in_afghanistan_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html)

I actually believe that caveats, when they’re known, put a nation’s troops at more risk than the nations who don’t have caveats. If you’re a thinking enemy like we’re facing in Afghanistan, they want to find out which are the troops that won’t fight, or that won’t fight with the freedom that others do, and naturally they gravitate that way.

HARM 3: Increased risk of losing the war in Afghanistan

Associated Press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html)

"Other NATO nations have troops there, but have imposed caveats on the use of them and on the use of their equipment -- this at a time when NATO's commanders on the ground urgently require additional manpower," said Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga. "NATO cannot afford to lose this crucial struggle against the regressive forces of a resurgent insurgency by being indecisive or lacking commitment," she said.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following PLAN to be implemented by any necessary legal means:

**Plank 1: Agency:** This plan will be carried out by the North Atlantic Council and NATO member governments.

Plank 2: Mandates: All caveats on the mission in Afghanistan and all future NATO missions will be abolished.

Plank 3: **Enforcement** shall be through NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 4: Any minimal administrative funding needed will be donated by the US Federal Government and derived from cuts in the National Institute on Aging. NATO administrators shall purchase 2 shredders, one in Brussels and one in Kabul, in which all copies of the caveats shall be destroyed. Officials in Kabul may purchase a generator to power their shredder if electricity is not available.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 7 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches may be used to clarify the plan as needed.

OBSERVATION 5. Eliminating caveats solves the harms and achieves advantages

ADVANTAGE 1:Increased mission flexibility and military capabilities

Julio Miranda Calha (General Rapporteur of the Defence and Security Committee) and Bert Koenders (General Rapporteur of the Political Committee), NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 29 Sept 2006, "DECLARATION ON NATO’S RIGA SUMMIT," Text adopted by the Standing Committee in Brussels, [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1007](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1007)

Forces deployed for NATO missions must have the flexibility to perform the range of operations demanded by a particular mission. All efforts should therefore be made to reduce the use of national caveats which all too often restrict national contingents from participating in operations to their full capability.

ADVANTAGE 2: Better support for local commanders

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added, ellipses in original)

"Commanders on the ground are best served if all their forces do not have caveats that place operational constraints on them," [US Afghan force commander Lt. Gen. Karl] Eikenberry said. "Any caveats that would restrict combat forces from being able to maneuver or to be deployed anywhere within Afghanistan for any kind of combat operation...are the ones of greatest concern."

ADVANTAGE 3: Force multiplier

Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer, US State Department, 25 Oct 2006, "NATO's Jones Urges Focus on Afghan Reconstruction, Rule of Law," <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=October&x=20061025171329MVyelwarC0.6853144>

Jones said he has identified 50 troop restrictions, known as “caveats,” which he considers significant enough to place limits on NATO’s operations. “Removing caveats is like providing more troops,” he said. “It’s like a force multiplier.”

2A EVIDENCE: REMOVE CAVEATS

HARMS

Afghan insurgents use NATO caveats to their advantage to break NATO's will

David Common (journalist, CBC News correspondent in France, has travelled to Afghanistan several times), 24 Nov 2006, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., AFGHANISTAN DIARY, "Afghanistan rages while NATO deals in caveats," [www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html)

In democratic societies, politicians are, of course, very careful about their military commitments, especially when elections are in the offing. Insurgent forces in Afghanistan know this. They will and are using it to their advantage, hoping to break the will of NATO nations.

Caveats reduce NATO's response to violence in Afghanistan

David Common (journalist, CBC News correspondent in France, has travelled to Afghanistan several times), 24 Nov 2006, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., AFGHANISTAN DIARY, "Afghanistan rages while NATO deals in caveats," [www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html)

As the commander on the ground, it means you have fewer resources to be able to deal with specific problems. The most cited example was the great surge of violence in the south of Afghanistan this fall, which Canadian and British soldiers had to confront alone since other forces could not shift to the south, due to their caveats.

Can't use German troops in the most dangerous Afghan provinces

Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson (Washington Post Foreign Service), 18 Sept 2006, WASHINGTON POST, "NATO Faces Growing Hurdle As Call for Troops Falls Short," [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/17/AR2006091700570.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/17/AR2006091700570.html)

Scheffer and other NATO officials said field commanders' hands are tied as much by a shortage of troops as by individual countries' prohibitions on how their forces can be used. Germany, for example, has mandated that its 2,750 troops can be stationed only near the capital of Kabul and cannot be diverted to the more dangerous southern provinces.

Caveats require more troops to be deployed

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1

The caveats require NATO to put more troops in the field to compensate for the countries that are prevented by their governments from joining in combat.

Caveats divide the Alliance

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added)

The restrictions risk driving a wedge in the NATO alliance between forces that fight and those that don't, [US Afghan force commander Lt. Gen. Karl] Eikenberry said. "Could you have an alliance in which you have one group that is always going into the toughest places and fighting and taking casualties, and you have a second group that is in a different category?" Eikenberry said over the weekend.

"Consultation" caveat = slower reaction times

Reuters news service, 26 Nov 2006, "FACTBOX-Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan," [www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165.htm](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165.htm) (parentheses in original)

Most national forces can only do certain tasks after consultation with their capitals -- a process that slows down reaction times. At least one government insists on being consulted before its troops are despatched to within one km (half a mile) of the restive border with Pakistan.

Can't do effective riot control with caveats

Max Boot (Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York), 21 June 2006, "NATO's Afghanistan challenge - Alliance faces its greatest threat in the same place the Red Army foundered," LOS ANGELES TIMES, [www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions](http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions)

In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.

INHERENCY

Scores of caveats in Afghanistan - at least 50 need to be eliminated now

Reuters news service, 26 Nov 2006, "FACTBOX-Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan," [www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165.htm](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165.htm)

Alliance officials say there are "scores" of them but have asked allies to provide up-to-date lists ahead of Riga. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe James Jones says there are 50 main caveats he is anxious to eliminate.

20 NATO members impose caveats

Helle Dale ( Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies), 22 Nov 2006, "Why NATO must evolve," WASHINGTON TIMES, [www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061121-083639-1377r.htm](http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061121-083639-1377r.htm)

What's more, restrictions imposed by various NATO countries limit the areas where troops can be deployed. Only six out of NATO's 26 members have no restrictions on the deployment of their troops. Germany troops, for instance, are confined to northern Afghanistan, and they are limited to performing construction projects. Turkish troops remain present in the Kabul region, but the Turkish government has rejected committing to any operations in the south. NATO Secretary-General James Jones has estimated that there are 102 national restrictions out of which 50 were seriously detrimental to deployment.

It's political: Politicians apply lots of caveats to troops in Afghanistan

David Common (journalist, CBC News correspondent in France, has travelled to Afghanistan several times), 24 Nov 2006, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., AFGHANISTAN DIARY, "Afghanistan rages while NATO deals in caveats," [www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html)

To protect themselves, those western politicians have draped many of their militaries in Afghanistan with caveats, basically rules on what their forces can and cannot do. Germany, for instance, limits its soldiers to operations in the relatively calm north. Others won't let their aircraft fly at night, or be used for anything besides humanitarian aid delivery. Some won't let soldiers from other nations ride in their vehicles.

Nov 2006: It will be months before any country considers lifting caveats

David Common (journalist, CBC News correspondent in France, has travelled to Afghanistan several times), 24 Nov 2006, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., AFGHANISTAN DIARY, "Afghanistan rages while NATO deals in caveats," [www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/common/20061124.html)

Canadian officials say they have lobbied every NATO nation to eliminate their caveats or provide more troops. So far, only Poland has agreed to send in extra soldiers, though that deployment was already expected. Privately, NATO officials say it will likely be months before any country might consider lifting its caveats.

NATO statements at Riga don't match actions about removing caveats

Michael Moran (award winning journalist), 29 Nov 2006, "NATO Pins Future to Afghanistan," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12056/natos_fateful_afghan_wager.html>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pinned its future credibility on its difficult mission in Afghanistan, declaring in a joint statement at its Riga summit that its peacekeepers must have the forces, resources, and flexibility needed "to ensure the mission's continued success" (WashPost). Yet they made only limited progress on lifting national restrictions on deployed forces which render many German, Spanish, Italian, and other troops of little use in combat zones (FT).

After Riga: restrictions continue to prevent Spanish and French troops from being used where they are most needed

Sarah Edmonds and Mark John (Reuters news service), 29 Nov 2006, "NATO leaders determined to succeed in Afghanistan," <http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-11-29T004527Z_01_L27793177_RTRUKOC_0_UK-NATO-SUMMIT.xml>

French officials said France could "on a case-by-case basis and on request" send troops outside their zone if necessary. Madrid's pledge was yet more guarded, with a Spanish official saying Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero had offered use of Spanish helicopters in exceptional circumstances to help evacuate wounded NATO solders, and not for combat. France has a contingent in the capital Kabul and Spanish troops operate in the relatively calm west. The most urgent need is in southern Afghanistan, where British, Dutch and Canadians have suffered heavy casualties.

Riga Summit was only a "small shift" on combat restrictions and only applies to "emergencies"

BBC News, 29 Nov 2006, "Nato hails shift on Afghan combat," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6195102.stm>

Correspondents say the combat curbs have been the most contentious issue at the two-day summit in Latvia, following tension over the reluctance of France, Germany, Spain and Italy to send their troops to southern Afghanistan. Those agreeing to ease the restrictions on deployment against the Taleban include the Dutch, Romanians and smaller nations such as Slovenia and Luxembourg. France, Germany, Spain and Italy have said they will now send help to trouble zones outside their areas, but only in emergencies. The Nato chief welcomed the small shift.

Caveats caused by fear of casualties

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1 (brackets added)

Restrictions are sometimes imposed by governments wary about casualties. German forces in Afghanistan, for instance, have been ordered to avoid combat and rarely venture outside their outposts for long patrols, according to an August report by the Congressional Research Service.

Turkey was asked, and refused, to remove caveats

BARÇIN YİNANÇ (journalist), 27 Nov 2006, "Afghanistan dominates tough NATO summit," TURKISH DAILY NEWS, [www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=60254](http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=60254)

While some forces are permitted to be used freely by operational commanders, some ISAF countries limit their troops to specific duties in specified parts of Afghanistan. Turkey is one of them. Approximately 700 Turkish troops are based in Kabul, and the Turkish government does not allow them to be used in other parts of the country, especially in combat missions in the south. Failing to convince Turkey's AKP government to send more troops to Afghanistan, the Alliance's top military command expects Turkey to reduce or remove its caveats. Turkey turned down this demand as well, by asserting that it has already met its commitments by assuming twice the command of ISAF.

SOLVENCY

Commanders need flexibility: If you sign up for the mission, you should not use caveats

Jim Michaels, 28 Sept 2006, USA TODAY, "Nations limit use of NATO forces" [www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats_x.htm) (ellipses in original)

"It is very difficult for a commander ... when he is not able to move forces around and to have them go where they're needed, when they're needed, to do the things that needed to be done," Rumsfeld said. "If you sign on to the mission, you should sign on to the whole package," said Canadian Lt. Col. Rejean Duchesneau, a spokesman for NATO's military arm.

Removing caveats could reduce the number of troops needed in Afghanistan

Jim Michaels, 28 Sept 2006, USA TODAY, "Nations limit use of NATO forces" [www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-28-afghanistan-nato-caveats_x.htm)

A recent Congressional Research Service study said caveats on German troops mean they "do not go on extended patrols and do not respond to local security events." NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said Germany has not dropped its restrictions. Removing restrictions might reduce the number of troops needed in Afghanistan, since commanders could shift available forces wherever they are needed.

BEST LAID PLANS: THE CASE FOR DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM

To understand the need for change in NATO today, you should understand the difference between two major types of defense planning that governments do to set the overall goals and budgets for their militaries. The US Defense Department in February of 2005 explained the difference between "threat-based" planning and "capabilities-based" planning in this way:

US Dept. of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Feb 2005, FACING THE FUTURE: MEETING THE THREATS AND CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY, Highlights of the Priorities, Initiatives, and Accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Defense 2001-2004, p. 15

"Under the threat-based model, planners would look at a threat posed, for example, by North Korea or Iraq or the former Soviet Union, and fashion a force to fit it. Under a capabilities-based model, planners would examine the capabilities that exist to threaten the United States, such as chemical, biological, nuclear, or cyber space capabilities, and fashion a response to contend with those capabilities regardless of where they might originate."

We will be presenting a comparative advantage case that shows NATO is currently trying to achieve the goal of transforming to "Capabilities-Based Planning" (CBP), but NATO is not on the right path to achieve it. That's why my partner and I stand resolved: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.  
  
OBSERVATION 1: DEFINITIONS

**NATO:** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#) *)*

**Significant:** "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org) *)*

**Reform:** "to put or change into an improved form or condition" *(Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. GOAL: NATO must successfully transition to Capabilities-Based Planning

There are two important facts about the Status Quo that NATO Secretary General Scheffer identified in a speech he gave in November of 2006. One is that NATO needs, but does not have, adequate CBP. The other is that NATO intends to use the Comprehensive Political Guidance document, CPG, to develop capabilities-based planning. Mr Scheffer said:

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 6 Nov 2006, "Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?" NATO On-Line Library, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm)

Of course, having the right capabilities means more than having the right hardware. It also includes having the right defence planning system. That’s why we are currently in the process of fine-tuning our defence planning process, based on the Comprehensive Political Guidance to be published in Riga. This is the framework which sets out the sort of Defence Capabilities we need to tackle the challenges we are most likely to face tomorrow. We need a planning process that is even more capabilities-based, even more tailored to the specific needs of individual Allies, and even more adaptive to deal with potential shortfalls.

OBSERVATION 3. INHERENCY: The Status Quo is not successfully transitioning to CBP

A. Comprehensive Political Guidance is inadequate to meet future challenges

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 9

At the center of Riga’s political agenda sits the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which will be endorsed by Heads of State and Government in November. This document aims to outline a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, but it fails to provide NATO members with the guidance they need to meet future challenges. As a result, NATO should aim to rewrite its Strategic Concept for its 60th anniversary summit in 2009.

B. The defense planning transition is failing

Stephan de Spiegeleire (Programme Director for Defence Transformation at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies), "Transformation in Trouble," 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

The Clingendael Centre for Security Studies has done quite a bit of work for NATO over the last few years. We have come to the conclusion that transformation is in trouble and that defence planning has not changed nearly as much as it probably should. A second reason why we came to this conclusion is through our Dutch contacts. We do a lot of work for the Dutch Ministry of Defence, where you see that national transformation gets only very little support from the defence planning process at NATO. The gap between member states and what is happening in Norfolk , Virginia (where Allied Command Transformation is located), and what is happening in the Alliance as a whole is only growing.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following PLAN to be implemented by any necessary legal means through the North Atlantic Council and NATO member governments:

Mandates:

1. The NATO Strategic Concept will be rewritten and adopted at the 2009 NATO Summit with a clear definition of NATO's defense planning requirements and priorities. The defense planning priorities of NATO shall be:
   1. defense of the homelands of NATO members against military invasion
   2. establishing a stable democratic government in Afghanistan
   3. reducing terrorism directed against the homelands of NATO members
2. These missions shall take budgetary priority over all other missions and activities of NATO members.
3. The Strategic Concept will supercede the CPG and will outline the specific military capabilities needed to achieve the Mandate 1 priorities.
4. NATO will establish a joint CBP committee, fully staffed, consisting of up to 3 military members from each NATO country representing different branches of the military (Army, Navy, Air Force). The joint committee will revise the Defense Requirements Review and the Long Term Requirements Study to conform to the Strategic Concept with the Mandate 1 priorities using the Australian government's CBP model.
5. NATO member governments will follow the recommendations of the CBP committee for the development of military capabilities.

**Funding:** Donations from the US Federal Government derived from eliminating the Federal subsidy for Howard University.

Enforcement: will be through NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance shall be removed from office.

Timeline:This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

The Affirmative reserves the right to clarify the plan as needed in later speeches.

OBSERVATION 5: We offer three advantages, in which NATO's military capabilities are enhanced in three unique ways:

ADVANTAGE 1: Enhanced Capabilities by overcoming political opposition to capabilities development

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 54

In sum, the Australian experience offers insights into the planning process, successes that other countries can duplicate, and mistakes that they can avoid replicating when introducing reforms to their defense planning methodologies. Without an identifiable threat upon which to focus, defense planning in NATO and PfP nations is a “tough sell” to many politicians, and justifiably so. What responsible political leaders and civilian officials are increasingly demanding from military establishments are well-reasoned justifications for military capabilities that meet stated requirements.

ADVANTAGE 2: Enhanced Capabilities from deeper alliance commitment to the planning process

A. Significance: Lack of commitment to defense planning hurts capabilities development

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Clingandael Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 60 (brackets added)

The main problem with the current NATO DPP [defense planning process], therefore, lies much less with the process itself than with the chasm between this process and member states. As long as there is even a perception, right or wrong, that the process is too opaque or remote to be trusted, national governments will not feel genuinely committed to the resulting capability requirements.

B. Solvency: The solution is joint international defense planning

Stephan de Spiegeleire (Programme Director for Defence Transformation at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies), "Transformation in Trouble," 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

The nations on this slide are on the receiving end of the process. Ultimately they are the ones that are confronted with force requirements. The nations themselves are somehow not organically included. Nations are the heart of NATO. Nations are the ones that have the money. Nations have the democratic legitimacy. They are the ones that should be empowering change. The defence planners in the member states should be networked with their colleagues in the other countries. They should jointly generate ideas that can then be transplanted into the NATO organization as a whole – in other words, a more nation-centric and network centric approach to defence planning.

ADVANTAGE 2: Enhanced Capabilities by reducing the European capabilities gap

A. Significance: Defense planning failures cause capability shortfalls

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (United States Permanent Representative to NATO), 8 Feb 2002, Graduation Address at The NATO Defense College, Rome, [www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept\_11/burns\_003.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/burns_003.htm)

We also need to make another key change, from threat-based to capabilities-based defense policy. During the Cold War, NATO sized and shaped its forces against specific geographic threats. The only Article 5 attack in NATO's history, however, came on September 11 from an unexpected source, in an unexpected form. What this tells us is that many of our old assumptions, old plans, and old capabilities are out-of-date.

B. Solvency: CBP overcomes European capability shortfalls

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon (Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research), 18th International Workshop on Global Security - Copenhagen, 24-27 May 2001 "Preparing for New Threats: How International Security Organizations Can Work Together"

According to General Sir Rupert Smith, who addressed the Workshop as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, the European shortfalls are a direct result of the NATO force-planning process. To a large degree, they are the careful and deliberate consequence of meeting Cold War requirements. General Smith proposes that "European navies and air forces evolved as supporting forces for the United States striking fleet and the United States Air Force. The European armies concentrated on the territorial defense of NATO's eastern frontiers." Consequently, they were not mobile because they did not need to be. As General Smith and others pointed out, however, the situation has now changed: forces must be flexible. In fact, according to Dr. William Schneider, Chairman of the Defense Science Board, it is no longer even possible to optimize against a specific threat. As a result, he advocates a "capability-based" planning process for the United States to replace the "threat-based" planning of the past.

2A EVIDENCE: DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM

DEFINITIONS

Definition of NATO defense planning

NATO Official web site, NATO TOPICS, 19 July 2005, "The Defence Planning Process," <http://www.nato.int/issues/dpp/index.html>

The aim of defence planning is to provide a framework within which national and NATO defence-related planning can be harmonised so as to meet the Alliance's agreed requirements in the most effective way. In other words, defence planning seeks to ensure that the Alliance has the requisite forces, assets, facilities and capabilities to fulfil its tasks throughout the full spectrum of its missions in accordance with the Strategic Concept. As such, it covers both NATO's own capabilities and those of Allied countries.

Capability-Based Planning analogy: Responding to the vulnerabilities and threats, not the opponent

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss (U.S. Army, serving on International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Belgium, has been a Strategic Plans and Policy officer working on Homeland Defense and Homeland Security), Summer 2005, "Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security," JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Vol 1 Issue 1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5> (brackets added)

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described this concept [Capabilities-based planning] well when he wrote, "It’s like dealing with burglars: You cannot possibly know who wants to break into your home, or when. But you do know how they might try to get in. You know they might try to pick your lock, so you need a good, solid, dead bolt on your front door. You know they might try breaking through a window, so you need a good alarm. You know it is better to stop them before they get in, so you need a police force to patrol the neighborhood and keep bad guys off the streets. And you know that a big German Shepherd doesn’t hurt, either."

CBP provides capabilities for wide range of challenges; different from "threat" and "scenario" based planning

Prof. Paul K. Davis (senior scientist and Research Leader at RAND, Professor of Policy Analysis in the Pardee RAND Graduate School, former member of Naval Studies Board under the National Academy of Sciences), 2002, "Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation," p. xi

Capabilities-based planning (CBP) is planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice. It contrasts with developing forces based on a specific threat and scenario.

CBP focuses on how enemies fight, not a fixed set of enemies

J.D. Crouch II (Deputy National Security Adviser), 5 Mar 2003, "Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: 'Transforming US Strategic Forces' " [www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003science/crouch.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003science/crouch.pdf)

CBP: "Capabilities-based planning focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats"

In-depth explanation of how CBP works: Fighting threats, not specific enemies

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss (U.S. Army, serving on International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Belgium, has been a Strategic Plans and Policy officer working on Homeland Defense and Homeland Security), Summer 2005, "Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security," JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Vol 1 Issue 1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5> (parentheses in original)

For example, with multiple actors possessing the means and the will to conduct terrorism in the U.S. Homeland, the focus of assessment is not Al Qaeda, but any potential terrorist group; i.e., what terrorist acts (or capabilities) are possible? Now the question becomes manageable within current information limits because the intelligence analysts are no longer predicting what or where Al Qaeda will strike next, but how any terrorist could strike. In this manner, a capabilities-based threat assessment is done by first assessing what types of threat lines of operation are possible to bring threat capabilities against the U.S. ( ballistic missiles? terrorism? air attack?). Then for each type of threat faced, threat lines of operation or “red lines” of threat capabilities can be developed to identify specific methods to deliver threat capabilities. Even this rudimentary level of analysis can assist planners in providing a framework for the threat environment. The combination of “lines of operations” and “capabilities” inherent in capabilities-based planning allows an intellectual structure to address the many challenges in homeland defense planning.

Differences between CBP and other forms of planning

Military Operations Research Society, Technical Cooperation Program (represents the agreed view of representatives from the five nations, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States, on how CBP should be conducted), Oct 2004, TCP TECHNICAL REPORT, Guide to Capability-Based Planning, A Paper prepared by the Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3 (JSA TP-3) of TTCP for the MORS Workshop held in Alexandria, VA, USA, Oct 2004, p. 4

CBP has two fundamental differences from other forms of traditional Capability Planning. First, it concentrates on what you need to do rather than what you have. Second, it attempts to move away from suggesting solutions too early in the process. The aim of delaying a decision on narrowing options is to encourage the development of more innovative alternatives and to help overcome simply replacing platforms and/or equipment with like-for-like. For example, it replaces questions such as “what options are there for new artillery?” with “how can we provide fire support to land forces?”.

Threat-based planning: Study opponents and outperform them

Col. Peter Faber (Researcher at the Academic Research Branch of the NATO Defense College, Rome), 2003, NATO Long-Term Defense Planning: Implications for the Future - Findings and Conclusions, p. 2

Threat-based planning involves identifying potential adversaries and evaluating their expected capabilities, now and in the future. Outperforming these opponents, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is central to this type of planning.

Defense Requirements Review

Allied Command Transformation Public Information Office, 12 Jan 2006, "Transformation Organisation - Defense Planning (Def Plan)," NATO TRANSFORMATION, NATO official web pages, [www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/defplanindex.htm](http://www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/defplanindex.htm) (DRR=Defense Requirements Review)

The objective of the biennial DRR study is to identify the minimum military requirements to meet the level of ambition specified by NATO within the predicted security environment. Requirements are specified in terms of the force levels, force structures, force readiness and force capabilities.

INHERENCY

NATO collective defense planning is separated from its member nations' defense planning (but shouldn't be)

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Clingandael Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 60 (parentheses in original, NAC=North Atlantic Council)

Amidst the enormous operational pressures on the Alliance today, there is a danger that medium- to long-term defense planning will fall victim to shorter-term operational planning. With the exception of a handful of larger nations, most of NATO’s 26 members are largely dependent on the NATO defense planning process (DPP) to define their own future capability requirements. In a period of deep uncertainty in the security environment and vertiginous changes in technology, the importance of this dependence cannot be overestimated. In the current system, many NATO nations (through the NAC) essentially entrust Alliance defense planners with the task of translating a shared political ambition level into concrete capability requirements. Yet many also continue to see this entire process as an impregnable “black box.” In many ways, the current NATO process for deriving defense requirements continues to be more divorced from national defense planning processes than is either desirable or necessary. As long as the process is seen as one in which the nations receive capability requirements from on high rather than help to determine them, buy-in in NATO capitols will be limited.

Defense Planning Process doesn't have support of NATO member governments

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Clingandael Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 60

There is no doubt that NATO has significantly improved its defense planning methodology in both the Defense Requirements Review and in the Long-Term Requirements Study. The method is firmly based on what has emerged as the current gold standard in defense and security planning: capabilities-based planning, in which capability requirements are derived from a diverse set of planning scenarios that reflect possible future security environments. The DPP – for all of its weaknesses – remains the Alliance’s most sophisticated analytical method to develop and prioritize medium- to long-term defense requirements.

Long-Term Requirments Study wasn't funded in 2006 - more focus on defense planning is needed

Stephan de Spiegeleire (Programme Director for Defence Transformation at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies), "Transformation in Trouble," 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

We have to re-empower the defence planning process. The Long-Term Requirements Study, for instance, in 2006 was not funded. That does not make much sense to me. You have to take this much more seriously than the sort of political exercise that we engage in regularly and where we come up with nice-sounding priorities, but that are not really carried by the member states. And if we were to place the nation-centric defence planning process more centrally, then the requirements that would be generated would also affect the nations and not just Norfolk or Brussels.

U.S. CBP is not being emphasized and is not coherent

Naval Studies Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2005, National Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning, p. 2 (brackets added)

Although the basic principles of capabilities-based planning and analysis are not new, they have not been emphasized within the DOD [Dept of Defense] in recent decades. Even today there is no consensus within the department about precisely what CBP is and what its essential elements are.

CPG [Comprehensive Political Guidance] is inadequate -- ignores the basic question: What is NATO for?

Clingandael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006, "Presenting the Trilateral Report – The NATO summit ‘Primer’ " [www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer\_ifs/inter\_konf\_2006/inter\_conf\_proceed/](http://www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer_ifs/inter_konf_2006/inter_conf_proceed/) (brackets added)

According to [Julianne] Smith [Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies], many member states are looking for guidance on NATOs future role. The CPG [Comprehensive Political Guidance document] in her view represents a compromise solution between offering specific defense planning guidance and rewriting NATO’s Strategic Concept. The CPG, however, ignores the basic question: What is NATO for?

Status Quo CPG wil not work

Clingandael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006, "Transforming military capabilities for NATO expeditionary operations" [www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer\_ifs/inter\_konf\_2006/inter\_conf\_proceed/](http://www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer_ifs/inter_konf_2006/inter_conf_proceed/) (brackets added)

For NATO to become a global alliance, transformation must occur. The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) is an important step, but is ultimately a compromise step and will not help to encourage members to increase their contributions. [General Klaus] Naumann [former chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee] suggested that output be the metric, rather than contributions, but lacking a strategic concept leaves no goals against which output could be measured.

We need better planning based on clear definition of what NATO's role should be

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 6 Nov 2006, "Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?" NATO On-Line Library, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm)

In other words, Afghanistan demonstrates very clearly that we need to look at security in a more comprehensive fashion. Such a holistic view requires, first and foremost, dialogue. It requires that we look at NATO not just as a force generation device, but also as a forum for a much more forward-looking discussion on future threats and challenges. In particular, we need to have an enlightened discussion on issues that require a clearer definition of what NATO’s role should – or should not – be.

Current NATO defense planning is detracting from the important issues

Stephan de Spiegeleire (Programme Director for Defence Transformation at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies), "Transformation in Trouble," 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

Another important point is that the defence planning process within NATO, which is really the heart of our forward planning, should be central again. Whenever there is a summit, there is a new incentive to come up with a new term (such as Prague Capabilities Commitment, Defence Capabilities Initiative). Now we have the Evolutionary Capability Criteria within the NRF. By putting the spotlights on those things, we detract attention from the real process that we should take seriously.

European capabilities gap is widening and efforts to close it have failed

Christoph Bertram (holds the Steven Muller Chair for German Studies at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) Spring 2006, NATO REVIEW, "Farewell to War," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

The gap between European and US capabilities and mentalities is widening as it is, and all the appeals of repeated NATO summits to close the capabilities gap have failed to produce the desired result.

SIGNIFICANCE

Alternatives to CBP don't work

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss (U.S. Army, serving on International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Belgium, has been a Strategic Plans and Policy officer working on Homeland Defense and Homeland Security), Summer 2005, "Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security," JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Vol 1 Issue 1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5>

Therefore, neither “threat-based” nor “scenario-based” planning will work effectively for homeland defense or homeland security planning because the asymmetric threat cannot be used as a template. Advocates of capabilities-based planning assert that it is this strong potential for the threat to achieve surprise by asymmetric means that makes threat-based and scenario-based planning a poor match for the needs of emerging planning challenges like homeland defense and homeland security. This is because:

* Threat-based planning is very susceptible to threat deception, causing the U.S. to mischaracterize and often underestimate the threat;
* Planners traditionally tend to “mirror image” threats when little hard intelligence is available which is only effective for symmetric threats;
* Large bureaucracies like DOD tend toward “group think” and discourage the unconventional thinking required to understand and assess asymmetric threats;
* Resource constraints tend to focus time and money on traditional big ticket weapons systems and discourage development of capabilities for the “unproven” asymmetric threats.

European capabilities gap hurts NATO operations

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon (Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research), 18th International Workshop on Global Security - Copenhagen, 2001, "Preparing for New Threats: How International Security Organizations Can Work Together"

The actions of the Bush Administration are perhaps understandable given the cumbersome nature of international security organizations and the capabilities gap between the U.S. and its European Allies that became evident after NATO actions in the Balkans. The gap may be exacerbated, moreover, by the limited flexibility of European forces, which makes it difficult for them to address a sufficiently wide range of threats or to project power into a region as remote as Afghanistan.

European capabilities gap harms viability of NATO and blocks European partnership with US

Defense Industry Daily, 17 Oct 2005, "EU Procurement Challenges & Defense Weakness Debated," <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/10/eu-procurement-challenges-defense-weakness-debated-updated/index.php> (brackets added)

AFP [Agence France Presse news service] characterizes the study as noting that Europe risks being unable to meet mounting security risks like international terrorism unless it reverses a failure to pool its defenses, and stating bluntly that that European leaders have "lacked the political will" to improve military capabilities. Such failure would harm "the viability of NATO as an alliance, and the ability of European countries to partner in any meaningful way with the US."

SOLVENCY

NATO Defense Planning gains advantages of collective military efforts while respecting national sovereignty

NATO Official web site, NATO TOPICS, 19 July 2005, "The Defence Planning Process," <http://www.nato.int/issues/dpp/index.html>

Defence planning in the Alliance is a fundamental element of the arrangements which enable its member countries to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence and other common military efforts to enhance security and stability. It prevents the renationalisation of defence policies, while at the same time recognising national sovereignty.

NATO needs to improve its capabilities using CBP

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (United States Permanent Representative to NATO), 8 Feb 2002, Graduation Address The NATO Defense College, Rome, [www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept\_11/burns\_003.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/burns_003.htm)

Rather than trying to guess which enemy the alliance will confront years from now, or where wars in the world may occur, we need to focus on what capabilities adversaries could use against us, on shoring up our own vulnerabilities, and on exploiting the most modern new technologies to extend our own military advantages. This is the essence of capabilities-based defense planning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld committed the U.S. military to this new approach in his landmark speech at the U.S. National Defense University last week. We believe NATO needs to make the same choice.

CBP improves the planning process - overcomes uncertainty about risks

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss (U.S. Army, serving on International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Belgium, has been a Strategic Plans and Policy officer working on Homeland Defense and Homeland Security), Summer 2005, "Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security," JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Vol 1 Issue 1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5>

One of the fundamental advantages of the capabilities-based planning process is that it is explicit. In expressing the threat assessment and resulting capabilities menu, the planning process model is rendered transparent. Assumptions and choices are tested and challenged in order to constantly revise, update, and improve the contingency plan. The planning process should integrate the needs and experience of senior decision-makers by presenting plans in a comprehensible format and allowing iterative involvement at every level of management and across different agencies and organizations. Capabilities-based planning can fulfill this requirement by formulating plans that can be expressed and adapted as both a menu of options and a rheostat of degrees of preventive response — all dictated by changes in intelligence warning. This approach to contingency planning exceeds the overall objective to overcome uncertainty with flexibility in planning.

NATO endorses capabilities-based planning for Ukraine

NATO Online Library, 2006, NATO-UKRAINE ANNUAL TARGET PLAN FOR 2006 IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO-UKRAINE ACTION PLAN , p. 5, [www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b060407e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b060407e.pdf)

Throughout 2006, Ukraine will continue to improve its national system of defence policy, planning and budgeting, as a key means of ensuring democratic, civilian management. Priorities in this area include the development of a 2007 budget on a programme basis, the transition to a capabilities-based planning system, and the introduction of an integrated information system. Ukraine will also seek to improve the efficiency and transparency of policy, planning, and budgeting processes throughout the wider security sector, including for law-enforcement authorities and intelligence services. Ukraine welcomes the participation of Allied and NATO experts in these processes, and will make active use of available PfP and bilateral training and education programmes in these areas.

Australian defense planning experience applies to NATO despite Australia's unique situation

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 36-37 (brackets added)

Notwithstanding the unique characteristics of Australia’s geo-strategic situation, the overriding policy requirement that Australian defense planners should come to terms with a threat-ambiguous environment is broadly similar to the imperative now faced by many NATO and PfP countries in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, an examination of the Australian capabilities-based methodology is more than apropos to the subject of PAP-DIB [Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building].

Australian methodology + clear plan for what NATO defense forces should do = better planning that justifies military expenditures

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 54

At bottom, the Australian methodology requires careful and systematic consideration of what a defense force should be structured to do. It should imbue the defense planning process with an active and practical mentality in what has been, in many instances, a reactive process, one that has been all too vulnerable to challenges by ministries of finance in all too many NATO and PfP nations.

Australian planning method overcomes institutional opposition to reform

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 51

A key lesson from the Australian experience is that a top-down approach was required to overcome institutional opposition (in particular, from the individual services) to implementing the planning process. The Australian experience also demonstrates that, without recognized and accepted national-level government-endorsed guidance—policy, strategic, and financial—a top-down approach to defense planning is very difficult to execute in the presence of opposition from the services and other institutional stakeholders.

CBP should be enhanced with the Defense Requirements Review, the Long Term Requirements Stuy and engagement of national defense planners

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Clingandael Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 60

NATO should resist pre-summit temptations to short-circuit the normal defense planning process with ad-hoc initiatives. Instead, the Alliance should invest more resources in refining its approach to capabilities-based planning, strengthening both the Defense Requirements Review and the Long Term Requirements Study, and ensuring that national defense planners are fully engaged in and thus committed to NATO’s defense planning process.

Defense planning needs enhancement: Long Term Requirements Study and member nation participation

Stephan de Spiegeleire (Programme Director for Defence Transformation at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies), "Transformation in Trouble," 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

Defence planning is a horrendously difficult enterprise. Small countries, such as the Netherlands , are critically dependent on NATO for this. We have to re-empower the defence planning process. The Long-Term Requirements Study, for instance, in 2006 was not funded. That does not make much sense to me. You have to take this much more seriously than the sort of political exercise that we engage in regularly and where we come up with nice-sounding priorities, but that are not really carried by the member states. And if we were to place the nation-centric defence planning process more centrally, then the requirements that would be generated would also affect the nations and not just Norfolk or Brussels .

Force development resources and responsibilities should be shifted to a joint staff

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 54

To be sure, not every aspect of the Australian methodology may apply to all states. However, one could make a strong argument that the shifting of force development resources and responsibilities away from the individual services to a joint staff warrants consideration by most NATO and PfP member nations. What may be particularly valuable to some nations are certain elements of the Australian methodology that would increase the intellectual discipline and rigor of their planning processes.

CBP increases political support for military forces

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 54

At a time when NATO and PfP nations are searching for convincing means to justify existing, let alone new, force structures, proposals based upon methodologies that emphasize threat-ambiguous (or capabilities-based) rationales stand a greater likelihood of obtaining government support than arguments based upon other, more ephemeral rationales.

CBP is better for planning against terrorism

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss (U.S. Army, serving on International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Belgium, has been a Strategic Plans and Policy officer working on Homeland Defense and Homeland Security), Summer 2005, "Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security," JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY, Vol 1 Issue 1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5>

Planners need to identify the threat of a truck bomb, for example; it matters little to defense and security planners which group actually recruited the driver or rented the truck. By using a capabilities-based approach to threat assessment, the question “who is the threat?” is reworded as “what could the threat do?” to allow exploration of a much broader range of eventualities and give homeland defense or homeland security planners a defined and detailed threat to plan against. This alone would be welcome in nearly all contingency discussions on protecting the U.S. against terrorist threats as a method to overcome challenges of uncertainty haunting current homeland defense and security planning efforts.

Australian model: Joint services defense planning works

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 53

Leaving aside the specific stages and details of the planning process, the Australian case reveals that a number of institutional and policy conditions are necessary. Top-down planning is particularly dependent upon government guidance: policy leadership, strategic guidance, and financial direction. An appropriate institutional structure is also necessary in order for these directives to be implemented. The Australian experience demonstrates that, without these structures, the planning process between the individual services and the development office can be very contentious and, as a result, often ineffectual. Thus, the creation of a joint headquarters with adequate staffing, headed by a senior military officer, to work with the civilian defense force development officials will also encourage success. One of the additional benefits of such a system is that it tends to encourage and facilitate the joint development of capabilities to meet endorsed tasks.

Australian CBP is a successful model

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 36-37

By the end of the 1980s, after many false starts, the Australian Department of Defense, including the Headquarters Australian Defense Force (HQADF), had developed principles and processes for guiding force development that reflected government strategy and guidance to defend the country, while giving less weight to “threats.” In their place, “credible contingencies” were created that were based on capabilities rather than on existing threats. The result of these efforts has been to create a unique methodology that made the development of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) more relevant to Australia’s enduring strategic circumstances. At the same time, the ADF become more responsive to government guidance and less influenced by particularly service-specific interests and problematic threat scenarios. Thus, the relevance of the Australian experience is that it established guidelines against which the ADF could conceivably operate in a non-threat-specific environment, while making adequate provision for other important planning factors, such as financial limitations.

Need CBP system with acceptance by national governments

Clingandael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006, "Riga Primer: NATOs functions, perceptions and future" [www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer\_ifs/inter\_konf\_2006/inter\_conf\_proceed/](http://www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer_ifs/inter_konf_2006/inter_conf_proceed/)

Similarly, most member states are dependent on NATOs Defense Planning Process (DPP) to define future capabilities. Member states view this defence planning as a sort of ‘black box’, where determining NATO defence requirements has been separated from national defence planning. Perceptions here must be altered along with the planning process to ensure acceptance by national governments.

Capabilities development must improve linkage to national planning

Clingandael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006, "Questions to the speakers from the audience" [www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer\_ifs/inter\_konf\_2006/inter\_conf\_proceed/](http://www.mil.no/felles/ifs/start/arrangementer_ifs/inter_konf_2006/inter_conf_proceed/) (brackets added)

[Stephan] De Spiegeleire [Program Director, Defence Transformation, at Clingandael Centre for Strategic Studies] stressed that the institutional focus in NATO misses the point that capabilities begin with national organizations. The linkages between countries and the negotiating processes between national capitals need to improve.

DAY OF RECKONING: THE CASE FOR GLADIO ACCOUNTABILITY

At first glance you might find the thesis of our case a little hard to believe. A short time ago, we would have thought the same thing. But the Italian government has officially admitted some shocking facts about NATO's behavior that compel us to affirm: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: We offer the following DEFINITIONS and ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

**NATO:** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#) *)*

**Significant:** "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org)*)*

**Reform:** "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

B. Analysis

As Communism and Democracy struggled for supremacy after World War 2, both sides used secret, unorthodox and sometimes illegal methods to achieve the advance of their ideology. We're all glad that democratic governments prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But the real success of Democracy requires respect for human rights and the recognition that the ends do not justify the means. We will show you that NATO used means that cannot be justified even by the best of intentions, and that the promotion of justice and democracy today require accountability for the sins of the past and reforms to prevent them from happening again in the future.

After World War 2, secret military teams, sometimes called "Stay-Behind" teams, were formed as a last-ditch means of resistance in case Western Europe were attacked by Soviet forces.

United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (sometimes called the "Church Committee" after Sen. Frank Church), 26 April 1976, Final Report, Book IV, Supplementary detailed staff reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, p. 36 (brackets added, parentheses in original)

“Until 1950 OPC's [Office of Policy Coordination, part of the CIA] paramilitary activities (also referred to as preventive action) were limited to plans and preparations for stay-behind nets in the event of future war. Requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these projected OPC operations focused, once again, on Western Europe and were designed to support NATO forces against Soviet attack."

Daniele Ganser, from the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, goes on to explain in December 2004 that NATO placed these secret teams in numerous European countries, some of them not even NATO members:

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "Secret Warfare: Gladio," excerpted from "Secret Warfare: Operation Gladio and NATO's Stay-Behind Armies," [www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret\_warfare\_and\_natos\_stay\_behind\_armies.htm](http://www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret_warfare_and_natos_stay_behind_armies.htm)

It was revealed, however, that stay-behind armies covered all of Western Europe and operated under different code names, such as Gladio in Italy, Absalon in Denmark, P26 in Switzerland, ROC in Norway, I&O in the Netherlands, and SDRA8 in Belgium. The so-called Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), linked to NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), coordinated the stay-behind networks on an international level.

Understanding this background leads us to

OBSERVATION 2. HARMS: "Stay-Behind" or "Gladio" teams are a blemish on NATO

A. Terrorism. There were many cases, but we offer these examples from Italy in the 1970s

Arthur E. Rowse(journalist, former staff writer for Washington Post and US News & World Report), Gladio: The secret U.S. War to subvert Italian Democracy. Covert Action Quarterly No. 49, Summer 1994. <http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/gladio.html>

Conclusive Gladio links to political violence were found after a plane exploded in flight near Venice in November 1973. Venetian judge Carlo Mastelloni determined that the Argo-16 aircraft was used to shuttle trainees and munitions between the U.S. base in Sardinia and Gladio sites in northeast Italy. The apogee of right-wing terror came in 1974 with two massacres. One, a bombing at an antifascist rally in Brescia, killed eight and injured 102. The other was an explosion on the Italicus train near Bologna, killing 12 and wounding 105.

B. Torture and coups

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "Secret Warfare: Gladio," excerpted from "Secret Warfare: Operation Gladio and NATO's Stay-Behind Armies," [www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret\_warfare\_and\_natos\_stay\_behind\_armies.htm](http://www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret_warfare_and_natos_stay_behind_armies.htm)

In Turkey the secret NATO stay-behind army was called “Counter-Guerrilla” and operated under the direction of the Special Warfare Department. According to Turkish General Talat Turhan the secret army was involved in terror, torture and coup d’états.

C. Lies and cover-ups

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html>

Ever since the discovery of the secret NATO armies in 1990, research into stay-behind armies has progressed only very slowly, due to very limited access to primary documents and the refusal of both NATO and the CIA to comment. On 5 November 1990, a NATO spokesman told an inquisitive press: "NATO has never contemplated guerrilla war or clandestine operations”. The next day, NATO officials admitted that the previous day’s denial had been false, adding that the alliance would not comment on matters of military secrecy.

OBSERVATION 3. INHERENCY: NATO is blocking efforts to bring about Gladio accountability

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

It was called “the strategy of tension” and it was carried out by members of secret stay-behind armies organized by NATO and funded by the CIA in Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and other European countries. The strategy apparently involved supplying right-wing terrorists with explosives to carry out terrorist acts which were then blamed on left-wing groups to keep them out of power. Only three countries, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland, have had a parliamentary investigation into NATO’s role and a public report. The US and UK, the two nations most centrally involved, are refusing to disclose details, so crucial pieces of the story are missing.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following PLAN, to be implemented by any necessary legal means:

**Plank 1:Agency:** The North Atlantic Council will appoint a 3-member Gladio Accountability Commission (GAC), with adequate staff and funding, made up of a NATO official from Belgium, one from Italy, and one from the Swiss Partnership for Peace program at NATO headquarters, who will carry out the mandates. All NATO member governments will cooperate completely with the GAC.

Plank 2: **Mandates:**

1. GAC will collect from NATO member governments all documents pertaining to Gladio/Stay-Behind teams and publish them on NATO's web site.
2. GAC will conduct investigations into criminal activities carried out by Gladio teams. GAC shall provide the names of individuals who participated in Gladio crimes, on which the statute of limitations has not expired, for prosecution.
3. GAC will establish a ban on all similar operations in the future.

Plank 3: **Enforcement** shall be through the GAC plus any or all of the following: Interpol, the International Court of Justice at The Hague, and any necessary military and law enforcement agencies of NATO member governments. Any criminals arrested for Gladio activities shall be prosecuted according to existing law. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office. Any government official intentionally obstructing this plan shall receive a 10 year jail sentence without parole.

Plank 4: **Funding** shall come from donations to NATO from the US Federal Government, raising the money by cutting Head Start and School Improvement Programs.

Plank 5: **Timing.** Plank 1 takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot. Mandate 1 will be completed no later than 90 days after an Affirmative ballot. Mandates 2 and 3 will begin 4 months after an affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. BENEFITS of adopting the plan

A. We uphold and strengthen European democracy through full disclosure of past crimes

Enrico Falqui (Italian member of the European Parliament), Speech before the EU Parliament, 22 Nov 1990, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_gladio/synopsis.htm>

This Europe will have no future if it is not founded on truth, on the full transparency of its institutions in regard to the dark plots against democracy that have turned upside down the history, even in recent times, of many European states. There will be no future, ladies and gentlemen, if we do not remove the idea of having lived in a kind of double state - one open and democratic, the other clandestine and reactionary. That is why we want to know what and how many ''Gladio'' networks there have been in recent years in the Member States of the European Community.

B. We uphold justice by fulfilling the European Parliament's request for a full judicial investigation

European Parliament, 22 Nov 1990, RESOLUTION ON THE GLADIO AFFAIR, Joint resolution replacing B3-2021, 2058, 2068, 2078 and 2087/90, sections 4 and 5, [www.poptel.org.uk/cgi-bin/dbs2/statewatch?query=Gladio&mode=records&row\_id=7255](http://www.poptel.org.uk/cgi-bin/dbs2/statewatch?query=Gladio&mode=records&row_id=7255) (brackets added)

[The European Parliament] 4. Calls on the judiciaries of the countries in which the presence of such military organizations has been ascertained to elucidate fully their composition and modus operandi and to clarify any action they may have taken to destabilize the democratic structure of the Member States;

5. Requests all the Member States to take the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organizations active in this field, and at the same time to monitor their links with the respective state intelligence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices;

C. Revealing Gladio will help guide public policy today

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

Today, with the Pentagon’s “Salvador Option” on the table, it’s time to revisit this hidden history of European counter-terrorism. While the Washington press corps seems convinced that the main problem with the "Salvador Option" is that the Pentagon is taking over what’s always been the CIA’s turf, the story of NATO’s stay-behind armies suggests that whether the CIA or Pentagon runs it, the new program will be a very ugly business.

2A EVIDENCE: GLADIO ACCOUNTABILITY

HARMS

Former CIA director William Colby confirmed existence of Gladio – but cover-up continues

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html>

Former CIA director William Colby confirmed in his memoirs that setting up the secret armies in Western Europe had been “a major program” for the CIA. The project started after World War II in total secrecy, and access to information was limited “to the smallest possible coterie of the most reliable people, in Washington, in NATO” and in the countries concerned. Yet when in Italy in 1990 former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner was questioned on television on Gladio, he strictly refused to answer any questions on the sensitive issue, and as the interviewer insisted with respect for the terror victims, Stansfield angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: "I said, no questions about Gladio!", whereafter the interview was over.

Judge Casson discovered Gladio was carrying out terrorism and blaming it on leftists

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html> (brackets added)

Felice Casson, an Italian judge who during his investigations into right-wing terrorism had first discovered the secret Gladio army and had forced [Italian Prime Minister Giulio] Andreotti to take a stand, found that the secret army had linked up with right-wing terrorists in order to confront “emergency situations”. The terrorists, supplied by the secret army, carried out bomb attacks in public places, blamed them on the Italian left, and were thereafter protected from prosecution by the military secret service.

Gladio terrorist confessed to 1972 bombing in Italy

Arthur E. Rowse, 31 Jan 2004, Independent Media Center, "GLADIO: THE SECRET U.S. WAR TO SUBVERT ITALIAN DEMOCRACY," <http://italy.indymedia.org/news/2004/01/473314.php?theme=1>

A triple murder at Peteano near Venice in May 1972 turned out to be pivotal in exposing Gladio. The crime occurred when three carabinieri, in response to an anonymous phone call, went to check out a suspicious car. When one of them opened the hood, all three were blown to bits by a boobytrap bomb. An anonymous call two days later implicated the Red Brigades, the most active of the left's revolutionary groups. The police immediately rounded up 200 alleged communists, thieves and pimps for questioning, but no charges were brought. Ten years later, a courageous Venetian magistrate, Felice Casson, reopened the long-dormant case only to learn that there had been no police investigation at the scene. Despite receiving a false analysis from a secret service bomb expert and confronting numerous obstructions and delays, the judge traced the explosives to a militant outfit called New Order and to one of its active members, Vincenzo Vinciguerra. He promptly confessed and was sentenced to life, the only right-wing bomber ever locked up.

Italian government admits Gladio’s existence and cover-up

Arthur E. Rowse, 31 Jan 2004, Independent Media Center, "GLADIO: THE SECRET U.S. WAR TO SUBVERT ITALIAN DEMOCRACY," <http://italy.indymedia.org/news/2004/01/473314.php?theme=1>

[Italian Judge Felice] Casson eventually found enough incriminating evidence to implicate the highest officials of the land. In what was the first such request to an Italian president, Casson demanded explanations from President Francesco Cossiga. But Casson didn't stop there; he also demanded that other officials come clean. In October 1990, under pressure from Casson, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti ended 30 years of denials and described Gladio in detail. He added that all prime ministers had been aware of Gladio, though some later denied it.

Gladio killed hundreds in Italy in the 1970s

Arthur E. Rowse, 31 Jan 2004, Independent Media Center, "GLADIO: THE SECRET U.S. WAR TO SUBVERT ITALIAN DEMOCRACY," <http://italy.indymedia.org/news/2004/01/473314.php?theme=1>

Conclusive Gladio links to political violence were found after a plane exploded in flight near Venice in November 1973. Venetian judge Carlo Mastelloni determined that the Argo-16 aircraft was used to shuttle trainees and munitions between the U.S. base in Sardinia and Gladio sites in northeast Italy. The apogee of right-wing terror came in 1974 with two massacres. One, a bombing at an antifascist rally in Brescia, killed eight and injured 102. The other was an explosion on the Italicus train near Bologna, killing 12 and wounding 105.

NATO stay-behind armies conducted terrorism and blamed it on communists

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "Secret Warfare: Gladio," excerpted from "Secret Warfare: Operation Gladio and NATO's Stay-Behind Armies," [www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret\_warfare\_and\_natos\_stay\_behind\_armies.htm](http://www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret_warfare_and_natos_stay_behind_armies.htm)

But there was agreement between the military secret services of the United States and of Western Europe that communist parties, and to some degree also socialist parties, had a real potential to weaken NATO from within and therefore represented a threat to the alliance. If they gained political strength and entered the executive, or, worse still, gained control of defence ministries, an emergency situation would result. The evidence now available suggests that in some countries the secret stay-behind armies linked up with right-wing terrorists and carried out terror attacks that were later wrongly blamed on the political left in order to discredit the communists and prevent them from assuming top executive positions.

NATO conducted attacks to influence politics in Europe

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

There’s nothing new about the “Salvador Option.” At the end of last month, Frank Cass in London released a new book by Dr. Daniele Ganser of the Center for Security Studies at the Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich called, “NATO’s Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe,” which offers plenty of evidence that there was also a “Salvador Option” in post-war Europe. It turns out that during the Cold War, European governments and secret services conspired with a NATO-backed operation to engineer attacks in their own countries in order to manipulate the population to reject socialism and communism.

Secret armies were involved in Turkey, Spain, Greece, Germany and other countries

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html>

In Turkey, the “Counter-Guerrilla” was involved in domestic terror and torture operations against the Kurds, while in Greece, the “LOK” took part in the 1967 military coup d’état to prevent a Socialist government. In Spain, the secret army was used to prop up the fascist dictatorship of Franco, and in Germany, right-wing terrorists used the explosives of the secret army in the 1980 terror attack in Munich. In other countries, including Denmark, Norway, and Luxemburg, the secret soldiers prepared for the eventual occupation of their home country and never engaged in domestic terror or manipulation. In the context of the ongoing so-called war on terror, the Gladio data promotes the sobering insight that governments in the West have sacrificed the life of innocent citizens and covered up acts of terrorism in order to manipulate the population. Allegations that NATO, the Pentagon, MI6, the CIA, and European intelligence services were linked to terror, coups d’état, and torture in Europe are obviously of an extremely sensitive nature, and future research is needed in the field.

“Strategy of tension” – NATO gave right-wing terrorists explosives and blamed terror in leftists

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

It was called “the strategy of tension” and it was carried out by members of secret stay-behind armies organized by NATO and funded by the CIA in Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and other European countries. The strategy apparently involved supplying right-wing terrorists with explosives to carry out terrorist acts which were then blamed on left-wing groups to keep them out of power.

“Salvador Option” policies involve secret hit squads

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

Washington is shocked by Seymour Hersh’s scoop about the Pentagon’s “Salvador Option,” an ambitious plan to deploy secret special forces in friendly and unfriendly countries to spy, target terrorists and their sympathizers, and conduct “hits,” all without Congressional oversight. Its model is the American counter-insurgency program in Salvador in the 1980s which funded nationalist death squads to hunt down insurgents. What’s new today is that the program would be run by the Pentagon, not the CIA, and it would be much broader in scope. According to Hersh, the Pentagon's gremlins are already at work in Iran prepping targets for possible US or Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

INHERENCY

NATO blocking Gladio investigations

Lila Rajiva, Common Dreams News Center, 10 Feb 2005, "The Pentagon's 'NATO Option' " [www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm](http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0210-22.htm)

The secret armies were first outed in August 1990 when then Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti confirmed the existence of Gladio, Latin for sword, a super secret group squirreled away in the military secret service, that had been manipulating the public with terrorist acts that it blamed on the Italian left. NATO’s reaction to Andreotti’s revelation was first denial, then stone-walling, and finally a closed-doors admission to the ambassadors of the European countries. Since then, although a former CIA director William Colby has confirmed the creation of the stay-behind command centers and networks, NATO itself has withheld details.

SOLVENCY/ADVANTAGES

Plan advocate: EU Parliament passed resolution demanding full investigation

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich; ETH=Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html>

The majority of EU parliamentarians followed Falqui, and in a special resolution on 22 November 1990 made it clear that the EU “protests vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network”, calling for a “a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims, and all other aspects of these clandestine organizations or any splinter groups, their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs of the countries concerned, and the problem of terrorism in Europe”.

Gladio accountability is essential to the future of democracy in Europe

Daniele Ganser (Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH in Zurich), Dec 2004, "NATO’s secret armies linked to terrorism?" <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GAN412A.html>

“This Europe will have no future,” Italian representative Falqui opened the debate, “if it is not founded on truth, on the full transparency of its institutions in regard to the dark plots against democracy that have turned upside down the history, even in recent times, of many European states.” Falqui insisted that “there will be no future, ladies and gentlemen, if we do not remove the idea of having lived in a kind of double state - one open and democratic, the other clandestine and reactionary. That is why we want to know what and how many "Gladio" networks there have been in recent years in the Member States of the European Community."

Gladio accountability is needed to force change in future policies

Daniele Ganser, Dec 2004, "Secret Warfare: Gladio," excerpted from "Secret Warfare: Operation Gladio and NATO's Stay-Behind Armies, [www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret\_warfare\_and\_natos\_stay\_behind\_armies.htm](http://www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/secret_warfare_and_natos_stay_behind_armies.htm)

The US Ministery of Defense, the Pentagon, did not take a stand on the subject of the secret NATO stay-behind armies in 1990 because it was not questioned at all by the US press. This lead US journalist Arthur Rowse to draw "The lessons of Gladio": "As long as the US public remains ignorant of this dark chapter in US foreign relations, the agencies responsible for it will face little pressure to correct their ways". Rowse criticized that the end of the cold war had not enhanced the transparency of US executive branches and that therefore the United States "still awaits a real national debate on the means and ends and costs of our national security policies."

Switzerland participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace

Center for Security Studies, 2006, "Partnership for Peace (PfP) Switzerland," International Security Forum, [www.isf.ethz.ch/partners/pfp\_switzerland.cfm](http://www.isf.ethz.ch/partners/pfp_switzerland.cfm) (brackets added)

For Switzerland the PfP [Partnership for Peace] is a key security policy forum. It enables Switzerland to put forth directly its interests with regard to NATO and other partner states as well as benefit from the exchange of information and experiences.

JOIN THE CLUB: THE CASE FOR ENHANCED MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

NATO's Secretary General says "NATO's door is open" when it comes to admitting new members into the alliance.

[Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

By November, Scheffer was using his same line to discuss potential Georgian membership: "Needless to say that NATO's door is open." ]

But that's only a good policy if those who come through the open door bring some benefit to the alliance. And because we find the Status Quo is not doing enough to ensure new members are an asset, and not a liability, my partner and I stand resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS

**NATO:** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#) *)*

**Significant:** "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org) *)*

**Reform:** "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform)*)*

**Referendum:** "the principle or practice of submitting to popular vote a measure passed on or proposed by a legislative body or by popular initiative" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/referendum*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/referendum) *)*

**MAP:** "The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance." (*NATO Official web page, 7 July 2006, NATO TOPICS, "Membership Action Plan (MAP)"* [*http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html)

**GDP - Gross Domestic Product.** "the official measure of total output of goods and services" *(Lincoln Anderson, "Gross Domestic Product," THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 2002,* [*www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GrossDomesticProduct.html*](http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GrossDomesticProduct.html)

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: We will show you that the Status Quo lacks important safeguards for prospective new members coming into the NATO alliance. Later under our Harms, we will show you why the lack of these safeguards is hurting NATO today.

Missing Safeguard #1: Popular referendum before joining the alliance

David J. Smith (Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington), 6 June 2006, "Information and Disinformation: Some Straight Talk about NATO," 24 HOURS, <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/media/mediaclips/2006/Smith%20-%2024%20Hours%20-%20Some%20Straight%20Talk%20-%205%20June.doc>

A country could hold a referendum if it is legally required to do that, or if its political leadership decides to seek political validation this way. In reality, among the ten countries that have joined NATO since the end of the Cold War, only Slovenia held a referendum.

Missing Safeguard #2: Verification of military capabilities

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 195 ("First Wave" = the first countries that joined NATO after end of the Cold War in the 1990s)

This focus on the primacy of providing capabilities and assets, no matter how small, to contribute to the War on Terrorism coupled with the Bush Administration’s preference to increasingly regard NATO as a “tool box” from which forces and niche capabilities can be drawn upon to contribute to US-led coalitions has resulted in the downplaying of overall military capabilities at the point of accession. Assessments evaluating the progress in the MAP process concluded that none of the nine aspirants had fully met the formal criteria for membership and that the military capabilities of all are substantially weaker than those of the “first-wavers” at the time they were invited to join in 1997.

Missing Safeguard #3: Enforcing compliance with 2% GDP defense spending goal

Agence France Presse, 29 Sept 2006, "NATO chief embarrassed by low defence spending," <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=144286>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation encourages its 26 member countries to target their defence budgets to at least 2.0 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2005, 18 of them fell short of that goal.

Now let's notice the problems caused by these missing safeguards as we go to

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS  
  
Harm 1: Lack of public debate about joining NATO hurts new members' performance once they join

Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova & Thomas S Szayna, March 2002, The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 5

The uninspiring Czech performance as a NATO member can be traced to the lack of a public debate regarding defence and military issues in the Czech Republic in general and, more specifically, about Czech responsibilities as a NATO member. Prior to accession, polls showed that Czech public support for membership was among the lowest of the ten countries aspiring to membership. The way the process of accession unfolded only compounded the initial hurdle of low approval. Czech officials and politicians prepared, negotiated, and implemented the entire process, with little public involvement or debate.

Harm 2: Militarily weak new members make the alliance weaker, not stronger

David Anthony Denny (Staff Writer), US Dept. of State, June 2006, "NATO's Changing Role in World Affairs Topic of Latest Webchat," International Information Programs, <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2006/Jun/06-775137.html> (brackets added)

One webchat participant asked [John] Hulsman [PhD, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation] which countries were likeliest to be offered membership next in NATO, which currently has 26 members. He replied that the question is harder to answer with each round of membership expansion. That is so, he said, because as NATO has moved eastward in terms of territory, the new members are, on balance, consumers rather than providers of security assets. "As NATO has an immense capabilities gap, this is not helping matters," he said.

Harm 3: Failure to meet the defense spending goal means failure of NATO's agenda

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Institute for Foreign Policy Studies), Remarks at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Conference, Dec 2005, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," Heritage Foundation Lecture #919, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

This ambitious agenda cannot be implemented with today’s level of military and security expendi­ture. NATO countries which dedicate only 1.1 per­cent–1.5 percent of their GDP to the overall effort are not pulling their weight. The current alloca­tions are not sufficient to fully fund the Prague and Berlin Plus commitments, the war on terrorism, and out-of-area deployments, including peace­keeping missions. To survive, NATO needs to find financial resources to fund its vital missions. Oth­erwise, as Ben Franklin said, “Those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither.”

To solve these harms, we offer the following PLAN, to be implemented by any necessary legal means:

**Plank 1: Agency:** The North Atlantic Council and NATO member governments

Plank 2: **Mandates:**

1. All new applicant nations shall be required to hold a binding referendum before being accepted into NATO membership.
2. A Military Readiness Committee (MRC) shall be established with sufficient staff and funding. MRC shall be empowered to certify that candidate member nations meet standards of military readiness, technological capability, NATO interoperability and overall would be a net military asset to the alliance. No criteria other than military readiness and net military asset determination shall be used. No new member nations shall be admitted without MRC certification.
3. MRC certification will continue to be required yearly for the first 10 years of membership.
4. Beginning 4 years after this plan takes effect, any NATO member that does not spend at least 2% of GDP on defense shall be suspended from the alliance. Membership shall be restored after completing 1 fiscal year of 2% GDP defense spending.

Plank 3: **Funding** shall come from donations from the US Federal Government derived from cutting the National Institute on Aging.  
Plank 4: **Enforcement** shall be through the North Atlantic Council and NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office. Any nation failing MRC certification shall not be invited into NATO or shall be dropped from the alliance if already a member, and will have to restart the application process from the beginning.  
Plank 5: This plan takes effect 7 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan as needed.

OBSERVATION 4: The plan produces ADVANTAGES over the Status Quo

Advantage 1: Referendums reduce public alienation and improve public acceptance of new policies

Bruno Kaufmann (President, The Initiative & Referendum Institute), 2003, International Symposium on Initiatives, Referendums, and Direct Democracy, The European Referendum Challenge: From French Revolution to European Integration Facts, Views, and Prospects, p. 44-45

Complementing indirect democracy by adding direct forms of co-determination can be considered as “social innovation with beneficial economic consequences.” The benefits of this social innovation include: reduced alienation from politics, greater legitimacy and transparency, a greater identification of citizens with the policies introduced and an increased capacity for learning in civil society.

Advantage 2: NATO pressure and sanctions will force new members to raise their performance

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 196 (brackets added; parentheses in original)

What do these developments portend for the prospects of sustaining military reform in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] within both the new and newly invited allies? There is universal agreement that leverage over new members diminishes drastically once the “golden ring of NATO membership” is achieved. Indeed, some have proposed organizational mechanisms through which under-performing members can be sanctioned and, if non-performance persists, dismissed from the Alliance. (Wallander, 2002: p. 6-7) The adoption of such a mechanism would be a positive lever for ensuring continued progress on improving the defense capacities of the CEE states.

Advantage 3: Raising defense spending to 2% of GDP provides needed resources for defense modernization

US Dept of Defense, 28 June 2004, News Transcript, NATO Summit Background Briefing, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040628-0946.html>

The two percent figures relates to defense spending as a percentage of GDP. It's a commonly-agreed goal, two percent, and about half the allies fall under that, which is unfortunate because more resources are needed for defense modernization.

2A EVIDENCE: MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

DEFINITIONS

MAP - programs to help candidate nations qualify to join NATO

Thomas S. Szayna (Political scientist, RAND), Testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 17 Apr 2002, p. 2

NATO launched MAP in April 1999, with the aim of keeping the alliance's door open to future members. MAP consists of individually tailored programs of activities and exchanges to help the aspirant countries prepare for possible membership. MAP contains five "chapters:" (1) political and economic issues; (2) defense/military issues; (3) resource issues; (4) security issues; and (5) legal issues. Each country prepares a detailed annual plan as part of MAP, with activities designed to further alliance compatibility in all five chapters.

INHERENCY

NATO is ignoring popular opposition to Ukraine's potential membership

M. K Bhadrakumar (career diplomat, 29 years in the Indian Foreign Service, served as ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey ), 31 May 2006, ASIA TIMES, " Russia's search for collective security," <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HE31Ag01.html>

NATO is also demonstratively making an exception for Ukraine by not insisting that before it become a member country, Kiev must resolve the problem of the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, or that it should do something about the manifest opposition to NATO membership among the majority of Ukraine's population.

Majority of NATO members spend less than 2% of GDP on defense

Sen. Carl Levin, 7 Mar 2006, "Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing to Receive Testimony from Admiral Fallon (Pacific Command), General Bell (U.S. Forces Korea), General Jones (European Command)" <http://www.senate.gov/~levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=253347>

However, as General Jones noted in an interview last October, even as NATO has demonstrated a willingness to do more, there appears to be a desire on the part of some of NATO members to “fund less.” Despite NATO members’ commitment at the 2003 Prague Summit to a spending goal of two percent of each country’s GDP for defense, a majority of NATO members are below that mark.

Riga Summit did nothing to enforce 2% GDP spending goal

Mark John, Reuters news service, 29 Nov 2006, "NATO rapid-reaction force gets final green light," <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L29436487.htm> (brackets added)

The [Riga] summit declaration "encouraged nations whose defence spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase spending in real terms". But it omitted a specific reference to the NATO target of maintaining defence spending at or above 2 percent of national income, something only six or seven of the 26 allies achieve.

No commitment to 2% GDP spending goal

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 17 (brackets added, parentheses in original)

The CPG [Comprehensive Political Guidance] does remind members that they should aim to spend two percent of GDP on defense, but the CPG in no way commits members to doing so. (Of NATO’s 26 members, only 7 have met this target to date.)

Status Quo has no incentive for new members to improve military capabilities

Celeste A. Wallander, November/December 2002, Foreign Affairs, "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out," [www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101facomment9987/celeste-a-wallander/nato-s-price-shape-up-or-ship-out.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101facomment9987/celeste-a-wallander/nato-s-price-shape-up-or-ship-out.html)

The golden ring of NATO membership has certainly served as a powerful incentive for internal reform and Westernization throughout central and eastern Europe. But what happens now that these new democracies are members? What is their incentive to continue on the path of reform and convergence with the Western security community that is NATO? Actually, there is none.

MAP is not a binding list of criteria for membership

Robert Bradtke (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs), 27 Mar 2003, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/nato177.html>

In establishing the MAP, NATO's leaders stated specifically that the MAP "cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership." Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, the aspirant countries developed an Annual National Program (ANP) to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms were focused on five key areas: political and economic development; defense and military issues; budgets; security of sensitive information; and legal issues. NATO reviewed the Annual National Programs, and each Ally provided comment and feedback. In the spring, each aspirant met with the North Atlantic Council in a "19-plus-1" format to review its progress in achieving its reform goals.

Referendum is not required to join NATO today

David J. Smith (Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington), 6 June 2006, "Information and Disinformation: Some Straight Talk about NATO," 24 HOURS, <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/media/mediaclips/2006/Smith%20-%2024%20Hours%20-%20Some%20Straight%20Talk%20-%205%20June.doc>

Contrary to Baluyevsky’s assertion, there is no NATO requirement that a prospective member hold a national referendum on joining the alliance. The mechanism for joining the alliance is acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty. That means that each current member must accept an amendment to that Treaty according to its constitutional requirements. At the same time, a country offered membership would have to ratify the Treaty according to its own constitutional requirements.

Lack of public debate is a shortcoming to the NATO membership process

Tatiana Kostadinova, Political Science Department, University of Minnesota Duluth, Prepared for delivery at the Bucharest Conference of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society of IPSA, Bucharest, Romania, June/July 2002.

Public awareness of a military alliance has a direct effect on the process of formation of opinions in support or in opposition to joining such an organization. The absence of a serious debate on the benefits and the responsibilities of NATO membership has recently been emphasized as a shortcoming of the process of enlargement to the East (Dorff, 1998; Grabbe & Hughes, 1999). Obtaining membership is viewed by the East Europeans as solving the problem of national security in general without realizing the costs of being a member.

Three new countries are trying to join NATO now

Southeast European Times, 25 Oct 2006, "Parliament members from Croatia, Macedonia, Albania push for NATO membership," [www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2006/10/25/nb-02](http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2006/10/25/nb-02) (brackets added)

Parliamentary delegations from Albania, Croatia and Macedonia met in Tirana on Tuesday (October 24th) to discuss measures aimed at bringing their countries closer to NATO membership. They pledged to continue to develop democratic institutions, defend human rights and strengthen rule of law. The MPs [members of Parliament] also agreed to promote political, military and economic co-operation and to accelerate the fight against organised crime and corruption. A joint declaration on these matters is to be presented at NATO's November summit in Riga.

HARMS

Very few of the new NATO members make any sizeable contribution to alliance capabilities

Dr Todor Tagarev (G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Bulgaria), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTOINS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 17

In addition, in the 1990s the defense establishments in the former Warsaw Pact countries and ex-Soviet republics were only a small part of what were immature and generally weak democratic institutions. Even under the impact of declining economies and the lack of an obvious enemy, senior political and military leaders felt safer adhering to inherited force structures and force development models. One result is that, at the time of their accession, very few of the new NATO members had any sizeable contribution to make to the Alliance’s capabilities.

Lack of referendum caused poor behavior by Czech republic

Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova & Thomas S Szayna, March 2002, The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 4

The main source of Czech hesitation toward NATO is a perception of a low level of influence that the public has on decision-making in security issues. The lack of transparency and public debate in the Czech decision to join NATO, exemplified by the lack of a referendum on the issue, is the main source of the problem. In other words, shortcomings in the democratic process in the Czech Republic continue to affect Czech attitudes and behaviour toward NATO. This is a most pertinent lesson regarding the anticipated next round of enlargement.

Low defense budgets reduce NATO's capabilities

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Institute for Foreign Policy Studies), Remarks at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Conference, Dec 2005, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," Heritage Foundation Lecture #919, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

Clearly, inte­grating the Balkans and expanding ties with Ukraine are missions most members agree on. Beyond that, NATO needs to balance ambition and funding. It is difficult to have an ambitious deployment policy or far-reaching and expensive partner­ships while budgets stagnate or decline.

NATO needs more funding to survive

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Institute for Foreign Policy Studies), Remarks at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Conference, Dec 2005, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," Heritage Foundation Lecture #919, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

To survive, NATO needs to find financial resources to fund its vital missions. Oth­erwise, as Ben Franklin said, “Those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither.”

NATO invitation leads to complacency: Pressure is needed to enforce reforms

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 218 (brackets added)

Some within the small community of civilian Czech national security experts contend that the Army is incapable of reforming itself. Those of this view believe that a NATO invitation in-hand only led to complacence – that once the ACR [Czech Army] was in NATO, as an institution it was less willing to work for reform. (Gabal interview, 2001) This view suggests that only sustained external pressure from both NATO and Czech political leaders will sustain the reform efforts.

NATO expansion creates difficulties if new allies don't reform

Defense Transformation and the New Allies Helle C. Dale (Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies) Heritage Lecture #853 8 Sept 2004 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm>

The expansion of NATO has brought the United States new and very important allies, but it has also exacerbated the difficulties of managing forces with very different technologies. This is particularly true because many of our new NATO allies are even less engaged in the race for defense transformation than our traditional European partners.

Weak new members are a liability to the alliance

Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2006, NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership, [www.cfr.org/publication/11159/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11159/) (parentheses in original, first brackets added, second brackets in original)

New members may not pull their military weight. Only six NATO members spend the suggested 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, requiring members like the United States to shoulder a higher financial burden. [Expert on NATO affairs and president of New Mexico-based St. Johns College Michael] Peters does not believe some of the states being considered for membership, such as Georgia, can make a meaningful military contribution to NATO. “It would be stretching the definition [of which countries qualify for the alliance],” he says. “But NATO’s already stretched it by including Baltic States like Latvia, which have no military capability. The only thing they bring from a military point of view is territory.”

New members were let into NATO without meeting capability standards

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 193-194 ("First Wave" = the first countries that joined NATO after end of the Cold War in the 1990s)

All three “first-wavers” fell far short of NATO military standards at the point of accession. Poland was largely regarded as having the most professional armed forces, with the Czech Republic and Hungary holding down distant second and third places. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been continually berated as “new allies” for not living up to the commitments established in the accession process to improve their military capabilities. The Czechs have responded with the reform plan detailed in this paper, while Hungary seems to have accepted the moniker of “most disappointing new member of NATO.”

Increased capabilities are a significant problem in Central and Eastern Europe

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 197 (brackets added)

While the direction and relevance of NATO may still lack certainty in the wake of the Prague Summit, the current international security environment calls for increased capabilities on the part of all states whose interests are threatened by the transnational threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as well as the challenges of dealing with failed states, resolving post-conflict societies, and nation building. These tasks will require a spectrum of capabilities sustained over an indefinite timeline. The U.S. has neither the resources, nor the wherewithal to take on these challenges alone. It is within this context that the success of military reform in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] states, and within other states with shared interests is important.

Elites avoid democracy by not holding referendum on NATO membership

Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova & Thomas S Szayna, March 2002, The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 5

Based on a widespread opinion among Czech politicians that Czech citizens have a passive or even a negative view toward military issues, national defense and alliances, some Czech politicians deliberately did not wish to “irritate” the public by discussing the possibility of joining NATO and wanted to keep a “low profile” in the question of NATO membership. Their goal was not to overcome the low level of public support by pushing the bar higher, but to crawl under it. Moreover, both of the main political parties shared this view. The main reason for the lack of a referendum on NATO membership stemmed from the doubts among the elite about the public voting in favour of NATO. Even though the opposition social-democrats included a promise of a referendum in their election campaign in mid-1998, they failed to carry through their promise after winning the elections.

Lack of referendum hurt Czech's participation in NATO operations

Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova & Thomas S Szayna, March 2002, The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 6

The low level of public support for NATO membership in the Czech Republic had led to an unflattering image of the country among some of the long-standing NATO members (especially the United States) as a likely low contributor to NATO. Czech behaviour during NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999 strengthened that image further. The Czech Republic was divided along social and political lines, even within the highest state institutions. A majority of the population opposed the operation and many officials of the government as well as members of the opposition tried to distance themselves from responsibility for NATO's decisions. A lack of consensus at the highest levels of the Czech representative bodies persisted throughout the entire Operation. Even though the Czech Republic eventually fell in line with NATO, Czech behaviour had cast doubts upon the loyalty and reliability of the country as a NATO member and exposed the deficiencies of the country’s security and political decision-making mechanisms.

ADVANTAGES

Referendum ("direct institutions") gives advantages to European democracy: accountability, transparency, participation

Bruno Kaufmann (President, The Initiative & Referendum Institute), 2003, International Symposium on Initiatives, Referendums, and Direct Democracy, The European Referendum Challenge: From French Revolution to European Integration Facts, Views, and Prospects, p. 44-45

It therefore becomes necessary to make very clear what are the advantages which accrue to a modern representative democracy from a combination of indirect and direct institutions, as against the traditional and dominant model of a purely parliamentarian democracy. This is especially true for the European Union, where national governments act as European lawmakers and therefore occupy a dual position of power – and, thus, such core concepts of democracy as accountability, transparency and participation cannot be met in a satisfying manner.

NATO can exert pressure to improve military capabilities

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (Associate Professor, U.S. Army War College), 2005, "Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Administration and Management, Volume Ten, Number 2, p. 219

Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia has yet achieved their shared goal of instituting radical military reform. Success will depend on maintaining the domestic political consensus within the government and the armed forces that is currently still at high levels compared to earlier points in the postcommunist era. Continued external pressure is also vital. NATO can exert leverage due to its interest in policing interoperability standards so that the Alliance can improve its capabilities.

Czech example shows referendums are needed in the future

Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova & Thomas S Szayna, March 2002, The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 6

But the deeper causes of Czech indecisiveness may lie in the lack of interest toward issues of defence and security. If that is the case, then in its mindset the Czech public may have remained outside the alliance. Or, potentially even more worrisome for NATO, the Czech public and politicians have succeeded in joining the alliance but may not be willing to make a contribution to collective defence. If that is indeed the case, then an analysis of the Czech public’s view of the alliance is also important from the standpoint of deciding which post-communist countries to bring into the alliance in the future.

MAKING THE TEAM: THE CASE FOR NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Hendrickson, an expert on NATO-Russia relations, described the thesis of our case in a paper he wrote in December 2005: "The 1999 50th Anniversary Summit reiterated this important relationship by declaring that 'a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.' "

[Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 4]

Today we will show you that the Status Quo has some cooperation between NATO and Russia, but not enough to bring about the lasting stability that a strong partnership could bring. To better achieve this goal, my partner and I are happy to affirm that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

**OBSERVATION 1: We offer the following DEFINITIONS**

**NATO:** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#) *)*

**Significant:** "important or noticeable" *(Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org) *)*

**Reform:** "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Dict. online, 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform) *)*

**NRC:** "The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established in May 2002 as the main forum for advancing NATO-Russia relations, in which the 26 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action." (*NATO official web page, 19 Oct 2006, NATO Topics: NATO-Russia Relations,* [*http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

**NRF:** NATO Response Force - "an integrated, combined force of 25,000 land, sea, air and special operations troops, all under one command, certified to handle seven distinct missions from forcible entry to humanitarian assistance." *(U.S. Department of State, Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS,* [*http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html*](http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html)*, brackets added)*

OBSERVATION 2: The GOAL of our case will be "a stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia" as described above by Colonel Hendrickson.

We will show you that by comparatively better achieving this goal, we will gain advantages over the Status Quo and justify an Affirmative ballot.

OBSERVATION 3: INHERENCY. The Status Quo fails to meet the goal

FAILURE 1: Russia is excluded from most NATO decision-making

Vladimir Socor (senior fellow and long-time senior analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, formerly a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, is a specialist in the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, CIS affairs and ethnic conflicts), 9 June 2004, " PUTIN TO BOYCOTT NATO SUMMIT" The Jamestown Foundation, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, <http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=2979&article_id=2368069> (brackets added)

[Sergei] Rogov [Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences] described the current situation as involving two baskets: a very large one in which NATO makes decisions without Russia, and a very small basket under the aegis of NRC [NATO-Russia Council], in which consultations are held but decisions are not made.

FAILURE 2: Russia is not informed nor consulted

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_report&report\_id=498](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498)

Along with conceptual and organizational changes in the 1990s, N.A.T.O. has conducted operations outside of its territory and enlarged its membership. A number of these developments have specifically annoyed Russia:

# N.A.T.O.'s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, with the air attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and the air campaign on Kosovo in 1999, in particular. Russia was neither consulted nor informed about these operations prior to their start.

FAILURE 3: NATO expansion to its borders risks Russia pushing back hard

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School), Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. viii

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has enlarged its membership twice with countries formerly under Soviet influence and control, and the Alliance is now preparing to begin the process for a third expansion effort. During this time, Russia has watched the borders of NATO creep ever closer to its own, but has generally been powerless to prevent it. Although NATO has taken pains to include and consult with Russia regarding its actions and future plans, the Kremlin cannot reasonably be expected to continue to watch NATO’s expansion eastward without eventually pushing back hard.

FAILURE 4: Russia is excluded from the NATO Response Force

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 39

Another long-term issue is the Russian relationship to NRF, since it is designed to play a role in both Article 5 and peace support operations. For the next few years, however, non-NATO members are likely to be excluded from NRF exercises and, so far, Russian participation is not part of the NRF concept.

OBSERVATION 4: We offer the following PLAN, to be implemented by any necessary legal means

**Plank 1: Agency**: The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and any necessary member governments.

Plank 2: **Mandates:**

1. The authority of the NATO-Russia Council shall be expanded. All decisions about future non-Article 5 military interventions, deployments, peacekeeping, and expansion of the alliance shall take place in the NRC in place of the NAC. No missions already existing at the time of an Affirmative ballot shall be affected by this rule.
2. NATO will begin preparing with any necessary training to integrate Russian participation into Combined Joint Task Forces and NRF, with a timetable for full integration by 2010.

Plank 3: **Funds** shall come from the US Federal Government, obtained by cutting the National Institute on Aging and Head Start.

Plank 4: **Enforcement:** Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 7 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: The Affirmative team reserves the right to clarify this plan in later speeches.

OBSERVATION 5. SOLVENCY: The plan overcomes the failures we identified in the Status Quo

SOLUTION 1: Expanding NRC to include "hard security" issues meets Russia's goals for NATO cooperation

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” <http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488>

The NRC was officially proposed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. He suggested that given the new security situation after the tragic events of September 11, intensive Russia-US cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, Russia’s support of the US operation in Afghanistan and the decision of President Putin to allow the US troops to relocate to Central Asia, it was logical and desirable to raise the level and intensity of Russia-NATO relations. However, in reality the idea was presented by Moscow, which then persuaded Blair (at that time Putin’s closest friend in Europe) to propose it. And the goal Russia was pursuing was not just an increase in cooperation with NATO in the anti-terror field, but integration into the decision-making system of the West in the sphere of “hard” security.

SOLUTION 2: Now is the time to open NRF and CJTF integration with Russia

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 39

But this exclusion should not continue forever. Indeed, NATO and PFP exercises will increasingly concentrate on training and exercising the NRF. Beyond 2010 -- if not sooner -- ways should be found to integrate Russian and other non-NATO forces in NRF peace support exercises and operations.

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 40

In sum, after 2006, Russian officers should be able to join PFP exercises at the operational level. And 2010 should be the deadline for Russian forces -- Generals and staff officers as well as selected troops -- to reach NATO/PFP standards for NATO-led CJTF joint and combined non-Article 5 operations.

SOLUTION 3: Increased military cooperation with Russia will improve the political relationship

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 9

It is impossible to define how much is enough at any point in the NATO-Russia military-to-military relations and cooperation. Most important is that the pace be consistent with political intentions and ability to follow through -- recognizing that the more Russians and NATO cadres have experience in working together, the more likely (other factors being equal) that the overall political relationship will prosper.

OBSERVATION 6: Improved NATO-Russia relations produce positive ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGES 1 and 2 both come from the same evidence, and they are 1) Helping Russia Reform; and 2) Increased European Stability

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 34

Much of the NATO-Russia relationship can be determined by the attitude of cooperation from the Alliance. Martin van Heuven, former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the European Office of the UN and International Organizations in Geneva and former member of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, has summarized the benefits of this cooperation, pointing out that “a purposeful Western policy of cooperation will remain important to help Russia reform and to meet the sensitive issue of Russia’s perception of itself as a world power. But Western cooperation will be validated only to the degree reform will create some form of dependency on the West, creating mutual incentives for cooperation.” He points out that “an unstable Russia would make for an unstable Europe. On the other hand, a Russia that is focused forward on reform rather than backward on lost empire, and that cooperates with NATO will be an indispensable and positive factor in European security. This should be the continuing objective of NATO policy.”

ADVANTAGE 3: Increased European security and improved response to global threats

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 48

For the sake of continental security and stability, cooperation with NATO is expedient for Russia. This cooperation can be channeled into establishing and maintaining stable relations in ways that maintain an adequate level of trust and transparency; establishing the principle of common liablity for jointly made decisions in areas of mutual interest, based on consensus; applying the benefits of Russia-NATO interoperability to the activities of other organizations and institututions, such as EC, OSCE, UN, as well as in the bilateral relationship; and using all these measures to enhance the ability of Russia and NATO to jointly counteract threats outside Europe.

2A EVIDENCE: NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION

GOAL

NATO-Russia cooperation on peace in Europe is Status Quo goal

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p.1 (brackets added)

Just prior to NATO's decision in July 1997 to admit to membership the first three countries from the former Warsaw Pact (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), it concluded a Founding Act with the Russian Federation. In it, the two parties agreed [to] build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO-Russia cooperation is unclear and lasting relationship not assured in the Status Quo

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 25

Since the beginning of NATO's post-Cold War transformation in the early 1990s and decisions, both in allied capitals and in Moscow, to develop a direct NATO-Russian relationship, the issue of the long-term nature of that relationship has been unclear. The Founding Act and the new NATO-Russia Council have helped, but they still do not point to a lasting relationship and its particular possibilities and requirements.

SIGNIFICANCE

NATO-Russia relationship is critical to Euro-Atlantic security

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 2

The NATO-Russia relationship is without question one of the most important and pressing issues that affects overall Euro-Atlantic security. It is a relationship that can, and must, survive future tests of differences in policies, actions and even sometimes values. However, it is a relationship worth fighting for, and leaders from both sides must find a way to work constructively through their differences. The future path of Euro-Atlantic security will depend on it.

Russia distrusts NATO

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 4

Ambassador Nicholas Burns, former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, explained that “one abiding legacy of the Cold War has been a deeply entrenched suspicion of NATO’s intentions, especially as the Alliance has expanded eastward and struggled to redefine its mission in the post-Soviet world. This feeling of distrust might be best summed up by the idea that, if it is good for NATO, it must be bad for Russia.”

Russia has legitimate worries about NATO

The Economist (British news magazine), 15 July 2006, "Surrounding Russia," [www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story\_id=7064507](http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=7064507)

Still, Russia's worries are partly genuine, and not altogether unreasonable. America would be concerned, argues Mr Nikonov, if Mexico and Canada were to join a military organisation led by Russia. Seen from Moscow, NATO expansion is beginning to look endless: the drive to “surround Russia with NATO,” says Dmitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, will demand “counter-measures”. The Kremlin worries about the future of its Black Sea fleet, should Ukraine get in. But even more important than bases, says Dmitri Trenin, of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, would be the sense that NATO membership had permanently reoriented Ukraine out of Russia's sphere of influence.

Russia is disappointed at lack of influence in NATO decision-making

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, "''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498>

Facing N.A.T.O., Russia feels a number of disappointments. For instance, Russia has no influence in N.A.T.O.'s decision-making process on the use of military force. Russia does not have access to the North Atlantic Council -- N.A.T.O.'s primary organ -- and, therefore, has no "veto right" to prevent certain decisions. Participation in decision-making is only offered in so-called "soft security" issues.

NATO operations in Balkans and Baltics produce negative Russian response

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, "''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498>

From N.A.T.O.'s side, by ignoring Russia in its Balkan operations, N.A.T.O. should have expected a negative response from Russia. This also applies to the continuing N.A.T.O. operation of providing air protection to the Baltic States. It would have been better to train and equip these states to perform this task themselves, which would have been less offensive toward neighboring Russia. Also, the U.S. deployment of forces near Russia and the possibility of N.A.T.O. bases in new member states are likely to affect mutual relations.

NATO operations in former Yugoslavia annoyed Russia – there was no consultation before it happened

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, "''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498>

Along with conceptual and organizational changes in the 1990s, N.A.T.O. has conducted operations outside of its territory and enlarged its membership. A number of these developments have specifically annoyed Russia:

# N.A.T.O.'s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, with the air attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and the air campaign on Kosovo in 1999, in particular. Russia was neither consulted nor informed about these operations prior to their start.

Distrust causing problems in Russia-NATO relationship today

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 17 June 2004, " VISIT TO MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION for a JOINT MEETING OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE" [www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=539](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=539) (brackets added)

In responding to questions from the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation, Mr [Sergei] Rogov [of the US and Canada Institute] noted the distrust that NATO expansion caused in Russia and that Russia cannot accept that European security issues can be decided without Russia playing an equal role. He cited the Russian withdrawal from Kosovo as consequence of this, noting that Russia removed its force from that NATO operation because it is not a member and does not have sufficient control over its forces in such a situation.

INHERENCY

Russia feels ignored as a major power in Europe – cannot understand nor accept NATO’s actions

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_report&report\_id=498](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498)

Russia was not informed prior to most of these decisions and feels ignored as a major power in Europe and even more as a former superpower. Furthermore, considering its traditional security perceptions -- pointing at encirclement by its enemies and an insatiable desire for security, demanding buffer zones such as the former Warsaw Pact satellites -- Russia has difficulty in understanding and accepting N.A.T.O.'s move eastward and conducting operations close to Russia's borders. The result of this is two-fold: disappointment and aversion.

Current expansion plans make now the critical time for improving relationship with Russia

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 1

As NATO now prepares for another likely round of enlargement within the next few years, its leaders must seriously consider the impact yet another growth eastward will have on the Russian Federation. Moscow has thus far accepted with relatively little protest NATO’s last two expansion rounds, which encompassed countries formerly under Soviet influence. This was partly due to Russia’s lack of ability to effectively prevent the Alliance from expanding, as well as the effort Alliance leaders made to keep Russia engaged with and included in NATO affairs. However, in considering another round of new members, which undoubtedly will include countries directly bordering the Russian Federation, NATO leaders will have to redouble their efforts and creativity to allay Russian fears of Western encirclement or encroachment.

NRC powers are limited and the agenda is fragmented – bypassing strategic decision-making

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” <http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488>

As a result, in May 2002 the NRC emerged in its present design – with a very limited agenda not even approaching the anticipated level of joint decision-making on fundamental political and hard security issues and problems of European and global security. Of course there is a NRC agenda, which includes the tasks of intelligence-sharing, rescue operations, non-proliferation issues, fighting terrorism, cooperation over Afghanistan and even “tactical” anti-ballistic missile systems, but this agenda is rather fragmented and focuses on entirely practical and technical issues, bypassing strategic decision-making.

Scope of NRC cooperation is not big enough in Status Quo, and unlikely to grow

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” <http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488>

The scale of cooperation in the NRC does not correspond to the size of the “new threats” of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism, regional instability, state failure, collapse of the Broader Middle East, etc. Moreover, any the NATO member state can block discussion of any question posed in the NRC if it deems discussion inappropriate for any arbitrary reason. This factor alone suggests that it is very unlikely that the NRC agenda and the scope will be increased in the near future; Poland, the Baltic States and the US, whose foreign policy elaboration will totally be dominated by the neoconservatives in the second Bush Administration, will certainly block any effort at Council efficacy. Since creation, there have been no precedents of the NRC moving beyond the initial agenda.

SOLVENCY

Russia-NATO relations are bad but Russia will try to work with NRC

M. K. Bhadrakumar (former diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan and to Turkey), 11 Nov 2006, ASIA TIMES online, "Russia and China create their own orbit," [www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\_Asia/HK11Ag01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HK11Ag01.html) (brackets added)

[Russian deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei] Ivanov reiterated that nonetheless, Russia would take at face value the potentials of developing a cooperative relationship within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council. But a spate of Russian statements in recent months indicates that the two sides' interests are diverging to a point of extensive disagreements. As Fedor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, wrote recently, "After a decade and a half of pretensions, Russian politicians are once again reaching for their pistols when they hear the word 'NATO'."

Russia should take an increased decision-making role in NATO to increase security in Europe

U.V. Morozov, 2004, RAND National Security Research Division (non-profit research organization), "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," Appendix D: Prospects for Elaboration of Joint Doctrines of Peacemaking Activities of Russia and NATO: Russia's Possible Role in NATO Rapid Reaction Forces, p. 46-47

Because of the need to fulfill mutual obligations, Russia-NATO cooperation will require closer partnership than ever before, starting with wider and more multilateral consultations on the key problems. As the relationship develops, this could lead to greater interoperability. At that point, Russia, together with other concerned non-NATO parties, would take a more and more active part in the decisionmaking process and in NATO actions (excluding obligations under Article 5 of Washington Treaty). At some stage, Russian cooperation in NATO may become necessary for ensuring overall security, both inside and outside Europe.

More issues need to be decided with Russian involvement in NRC

Vladimir Socor (senior fellow and long-time senior analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, formerly a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, is a specialist in the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, CIS affairs and ethnic conflicts), 9 June 2004, " PUTIN TO BOYCOTT NATO SUMMIT" The Jamestown Foundation, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, <http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=2979&article_id=2368069>

Sergei Rogov, director of the USA Institute and an influential policy adviser, outlined Moscow's short- and medium-term goals with respect to NRC in an unusually public forum. In a May 27 interview, Rogov recommended that NATO's character as a "defensive military alliance" is diluted through Russia's inclusion in the alliance's decision-making processes via NRC. As an early first step, Moscow and NATO would proceed within NRC to develop three baskets of issues: one basket on which Russia would enjoy the same decision-making rights, including veto rights, as does each NATO member country; another basket of issues on which NATO "must consult Russia, which will voice its opinion," before NATO makes a decision; and a third group of issues, on which NATO will decide without Russia.

NATO should have a goal of military cooperation with Russia in non-Article 5 operations

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 39

NRC should give clear guidance and direction, as well as support, to NATO Strategic Commanders and the Russian General Staff in order to develop the ambitious program "beyond 2006." The ultimate goal of the overall NATO-Russia military cooperation program has been well defined by NATO Strategic Commanders and the Russian General Staff. Capabilities have to be built and maintained that would enable Russian generals, staff officers, and troops to operate within a CJTF during NATO-led non-Article 5 operations.

Russia is boosting its defense spending

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 17 mar 2005, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States," Statement For the Record Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 17

Moscow has been able to boost its defense spending in line with its recovering economy. Russia's Gross National Product averaged 6.7% growth over the past five years, predominately from increased energy prices and consumer demand.

Russia has successfully cooperated in the past with NATO in Kosovo

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 39

For a limited period of time, a battalion with its own organic logistic elements can be integrated into a brigade of another nation. Even better would be a brigade that would be integrated into a multinational division. In the past, NATO's Article 5 exercises, beginning int the 1960s and extending to actual peace support operations in the Balkans, have reflected this type of integration. In Kosovo, for example, a Russian battalion was made part of a German brigade, and the arrangement worked.

NATO should give Russia a voice in decision-making – or else Russia will look to China and India for security

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 35

Western institutions in general and NATO in particular should continue their strong focus on giving Russia a genuine voice in international decision-making. Otherwise, Russia will not perceive itself to have the same stake in these institutions as its western members and will continue to look to other partners, such as China and India, for support and security.

NATO should cooperate more with Russia even while waiting for Russian reforms

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 35

Although Russia will undoubtedly not become a member of all western institutions, it can still play a vital role and, more importantly, remain more closely integrated with these institutions. Granted, Russia must still show significant reform in several different areas in order to be taken seriously by Western institutions and integrated more closely into its structure. However, without weakening its own position or influence, the West can also still ensure that Moscow has a legitimate international voice commensurate with its perceived “great power” role, reasonable and competitive economic possibilities compatible with its own goals, and the opportunity to agree on many international foreign policy goals, even if there still exist some disagreements over the means to those goals. In the end, NATO must decide what kind of relationship it can and should have with Russia, keeping the long term in view. NATO should be a constructive partner and be able to understand the complexities of the situation the Kremlin leadership is facing. Alliance leaders should give a clear and consistent message of support and engagement to Russia, and should stand firm on those issues that involve its core interests and principles. Above all, NATO must convince Russia that it honestly has Russia’s best interests at heart, and that Moscow faces no threat from the Alliance.

NATO’s rule should be to include Russia and exclusion is the exception

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. viii

Increasingly, the basic approach should be that *inclusion* is the rule and *exclusion* is the exception. NATO and Russia must increasingly seek counsel with one another in any crisis either faces.

Russia should participate in NRF

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 10

Obviously, this concept will depend on the degree to which Western and Russian strategic and political interests are compatible and reinforcing, which will not always be the case (see Chapter Three), a judgment that often cannot be made in advance. Within these limitations, however, Russia should increasingly participate (with other EAPC states) in the practical workings of NATO-run Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and in NRF.

NATO and Russia should work to get Russia participating in NRF

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 10 (brackets added)

Given that the latter [NRF] will depend heavily on force-generation processes and is already being configured to be as much "plug and play" as possible -- ie., to enable individual allied countries to opt out of particular operations without jeopardizing the ability to carry out those operations--Russia can be a participant, and both NATO and Russia should work toward that end.

Russia should be involved in decision-making about peacekeeping operations and NRF deployment

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 9

Russian staff planners and military experts should be progressively consulted and engaged in developing NATO peacekeeping doctrine, including the employment doctrine for NRF--recognizing, of course, the requirements for engaging other EAPC/PFT countries. A viable vehicle for such an effort already exists, in the form of the Generic Concept for NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations, whose political decisionmaking aspects were agreed on in October 2002. This should develop into a corpus of common doctrine, developed as a two-way street and to be drawn upon by a wide range of "NATO-family" countries.

Joint decisions with Russia about security should be done to the maximum extent possible

Robert E. Hunter, PhD. (Senior Advisor at Rand Institute, former US ambassador to NATO) & Sergey M. Rogov (Director, Institute of US and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences ), 2004, RAND National Security Research Division, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant," p. 5

Russia should take a role in the development of Western policy and practice in areas beyond Europe, including the definition of *security.* One definition, most clearly advanced by the United States, implies a deep and lasting engagement by Western countries and institutions in the Middle East (and potentially beyond), including the region's long-term transformation--both on the parts of individual states and collectively. Here, too, there will be both a need and an opportunity for Russian "consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern."

NATO-Russia cooperation will help Russia reform by creating dependency on the West

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 34

Martin van Heuven, former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the European Office of the UN and International Organizations in Geneva and former member of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, has summarized the benefits of this cooperation, pointing out that “a purposeful Western policy of cooperation will remain important to help Russia reform and to meet the sensitive issue of Russia’s perception of itself as a world power. But Western cooperation will be validated only to the degree reform will create some form of dependency on the West, creating mutual incentives for cooperation.” He points out that “an unstable Russia would make for an unstable Europe. On the other hand, a Russia that is focused forward on reform rather than backward on lost empire, and that cooperates with NATO will be an indispensable and positive factor in European security. This should be the continuing objective of NATO policy.”

NATO-Russia military cooperation would share military capabilities and remove distrust

Dr. Marcel de Haas (Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael), Power and Interest News Report (independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.), 29 May 2006, "''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities'' <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498>

In addition to the current actions and plans for joint operations and exercises, there are more mutually beneficial possibilities of military cooperation that could be advanced. These possibilities include the exchange of operational experiences in irregular warfare (Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan) and operational doctrines (Russia's concept of mobile forces and N.A.T.O.'s concept of the expeditionary use of forces, as well as mutual views on the increasingly intertwined internal and external security). Also, to encourage mutual understanding and subsequently remove feelings of distrust, the exchange of (cadet) officers in training modules and of military academic staff in lecture postings could be established.

NRC should be upgraded with broader agenda and bigger decision-making

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” <http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488>

The Alliance’s direct involvement in Iraq is rather probable in the next year or two. In this case one should expect a rebirth of Russian interest in NATO as a decision-making body. And for this option it is necessary to preserve the NRC not just as talking shop, but in spirit as well - a successful forum, beneficial for both sides and open to the real possibility of intensifying and “upgrading” the Council in the future, of broadening its agenda and increasing its share in decision-making for the Euro-Atlantic area.

How the NRC was started

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 5-6

As a result, NATO leaders decided a new forum was necessary. After discussions at the Rome Summit in May 2002, they agreed that, despite a joint commitment to peacekeeping in the Balkans and the development of a substantial program of practical security and defense related cooperation, underlying “inhibitions” remained on both sides and should be dealt with in a new organization. The May 2002 Rome Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality” thus established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which met for the first time in May 2003 in Moscow.

Description of what NRC does

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson (US Air Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, nineteen years as an intelligence officer, served two years as the Air Attaché to Russia, graduate of the Air Force Academy, and has a master’s degree in national security affairs, and Soviet & East European studies from the Naval Postgraduate School) , Dec 2005, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled," p. 6 (ellipses in original)

According to the Rome Declaration, The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus…. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. Comprising three committees, seven standing working groups, and a number of other ad hoc expert groups designed to develop further cooperation in key areas, the NRC goes far beyond the previous PJC by seating Russia equally “at 27” with the 26 Allies for open, transparent discussions, rather than having the Allies first arrive at consensus and then face Russia later with a consolidated front.

AFFIRMATIVE Topicality: Reforming NATO Operations is topical

by Matthew Baker

I. AN ORGANIZATION INCLUDES ITS POLICIES, OPERATIONS, AND ACTIVITIES

An organization such as NATO is defined by its activities

Stanley R. Sloan (Senior Specialist in International Security Policy Congressional Research Service), “NATO’s Evolving Role and Mission,” Congressional Research Service, 1997, <http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-708>

“What is NATO?" The answers are based on an interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty, the observation that an organization is defined by its activities, and the declared objectives and intentions of its members.”

Policies are a part of organizations

Susan Snedaker (MBA, BA, MCSE, MCT, CPM and Principal Consultant and founder of VirtualTeam Consulting, LLC), Syngress IT Security Project Management Handbook. Chapter 13, June 2006, [www.syngress.com/book\_catalog/381\_Sec\_IT\_PM/sample.PDF](http://www.syngress.com/book_catalog/381_Sec_IT_PM/sample.PDF)

“Policies are a part of every organization, whether they’re formal or informal, written or practiced.”

Operations are part of an organization

Dr. Hong Chen (PhD from Stanford and Professor at Sauder School of Business, Univ. of British Columbia) “Operations and Logistics,” University of British Columbia, Updated March 3, 2006   
[www.sauder.ubc.ca/faculty/divisions/operations\_logistics.cfm](http://www.sauder.ubc.ca/faculty/divisions/operations_logistics.cfm)

“Every organization either manufactures a product, or provides a service, or both. "Operations" refers to the part of the organization that actually produces the product or service, while "logistics" refers to the part of the organization that delivers the product or service to the customer.”

Policies express an organization’s values

La Piana Associates (A Management Consulting Firm), “Strategic Restructuring: Partnership Options for Nonprofits,” 2000, <http://www.lapiana.org/resources/tips/leadership/11_2000.html>

“The policies of an organization express its shared values.”

II. TOPICALITY IMPACT TURNS

A. Boundaries/Limits- Boundaries and limits are often bad. They check creativity, self-expression, and individuality. The way the negative is narrowly applying boundaries significantly decreases the area covered by this year’s resolution thus harming overall educational value.

B. Education- Having a wider range of cases to research and discuss increases the amount of education received from debate. The only thing harming education in today’s round is the Negative’s refusal to debate real world issues in preference of procedurals.

III. NOT A NEGATIVE VOTER

Literature Checks Abuse: The negative has plenty of evidence against our case. Why would they research against nontopical cases and where is the abuse if they have arguments?

Clash Checks Abuse: The negative has developed plenty of arguments against our case. Obviously, despite their claims of its nontopicality, the value of debate has not been diminished.

IV. ABSOLUTE VOTER

Like a kritik, topicality is a pre-fiat argument which is a priori (considered before anything else). Whereas, other arguments impact in the imaginary world of fiat, topicality impacts in the immediate world of this debate round affecting the future performance and actions of both teams, the audience, and even the league in general. Therefore, as a Negative win on topicality creates a negative ballot, it’s only fair that an affirmative win on topicality should create an affirmative ballot. Such a ballot condemns arguments which detract from true education and sends a message that trivial time-wasting topicality arguments will not be tolerated.

Topicality Backup

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF NATO

NATO is a Security Group

West Encyclopedia of American Law, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2nd Edition, 2005

“The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective security group that was established by the North Atlantic Treaty (34 U.N.T.S. 243) in 1949 to block the threat of military aggression in Europe by the Soviet Union.”

NATO is the expression of Shared Values

William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter, and Hilary D. Driscoll, “NATO at Fifty: Defining NATO’s Purpose,” The Eisenhower Institute, 1999,<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/coalition/usandnato/NATOatFiftyBook/Perry.htm>

“NATO is the expression of the shared values and interests of a community of member nations.”

SPECIFIC NATO REFORMS

Realigning US military posture in Europe is a NATO Reform

Khatya Chhor, “Western Press Review: The NATO Split Over Iraq—Is it Now An ‘A La Carte’ Alliance?,” Radio Free Europe, February 12, 2003, <http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/02/12022003163711.asp>

“A separate editorial in the "The Wall Street Journal" on the same subject goes on to discuss the NATO reforms suggested by U.S. General James Jones, the new supreme allied commander for Europe. Jones suggests realigning the U.S. military posture in Europe to better reflect current political and military realities.”

Expanding membership to Israel, Japan, or Australia constitutes a NATO reform

Associated Press, “Ex-Spanish premier calls on NATO to add Israel as member,” April 27, 2006, <http://www.icjs-online.org/orig.php?eid=1410&ICJS=2394&article=893>

“Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar called for far-reaching NATO reforms to combat Islamic extremism, including expansion of the alliance membership to include Israel, Japan and Australia. The appeal came in an article published Thursday.”

NATO reform includes expansion and CJTF

The Heritage Foundation, “President-Elect Bush Should OK European Defense Pact, Analyst Says,” January 16, 2001, [www.heritage.org/Press/NewsReleases/NR011601.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Press/NewsReleases/NR011601.cfm) (brackets added)

“[Heritage senior analyst John] Hulsman suggests other NATO reform for the Bush administration, including:

A slow expansion of NATO

Some advocates of NATO expansion want a rapid influx of countries that do not meet all the membership criteria. That’s a bad idea, Hulsman says, comparing it to shipwrecked sailors swamping a full lifeboat and risking the safety of those already on board. “Strict adherence to the criteria for NATO membership is crucial,” he writes. “The last thing the United States needs in NATO is another European country that can’t pay its own way.”

A new option for handling a European crisis outside of NATO

In 1999, NATO members had only two options for a military crisis that occurred outside the alliance—commit troops to a full alliance operation or veto involvement. Hulsman says the United States should use the new Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) option more to avoid bearing a heavy burden in conflicts that do not affect its interests. For example, if the CJTF option were used in Kosovo, the United States would maintain a small presence in the Balkans, providing only intelligence and logistics for European ground troops. There are now about 5,900 U.S. troops stationed in Kosovo, but because of troop rotation and logistical support, the operation effectively ties up 17,000 troops indefinitely on an open-ended mission.”

Previous NATO reforms includes command structure reform, new states, cooperation councils

John Auger (Raporteur), “Preliminary Report of the NATO/CCMS Environmental Security Conference,” Center for Strategic Leadership US Army War College, September 1997, [www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/NES.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/NES.pdf)

“In the context of current NATO reforms (i.e., new command structure, new member states, enhanced NATO and WEU ties, NATO-Russia Founding Act, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)/ Enhanced Partnership for Peace (EPfP), further development of the Strategic Concept) the Alliance will face fundamental changes over and beyond the year 2000.”

Reforms include, addressing new challenges, developing military capabilities, & meeting new challenges

Michael Ruhle (Head of Policy Planning and Speechwriting in the Political Affairs Division of NATO), “NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11.” Parameters, Summer 2003, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/ruhle.pdf>

“If the above changes and continuities are taken into account, a fairly clear picture emerges of three major directions for NATO’s reform. First, NATO must find a new balance between addressing its tradition, Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Second, it must acquire military capabilities to fulfill its new missions. And, finally, it must learn to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges.”

Increased European decision making in NATO is NATO reform

Centro Studi di Politicia Internazionale, “Conference Report: A Strategy of Stabilisation for the Balkans,” July 1999, [www.cespi.it/ROSA/Rosa-LINK%206.htm](http://www.cespi.it/ROSA/Rosa-LINK%206.htm)

‘The transition to an Atlantic alliance where Europe is much more in charge of itself is what NATO reform should really be about.”

NATO reform must address its role and what missions it should carry out

Foundation for the Social Analysis and Studies,“NATO: An Alliance for Freedom,” 2005, [www.fundacionfaes.es/documentos/Informe\_OTAN\_Ingles.pdf](http://www.fundacionfaes.es/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf)

“We also believe that, however mush the issue of the organization’s military deficiencies is addressed, NATO reform must inevitably tackle the question as to exactly what the member countries believe its role is and should be, including the missions it should carry out. In short, they must decide precisely what NATO’s purpose is.”

AFFIRMATIVE Topicality: Adding New Members is topical

by Matthew Baker

Enlargement closely linked with reform

Helga Haftendorn (Professor emerita of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin), “The Post-Cold War Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance,” The Madeleine Feher European Scholare Lecture, 1997. [www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/publications/mfa1.html](http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/publications/mfa1.html)

“NATO enlargement has been closely linked to NATO reform.”

Expansion into Central & Eastern Europe = integral part of NATO reform

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD and Research Fellow for European Affairs in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “The Conservative Case for NATO Reform,” The Heritage Foundation, May 8, 2002, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/HL744.cfm>

“As many of the Central and Eastern European states tend to politically be more in-sync with America than with the Western Europeans, enlargement can be seen as a way to significantly increase the number of possible partners for the U.S. in conducting coalitions of the willing. Such an expansion policy is an integral part of the program for overall NATO reform.”

Logical Analysis:

1. Negative abuse: No actor specified, no right to add one

Notice that the resolution is written in the passive voice with regard to reform of NATO: that NATO "should be significantly reformed." It doesn't say who does the reform. It doesn't say "that NATO should internally reform" nor that "NATO members should reform the alliance." The actor carrying out the reforms is intentionally left unspecified by the resolution. Thus it is abusive for the Negative team to restrict Affirmatives by inventing something not in the resolution and then claiming we're bad for violating this new thing they invented. As long as we don't propose reforming NATO by magic or divine intervention, we are not unreasonable for proposing an actor outside NATO to be involved in reforming NATO, if we prove evidentially that it is a reasonable thing to do and that our actor has the power to do it.

2. Reasonability: adding new members to NATO is reasonable and debatable

Given the history of NATO expansion over the last decade, it is entirely reasonable for Negative teams to expect Affirmatives to propose adding new members to NATO. There is nothing abusive, squirrely, or unexpected about such a case. I'll bet the Negative has tons of evidence on that subject in their files, which indicates that they fully expect such cases.

There are still reasonable limits on such cases that make them easily debatable. Affirmatives are only going to propose NATO expansion to countries that they can prove have some benefit to themselves or others by joining NATO and that benefit must be proven evidentially. The only thing "unreasonable" about the subject of NATO expansion would be the Negative's claim that this unfairly broadens the Affirmative's grounds. Remember, we have to back up our plan with evidence, and there is no evidence that every single country in the world would benefit from NATO. The scope of evidentially-supported Affirmative plans involving expansion is quite limited and Negatives can easily prepare for them.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN NARCOTICS

MINOR REPAIR/COUNTERPLAN LINK: European Union + “Paris Plan” + enhanced Iran cooperation

Iran wants to cooperate with the European Union on counter-narcotics

Council of the European Union, 22 May 2006, State of Play in Implementing the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Action-Oriented Paper To Combat the Production of Drugs in and Trafficking from Afghanistan and along the heroin routes, p. 11 (brackets added)

Notwithstanding the current political environment, Iran remains willing to work with international partners on CN [counter-narcotics], and is keen to enlist the support of the EU in the form of training, technical assistance, equipment and intelligence.

Iran is effective at combating drug trafficking

Council of the European Union, 22 May 2006, State of Play in Implementing the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Action-Oriented Paper To Combat the Production of Drugs in and Trafficking from Afghanistan and along the heroin routes, p. 11

Iran is more committed to and effective at combating drug trafficking than most other countries in the region. It achieves this at a significant cost: on average two Iranian law enforcement officers are killed each week trying to apprehend armed traffickers.

Iran leads the world in opium seizures

Bill Samii, 29 Sept 2005, " Iran: Government Reverses Course In War On Drugs," RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/35bda0e8-f2c5-4a20-a801-cab9684a316a.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/35bda0e8-f2c5-4a20-a801-cab9684a316a.html)

The Iranian approach to drug control is very relevant to the rest of the world, because Iran's neighbor, Afghanistan, is the world's leading producer of opium. Iran leads the international community in global opium seizure rates and it is second to Pakistan in opiate seizures, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Iran prevents drugs from getting out of Afghanistan to the West

Bill Samii, 29 Sept 2005, "Iran: Government Reverses Course In War On Drugs," RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/35bda0e8-f2c5-4a20-a801-cab9684a316a.html>

However, the most recent International Narcotics Control Strategy Report from the U.S. State Department remarks positively on Iranian drug-control efforts (http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/). "There is overwhelming evidence of Iran's strong commitment to keep drugs leaving Afghanistan from reaching its citizens," according to the report. "As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the West."

Afghan government welcomes Iran’s help against drugs

Bill Samii, 29 Sept 2005, "Iran: Government Reverses Course In War On Drugs," RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/35bda0e8-f2c5-4a20-a801-cab9684a316a.html>

Iran is very active in cooperating with and assisting Afghanistan in its efforts to confront opium cultivation and trafficking. Seyyed Mohammad Azam, spokesman for the Afghan Counternarcotics Ministry, attended the Paris Pact conference in Tehran. In a 14 September interview with Mashhad radio's Dari service, he praised Iranian efforts saying, "The Afghan government believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has played an effective role in tackling drugs. We value the activities of Iran's counternarcotics forces and are grateful for their cooperation. We now have bilateral cooperation and hope to strengthen these positive and effective relations in the future, too."

“Paris Pact” provides international framework for counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan

UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 23 June 2006, "Afghan drug routes in focus at Moscow ministerial conference next week," [www.unodc.org/unodc/press\_release\_2006\_06\_23.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/press_release_2006_06_23.html)

The first Ministerial Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe took place in Paris in 2003. Participants agreed the Paris Pact as an international framework for concerted action to limit the illicit trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan through and to West & Central Asian and European countries. UNODC launched the Paris Pact Initiative to facilitate counter-narcotics enforcement cooperation and coordination among countries seriously affected by Afghan opiates trafficking.

Iran is helping Afghans reduce drug trafficking

Bill Samii, 6 Apr 2006, "Iran: Drug Control Emphasized As New 'Crack' Gains Popularity" RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/57a99e99-df57-4066-90aa-8a89460a0314.html>

Brigadier General Hamid Maleki, a counternarcotics official from the Iranian police, told the Paris Pact meeting that his country has spent more than $900 million to secure the frontier with Afghanistan and Pakistan by building border posts, watch towers, barbed-wire fences, and trenches. Iran also trains Afghan border guards and counternarcotics personnel, equips border posts in Afghanistan, and provides motorcycles. In mid-March, furthermore, the Iranian parliament authorized the government to lend $20 million to other countries for demand reduction and counternarcotics activities. Iranian officials insist that the international community do more to defray the associated costs, because Iranian efforts prevent drugs from reaching Europe.

Iran is active in the “Paris Pact”

Bill Samii, 29 Sept 2005, " Iran: Government Reverses Course In War On Drugs," RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/35bda0e8-f2c5-4a20-a801-cab9684a316a.html>

Iran also is active in the Paris Pact for countries affected by the Afghan opium economy, in which the main focus is border control and law enforcement along the main trafficking routes. A Paris Pact conference took place in Tehran in mid-September. The event was organized by the Drug Control Headquarters and the UNODC and it included participants from 40 countries. Drug Control Headquarters chief Hashemi noted that this meeting is necessary for the development of strategies and an exchange of views. He said sharing information will contribute to effectiveness and efficiency.

“Paris Pact” takes into account analysis by local authorities

Council of the European Union, 22 May 2006, State of Play in Implementing the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Action-Oriented Paper To Combat the Production of Drugs in and Trafficking from Afghanistan and along the heroin routes, p. 6

The EU will continue to support the Paris Pact as a mechanism for coordination and regional cooperation. Its regional round tables, which should address both supply and demand concerns, should more systematically rely on an evaluation of the situation elaborated by the Drug Liaison Officers of the region. In addition, strategic analysis of the threat by the local authorities and by the UNODC should be taken into consideration.

Europe’s problem: Afghan heroin is only 10% of US heroin supply

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-18

Heroin originating in southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroin available in the United States” from 1980 to 1987, and the DEA’s Heroin Signature Program has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to 10% of the heroin available in the United States.

The impact to this evidence is that the Status Quo already has a mechanism that could solve the problem with only a minor change. The EU and the UN are already cooperating on anti-drug policy using the Paris Pact framework. This policy is better than the Affirmative’s policy 1) because it has already has people gathering information to find out where the problems really are; and 2) because it is involving other countries in the region and is not limited to NATO like the Affirmative team is. All we need to do is have the EU increase cooperation with Iran. The evidence shows that they are willing to join and that they have a proven track record of effectiveness in fighting drugs in the region.

MINOR REPAIR/COUNTERPLAN: Better solvency if we just legalize it

John Tierney, 23 Sept 2006, New York Times, Column: Reading The Coca Leaves, http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking06/ReadingCoca.html

Drug prohibition in Bolivia and Afghanistan has done exactly what alcohol prohibition did in America: it has financed organized crime. The only workable solution is to repeal prohibition. Give Afghan poppy growers a chance to sell opium for legal painkilling medicines; give Andean peasants a legal international market for their crops in products like gum, lozenges, tea and other drinks.

HARMS

1. Al-Qaeda is not profiting from Afghan drugs

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-15

According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leaders considered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved in managing and profiting from aspects of Afghanistan’s narcotics trade. Ideological considerations and fear of increased visibility and vulnerability to foreign intelligence and law enforcement services reportedly were the predominant factors in their decision.

2. Narcotics are not blocking development in Afghanistan

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

The Afghan government should halt eradication until the entire country's security situation is stable. Interdiction should be left to Afghan counternarcotics units, even though their capabilities are limited. The new Afghan counternarcotics units' small numbers, frequently inadequate equipment, and lack of training make it inevitable that they will be able to interdict only a limited number of shipments and destroy only a limited number of heroin labs. Although government officials claim that narcotics are impeding the development of the Afghan state, that diagnosis actually confuses the symptom and the cure: state building must come before the narcotics epidemic can be controlled.

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo is building security and development, which will allow Afghans to drive out narcotics

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

Our soldiers are not narcotics police and we do not ask them to be. They are not waging a narcotics war; they will not destroy poppy fields and fight farmers for bags of opium—they are helping to create the conditions of security and development in which the narcotics industry will be weakened and eventually driven out by the Afghans themselves.

2. China, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan are setting up anti-narcotics plan for Afghanistan

Bill Samii, 6 Apr 2006, "Iran: Drug Control Emphasized As New 'Crack' Gains Popularity" RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/57a99e99-df57-4066-90aa-8a89460a0314.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/57a99e99-df57-4066-90aa-8a89460a0314.html)

Absent more assistance, Iran works directly with countries that are fighting drugs, particularly Afghanistan. Drug-control personnel from Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan met in Rawalpindi on December 6 to exchange information, Associated Press of Afghanistan reported. Afghan Counternarcotics Minister Habibullah Qaderi visited Iran on January 3 to meet with his Iranian counterpart, discuss cooperation, and inspect the border, Mashhad radio reported. Ezzatollah Wasafi, the governor of Farah Province in Afghanistan, visited Iran on January 14 and said he secured Tehran's pledge to help his administration's poppy eradication efforts, Mashhad radio reported. On February 28, Afghanistan signed an agreement with Iran, China, and Pakistan on border security in an effort to control smuggling, AFP reported. Qaderi and Maleki met again in Vienna on March 18, during the meeting of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), IRNA reported.

3. Paris Pact involves Europe + Iran + UN + US in drug control efforts

Bill Samii, 6 Apr 2006, "Iran: Drug Control Emphasized As New 'Crack' Gains Popularity" RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/57a99e99-df57-4066-90aa-8a89460a0314.html>

The Paris Pact is another multilateral drug-control group with which Iran is involved, and Tehran hosted a Paris Pact roundtable on September 13-14. The Paris Pact started with a meeting of 55 countries in the French capital in May 2003, when they agreed on the need for strong and coordinated border-control activities and law enforcement along the main drug-trafficking routes. UNODC subsequently launched the Paris Pact Initiative, with support from France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Counternarcotics enforcement experts, as well as delegations from 20 countries, the EU, the Economic Cooperation Organization, Interpol, and UNODC participated in the September meeting in Tehran. Opiates trafficking and drug-control activities in Iran were discussed, as were the need to strengthen regional and international cooperation on drug control in Iran. One of the newer initiatives mentioned at this event was the Nomak Project, which collects and analyses information on Southwest Asia heroin trafficking.

4. Britain is stepping up anti-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-20

The United Kingdom currently serves as the lead nation for international counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assist Afghan counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operations for interdiction and eradication. British defense officials have announced plans to send up to 4,000 British troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, where their mission reportedly will include efforts to support security operations and target narcotic traffickers.

5. Lots of US and international programs already exist to fight Afghan narcotics

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-1

Afghan, U.S., and international authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse an unprecedented upsurge of opium poppy cultivation and heroin production: they have begun implementing a multifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns, judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction operations, and more robust poppy eradication.

6. NATO is helping Afghan government on long-term solution to drug problem: police and judiciary

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-5 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

In these circumstances, ISAF and the Karzai government are working on a longterm solution to the problem. NATO is assisting in the building of an Afghan law enforcement infrastructure intended to dismantle the opium industry and prosecute drug traffickers. To this end, ISAF is training a special narcotics police force and developing a professional judiciary, heretofore absent in Afghanistan.

SOLVENCY

1. Solvency Turn: Increased NATO control creates easier environment for poppy production

JAMES APPATHURAI (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, "Background briefing," NATO SPECHES, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm)

I am aware of, as you all are aware, of course, that it is true that the UN has identified an upsurge in poppy production in areas under NATO control. I do believe, in fact, that one of the reasons is that indeed the areas under NATO control are more stable, and therefore it is an easier environment for poppy production to take place.

2. Must solve demand side of the opium problem

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963>

It is also critical to address the demand side of the problem. Afghan farmers grow opium poppies to meet the demand for heroin in Europe. If demand fell, so would the financial incentive to produce opium.

3. Must have functioning Afghan justice system to solve narcotics

JAMES APPATHURAI (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, "Background briefing," NATO SPECHES, (ellipses in original) <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

To give you an example of what I mean by NATO's commitment is only… can only be part of the combined international effort, NATO will play a role, a supporting role, in the effort against counter-narcotics. And this is obviously one of the key challenges that the country faces. But for an effective counter-narcotics strategy, one must have not only effective Afghan forces, police and army, but farmers have to have alternative livelihoods, there has to be an effective justice system, there has to be a functioning prison system and an effective police service as well.

4. Corrupt Afghan officials will block further progress

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs - Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," Summary page

Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug related corruption among appointed and newly elected Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.

“Eradication” – SOLVENCY

1. Eradication failed in Columbia – more drugs now than before eradication

Juan Forero (Staff Writer), NEW YORK TIMES, 19 Aug 2006, "Colombia’s Coca Survives U.S. Plan to Uproot It," [www.nytimes.com/2006/08/19/world/americas/19coca.html?ex=1313640000&en=d091c696b98bceba&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/19/world/americas/19coca.html?ex=1313640000&en=d091c696b98bceba&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss)

The plan seemed simple enough. “The closer we can attack to the source, the greater the likelihood of halting the flow of drugs altogether,” a State Department report said soon after Plan Colombia began. “If we destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drugs will enter the system.” Yet recent data show the following results:

As much coca is cultivated today in Colombia as was grown at the start of the large-scale aerial fumigation effort in 2000, according to State Department figures.

2. Afghan police are key to opium eradication but they are ineffective

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-12 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The police play a key role in Afghanistan’s stabilization because they, along with the Afghan army, have primary responsibility for destroying poppy fields and opium labs. The effort to build a professional police force may have suffered a setback in the summer of 2006 when President Karzai, noting the ineffectiveness of the force, began to consider placing individuals closely associated with warlords into senior positions in the force due to their knowledge of the region, a proposed move sharply criticized by U.N. officials in the country.

“Alternate Crops” - SOLVENCY

1. Drug barons force farmers to refuse alternate livelihoods

Council of the European Union, 22 May 2006, State of Play in Implementing the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Action-Oriented Paper To Combat the Production of Drugs in and Trafficking from Afghanistan and along the heroin routes, p. 10

Local drug barons and power holders, often in command of illegally armed groups, frequently threaten and extort farmers to refuse alternative livelihoods or to resume poppy cultivation after short-lived attempts at other means of living. This is particularly the case in areas where government reach is weak.

2. Alternate livelihoods won’t work until security and roads are in place

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963>

The success of the counter-narcotics programme heavily hinges on the ability to provide viable alternative livelihoods, but this is dependent on building roads and irrigation systems that make other crops a viable alternative. Yet, projects of this nature are virtually impossible without some level of security against those forces that seek to arrest Afghanistan's progress and drag it back to the medieval governance of the Taliban years.

3. Debt, economic conditions and powerful landowners block solutions to opium growing

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-10 (brackets in original)

Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and to agree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements. Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selection choices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favor opium poppy over other traditional crops. According to experts, this combination of drought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey warns that in areas where farmers carry high salaam and other loan debt, significant decreases in opium poppy cultivation and associated revenue maybe “potentially problematic” and could create “severe financial pressure on to farmers to resume opium production [in 2006] in order not to default.”

4. Afghan economy and infrastructure cannot support alternate crops

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-5-6 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

Another component of the counter-narcotics effort is to persuade farmers to switch to alternative crops. Such crops cannot compete with poppies; income from a hectare of poppies can reach $4600 a year, while wheat, one of the suggested substitute crops, can bring only $390. Orchards might bring more money, but they require years to develop. A more extensive market infrastructure is necessary as well. U.S. officials believe that an extensive road-building effort is imperative to modernize the country’s economy.

5. No good substitutes for opium crop

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 51

Whether or not General Jackson’s fears are justified, a number of basic facts make poppy eradication difficult for NATO. First, opium production is the only income for many Afghan farmers. Depriving the farmers of their livelihood would force some of Afghanistan’s weakest segments of society into utter misery. While any responsible poppy eradication program would aim to replace the farmers’ opium harvest with alternative crops, there are not a lot of good substitutes that would produce immediate results.

6. No governmental control in poppy cultivation districts

Carlotta Gall (staff writer), 3 Sept 2006, "Opium Harvest at Record Level in Afghanistan," NEW YORK TIMES, <http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1162946408-3rMvCSsV55gvJ6zj1/hoow> (brackets added)

The increase in [poppy] cultivation was mainly a result of the strength of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, which has left whole districts outside of government control, and the continuing impunity of everyone involved, from the farmers and traffickers to corrupt police and government officials, Mr. Costa said.

7. Alternate crops cannot survive drought in Afghanistan

Carlotta Gall (staff writer), 3 Sept 2006, "Opium Harvest at Record Level in Afghanistan," NEW YORK TIMES, <http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1162946408-3rMvCSsV55gvJ6zj1/hoow>

One province in the north, Badakhshan, where there is no problem of an insurgency, also had a significant increase in poppy cultivation. Mr. Costa attributed that mostly to the lack of government control and the presence of powerful warlords and corrupt local officials. A substantial drought also played a part, because no alternative crop could survive as the poppies did.

8. Already tried and failed: Alternate crop program in 2005 failed to reduce overall opium output

Congressional Research Service, 25 Jan 2006, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," <http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL32686>

In 2005, U.S. and Afghan officials implemented a new strategy to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist linkages. According to a U.N. survey, these new initiatives contributed to a 21% decrease in the amount of opium poppy cultivation across Afghanistan in the 2004-2005 growing season. However, better weather and higher crop yields ensured that overall opium output remained nearly static at 4,100 metric tons.

“Stricter Enforcement” – DISADVANTAGES

Increased arresting and imprisoning is counterproductive: poverty and prostitution

Bill Samii, 6 Apr 2006, "Iran: Drug Control Emphasized As New 'Crack' Gains Popularity" RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/57a99e99-df57-4066-90aa-8a89460a0314.html>

Not everybody is convinced of the wisdom of this approach. Ayatollah Hassan Marashi, who previously served on the High Council for Judicial Development and in the judiciary, said many people who become drug dealers do so out of economic necessity, "Aftab-i Yazd" reported on January 28. Arresting and imprisoning such people is counterproductive because their families only sink deeper into poverty and sometimes turn to prostitution.

“Eradication” – DISADVANTAGES

1. Forced eradication produces violence and is unlikely to succeed

Council of the European Union, Horizontal Working Party on Drugs, 18 May 2006, "The EU Approach on alternative Development," p. 5

There is every reason to believe that drug growing farmers are aware of the illegality of their activities.

However, the EU also realises that it cannot ask many of these farmers, most of them extremely poor, more than what they can deliver. In this respect forced eradication, when alternative livelihoods are not available:

* tends to generate social and political violence.
* tends to displace cultivation to more inaccessible spots.
* is unlikely to succeed in the long term.
* finally, the benefit ratio is low.

2. If successful, anti-narcotics effort would hurt Afghan economy and government revenue

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-15

Analysts argue that efforts to combat narcotics must address Afghanistan’s economic dependence on opium and replace drug profits with licit capital and investment. InFebruary2005, the IMFwarned that new counternarcotics efforts, if successful, “could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments, and government revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support for domestic consumption and taxed imports.

3. Increased fighting in the Afghan provinces

Christopher M. Blanchard (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), 25 Jan 2006, Congressional Research Service, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," p. CRS-13-14

Afghan soldiers and police also were killed during 2005 by attackers firing on government eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar. These clashes and attacks follow a pattern evident in previous years, in which eradication teams employed byprovincial authorities faced demonstrations, small arms fire, and mined poppy fields, At the outset of the Afghan government’s first eradication campaign in April 2002, for example, Pashtun farmers barricaded the major highway linking Pakistan and Afghanistan, and clashes between opium farmers and Afghan eradication teams killed 16 people.

**NATO will face greater resistance and armed conflict**

Julianne Smith (fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the German Marshall Fund as a program officer on the Foreign Policy program), Nov 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Transforming NATO (…again) - A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006," p. 51

British Army Chief General Sir Mike Jackson has argued that eradication of opium production could be counterproductive under the current circumstances. In General Jackson’s view, the pockets of security that currently exist in Afghanistan reflect positive relationships between ISAF and the local warlords – relationships that are positive only because ISAF is not involved in poppy eradication. If ISAF suddenly got involved in poppy eradication, General Jackson reasons, those positive relationships could quickly turn violent and ISAF would face a greater amount of resistance and armed conflict.

Violent resistance and insurgency if drug eradication is increased

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-5 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

At the same time, farmers in parts of the country view the poppy as their only source of income. Eradication of the industry without a substitute source of income would throw these farmers into destitution, and they violently resist any effort to destroy their crops. Allied officials believe that destruction of the poppy crop today could fuel an insurgency.

4. Eradicating foreign country’s crops is crazy and oppressive

John Tierney, 23 Sept 2006, New York Times, Column: Reading The Coca Leaves, [www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking06/ReadingCoca.html](http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking06/ReadingCoca.html)

America makes plenty of things that are bad for foreigners' health -- fatty Big Macs, sugary Cokes, deadly Marlboros -- but we'd never let foreigners tell us what to make and not make. The Saudis can fight alcoholism by forbidding the sale of Jack Daniels, but we'd think they were crazy if they ordered us to eradicate fields of barley in Tennessee. They'd be even crazier if they tried to wipe out every field of barley in the world, but that's what our drug policy has come to.

5. Fighting poppy crops hurts reconstruction efforts

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-18 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

NATO’s effort to assist the Karzai government in weakening the narcotics trade demonstrates the central dilemma of ISAF’s mission. The allies must fight an insurgency tied to the opium industry with forceful means while at the same time attempt to win the confidence of the Afghan people through reconstruction of the country. In this view, “breaking down suspected insurgents’ doors in the morning [makes] it difficult to build bridges in the afternoon.” While NATO officials state publicly that allied forces are not burning poppy fields and are depending instead on the Afghan army and police to do the job, farmers are well aware that it is ISAF that supplies the intelligence, training, and logistics enabling government security forces to attack the industry, the lifeline of many poor Afghans.

6. Eradication increases poverty and strengthens the Taliban

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Despite efforts by Washington and Kabul to persuade local Islamic clerics to issue a fatwa against drug production, eradication remains an unpopular counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. This is hardly surprising, given that eradication frequently deprives populations of their sole source of livelihood. The inability of peasants to repay their creditors as a result of eradication only drives them deeper into debt, pushing them to grow even more poppy in the subsequent year. This is exactly what happened in the few regions where drug eradication was carried out in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004. If farmers fail to repay their debt, they frequently end up in a form of serf labor, growing poppy on their moneylender's land. Some are forced to flee to Pakistan, where they may end up in the radical madrasas of the Deobandi movement, whose harsh interpretation of Islam and strong anti-U.S. stance became the primary ideological and religious influence on the Taliban. Pakistani and Afghan students indoctrinated in these schools during the 1980s and 1990s provided a large portion of the Taliban's fighters, and current students appear to be restocking the ranks of Taliban remnants today.

7. Eradication strengthens regional warlords and weakens the Afghan state

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Eradication drives the local population into the hands of regional warlords, even if they now call themselves politicians or have secure government jobs, strengthening the centrifugal forces that historically have weakened Afghanistan as a state. Local warlords can capitalize on popular discontent with eradication by claiming something such as "the evil Karzai government, having sold out to the foreign infidels, is impoverishing the rural people and forcing them into semi-slavery."

8. Even indirect eradication efforts result in violence and loss of Afghan citizen cooperation

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Although the new Pentagon policy of supporting counternarcotics operations is meant to avoid alienating the local population by not involving the U.S. military directly in eradication, it will put U.S. soldiers in the position of fighting against local peasants who violently resist counternarcotics operations. The favorable image of the U.S. military in Afghanistan will be destroyed if U.S. soldiers are forced to return fire at a mob of armed, angry villagers. Wider cooperation and intelligence provision will fall apart rapidly.

9. Aerial spraying would increase conflict, discredit the Afghan government and sentence poor Afghans to starvation

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Aerial eradication, for example, with a fungus, would somewhat reduce the physical danger faced by eradication teams. Yet, spraying, which is always extremely unpopular among populations in drug-producing countries, would further alienate the Afghan people and invite local strongmen to start shooting at eradication planes. U.S. soldiers protecting the spraying planes would once again be placed in danger and enmeshed deeper in armed confrontations with local populations, delegitimizing the U.S. presence. Even if a private contractor such as Dyncorp, which has experience spraying in Colombia, carried out such an operation secretly and both the Kabul government and the international community denied any knowledge or authorization, the United States, which controls Afghanistan's air space, would inevitably receive the blame as a bully sentencing poor Afghan Muslims to starvation, and Karzai's government would face discredit as an impotent U.S. stooge.

10. Solvency + Disad: "Compensated Eradication" doesn't work and is destabilizing and explosive

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Compensated eradication, as it has been applied in the past, is also not a viable solution. Recognizing the significant negative repercussions of eradication on the livelihood of the population and the resistance it generates, compensated eradication schemes seek to mitigate these problems by providing peasants with some monetary compensation for the losses incurred from the destruction of their illicit crops. First, even when actually delivered and not simply promised, such financial compensation has always been a small, onetime payment that requires peasants to forgo large, long-term profits. Moreover, much of the money dispensed by the British in their 2002-2003 compensated eradication scheme in Afghanistan ended up in the hands of regional strongmen, while many of the peasants who agreed to eradicate their plots never saw any money. Yet, even if corruption were eliminated from the process, the traffickers could still retaliate by simply outbidding the government's compensation for next year's crops -- the international community is unlikely to be willing to devote escalating sums of money to outbid local druglords to continue buying opium from the peasants for many years. In sum, eradication is rarely successful in significantly limiting drug production for a sustained period of time and is tremendously politically destabilizing and explosive.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN IS HOPELESS

[Note: The point of this evidence is that Affirmative plans that make changes in NATO to solve problems in Afghanistan -- any kind of changes -- are doomed to fail because the problems in Afghanistan cannot be solved by NATO. They are either too big to be solved at all or could only be solved by other actors outside of NATO.]

If Afghan government itself does not reform, foreign troops will fail

Barnett R. Rubin PhD. (Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan), Jan/Feb 2007, "Saving Afghanistan," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html)

Even with opium production at record levels, slowing economic growth is failing to satisfy the population's most basic needs, and many community leaders accuse the government itself of being the main source of abuse and insecurity. Unless the shaky Afghan government receives both the resources and the leadership required to deliver tangible benefits in areas cleared of insurgents, the international presence in Afghanistan will come to resemble a foreign occupation -- an occupation that Afghans will ultimately reject.

NATO can't solve: Multiple US policy failures are the cause of Afghanistan's problems

Barnett R. Rubin PhD. (Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan), Jan/Feb 2007, "Saving Afghanistan," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html)

Only dramatic action can reverse the perception, common among both Afghans and their neighbors, that Afghanistan is not a high priority for the United States -- and that the Taliban are winning as a result. Washington's appeasement of Pakistan, diversion of resources to Iraq, and perpetual underinvestment in Afghanistan -- which gets less aid per capita than any other state with a recent postconflict rebuilding effort -- have fueled that suspicion.

The real terrorism threat is in Pakistan

Barnett R. Rubin PhD. (Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan), Jan/Feb 2007, "Saving Afghanistan," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html)

Contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, whose attention after the September 11 attacks quickly wandered off to Iraq and grand visions of transforming the Middle East, the main center of terrorism "of global reach" is in Pakistan. Al Qaeda has succeeded in reestablishing its base by skillfully exploiting the weakness of the state in the Pashtun tribal belt, along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. In the words of one Western military commander in Afghanistan, "Until we transform the tribal belt, the U.S. is at risk."

NATO not effective: Taliban strength increases in areas under NATO occupation

Barnett R. Rubin PhD. (Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan), Jan/Feb 2007, "Saving Afghanistan," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html)

Nato deployed to areas neglected by the coalition, most notably to the southern province of Helmand -- and the Taliban responded with increased strength and maneuverability. On September 8, a particularly bold attack on a coalition convoy in the city killed 16 people, including two U.S. soldiers, near the U.S. embassy -- the most heavily fortified section of Kabul. Even as NATO has deployed its forces across the country -- particularly in the province of Helmand, a Taliban stronghold that produces some 40 percent of the world's opium -- the Taliban have shown increasing power and agility.

NATO following same path as Soviets in ‘80s – Soviet commanders predict NATO will lose

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

The fatality rate of the 18,500-strong NATO force averages about five per week, which is roughly equal to the losses suffered by the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Indeed, in withering comments to The Sunday Telegraph newspaper last weekend, Soviet commanders who oversaw Moscow's disastrous campaign have predicted that the NATO forces will ultimately be forced to flee from Afghanistan.

Afghan resistance defeated much larger Soviet army

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

A comparison with the 1980s is in order. The 100,000-strong Soviet army operated alongside a full-fledged Afghan army of equal strength with an officer corps trained in the elite Soviet military academies, and backed by aviation, armored vehicles and artillery, with all the advantages of a functioning, politically motivated government in Kabul. And yet it proved no match for the Afghan resistance. In comparison, there are about 20,000 US troops in Afghanistan, plus roughly the same number of troops belonging to NATO contingents, which includes 5,400 troops from Britain, 2,500 from Canada and 2,300 from the Netherlands. Nominally, there is a 42,000-strong Afghan National Army, but it suffers from a high rate of defection.

2500 extra troops will not make any difference in Afghanistan

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

General Jones has asked for 2,500 additional NATO troops. But the major NATO countries - Turkey, France, Germany, Spain and Italy - have declined to send more. In actuality, it is questionable whether 2,500 more troops would make any significant difference in a country of the size of Afghanistan and with such a difficult terrain.

2500 more troops won’t help against Taliban with grass roots support

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

Even with 2,500 additional troops it is highly doubtful whether NATO can succeed in defeating the Taliban. For one thing, the Taliban enjoy grassroots support within Afghanistan. There is no denying this ground reality.

US has no strategy for victory in Afghanistan

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

But germane to the crisis in a fundamental sense is the hard reality that no matter the oft-repeated factor of a reasonably secure cross-border sanctuary in Pakistan, the Taliban have indeed staged a comeback in essence as an indigenous guerilla force capable of waging a long-term struggle. That is to say, the central issue is that the US has simply failed to come up with a winning political and military strategy in Afghanistan.

Taliban staging a comeback due to failure of political dialogue

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

In other words, there is a fundamental issue of the legitimacy of state power that remains unresolved in Afghanistan. At a minimum, in these past five years there should have been an intra-Afghan dialogue that included the Taliban. This initiative could have been under UN auspices on a parallel track. The inability to earn respect and command authority plus the heavy visible dependence on day-to-day US support have rendered the Kabul setup ineffective. Alongside this, the Afghan malaise of nepotism, tribal affiliations and corruption has also led to bad governance. It is in this combination of circumstances that the Taliban have succeeded in staging a comeback.

Coalition forces have lost the acceptance of the Afghan people

M.K. Bhadrakumar (career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey), 30 Sept 2006, "Afghanistan: Why NATO cannot win," SOUTH ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/HI30Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI30Df01.html)

Second, the Taliban are becoming synonymous with Afghan resistance. The mindless violations of the Afghan code of honor by the coalition forces during their search-and-destroy missions and the excessive use of force during military operations leading to loss of innocent lives have provoked widespread revulsion among Afghan people.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHAN MISSION

HARMS/SIGNIFICANCE

1. Afghan mission is welcomed by local population and contributing to economic development

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

NATO's Afghanistan mission provides a good example of the enduring utility of the Alliance and the type of contribution it can make to security in the Greater Middle East. In Kabul, the northern and western parts of the country, ISAF trops are greeted extremely positively by the local population -- a phenomenon I witnessed firsthand during a December 2005 visit -- and have made visible contributions to economic development through their work with local governments, schools and utilities.

2. NATO troops are thumping the Taliban – Gen. Jones says mission will succeed

Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, 5 Oct 2006, "Expanded NATO Role in Afghanistan to Boost Counterterrorism Fight" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-afps04.htm> (brackets added)

However, news on the military front has been more encouraging, [NATO Supreme Commander Gen. James] Jones said, as NATO troops gave Taliban forces a good thumping during recent fighting in southern Afghanistan.The Taliban “tried to fight NATO troops almost conventionally, and they took a pretty heavy beating for it,” Jones observed. “I don’t expect them to make that mistake again. And, they’ll probably go back to this war of attrition that they’re better at than conventional battle.” But, “anything we do militarily is perishable if it’s not accompanied by reconstruction,” Jones emphasized. So, he said, ultimate success in Afghanistan is predicated on not making enemies among its people and keeping focused on international reconstruction efforts. Achieving victory in Afghanistan involves winning over the hearts and minds of its people, said Jones. “Eventually, it’ll be a success,” he predicted.

3. Solid progress is being made: Free elections and improvements in security & reconstruction

American Forces Press Service, 5 Oct 2006, "Defense Department Lauds Transfer in Afghanistan as Milestone" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-afps02.htm> (brackets added)

The [Dept. of Defense] release notes solid progress already made in Afghanistan, “most notably, the first free national elections in Afghanistan last year, and improvements in security and reconstruction.” As this progress continues, continued international support will be critical, it said. “As we work through current security challenges, the international community's increased support for reforming the Afghan police, developing a judicial system and combating the narcotics problem is crucial for long-term success in Afghanistan.

4. Afghan mission is succeeding and reconstruction & development are well supported

American Forces Press Service, 5 Oct 2006, "Defense Department Lauds Transfer in Afghanistan as Milestone" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-afps02.htm>

”Today’s milestone transfer of authority serves as a reminder “of the sacrifices proud professionals from many nations have made for the people of Afghanistan and our collective security,” the release noted. “The NATO alliance's successful record in Afghanistan speaks volumes about the future of Afghanistan,” it said. “Tested militarily and diplomatically, nations have continued to answer by supporting free elections, expanding the mission and supporting reconstruction and redevelopment in Afghanistan.”

5. NATO’s ISAF shows improved security under its control

Human Rights Watch, 31 Dec 2005, HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW, "Essential Background: Overview of human rights issues in Afghanistan," <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/afghan12266.htm>

In late 2003 NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2005, some ten thousand NATO forces expanded ISAF’s reach to western and central parts of the country. Areas where ISAF operates show improved security.

6. Afghan refugees are returning, access to medicine and education are improving

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

NATO has been in charge of this mission for three years. It has helped generate the confidence for millions of refugees to return, and improved access to better medicine and education. It has followed a clear plan to expand security and reconstruction, from the north, to the west, and now to the more challenging south. We have been engaged in that process throughout, having until recently provided a provincial reconstruction team in Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. The south is more challenging, but this was always well understood—which is why NATO sought a firm platform of progress in the north and west first.

7. Troop strength levels are adequate and NATO is succeeding

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm) (brackets added)

He [ISAF Commander Gen. David Richards] also said he was confident he had the forces to do the job, and that he had been encouraged to see nations suchas Germany and Spain considering making additional forces available.“I believe that NATO is thoroughly fit for this role. It has been suggested that because it does not have forces in every province, it cannot succeed. But this misses the fundamental point that we are in a stage when NATO is expanding in Afghanistan. Months ago, there were no NATO troops in the south at all, and few US troops. Soon there will be nearly 9,000 in the south, part of a total of around 18,500. NATO is building on a success that many seem determined to ignore.“

8. Troop strength increasing to 30,000 and Gen. Jones says this is enough

Robert McMahon (masters degree in International Relations, has covered foreign affairs since 1990 for the Associated Press, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), 4 Oct 2006, NATO Official Says Counternarcotics Strategy Needed to Stabilize Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/11600/nato\_official\_says\_counternarcotics\_strategy\_needed\_to\_stabilize\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11600/nato_official_says_counternarcotics_strategy_needed_to_stabilize_afghanistan.html)

The number of troops under NATO command in the country will increase to about 30,000. There have been recent appeals by NATO for more troops but Jones stressed the troop levels were adequate. About 140 international troops have been killed in fighting or accidents in Afghanistan this year. Jones said the 9,000 troops recently deployed to the volatile southern region have performed very well in tough combat conditions and would be having a positive impact on the region, normally a hotbed of Taliban activity.

9. Taliban is not winning: NATO is spreading security

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

It is not, as some suggest, a failure to anticipate a violent response to our arrival. Yes, the violence has increased, but that was inevitable. We are challenging the power of the Taliban and other enemies of the Afghan Government, and they are reacting. But despite their efforts, we are spreading security.

10. Afghan insurgents failing against NATO forces

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

We knew that the kind of people who behead teachers, burn schools, smuggle drugs and assassinate government officials were not likely to stand by and allow progress to happen. Yes, we have taken casualties, but we have overmatched the opposing forces every single time we have faced them. They have tried to block our deployment, and failed.

11. Afghanistan stabilizing, militias are disbanded, and Taliban cannot challenge the government

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963>

Afghanistan continues to make progress towards stability on a variety of levels. Although governing institutions remain weak, they have continuously improved over the last few years. The large militias have been disbanded and their leaders either co-opted or marginalized. The threat from the Taliban remains serious but it is by all accounts incapable of mounting a serious challenge to the central government.

12. Afghan insurgency has dwindled and cannot hold any territory

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2006, "17-19 MAY 2006 - Visit to AFGHANISTAN by the DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE and the POLITICAL COMMITTEE" <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=963>

Western Ambassadors and military commanders alike noted that the insurgency is very limited in its reach and popular appeal, but the increased use of terror tactics such as improvised explosive devices increases the level of attention focused on it. The general assessment of the Taliban insurgency is that their active fighters have dwindled to number in the hundreds at any one time and they cannot take and hold territory.

13. NATO can win in Afghanistan and knows what it will take to succeed

Associated press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html)

De Hoop Scheffer urged NATO allies not to lose heart, insisting the operation was a "mission possible." "We need to be frank about the risks, but we also need to avoid overdramatizing," he said. "NATO has been in Afghanistan for three years -- time enough to know what it takes to succeed."

14. Progress on democracy and development is clear in Afghanistan

James Appathurai (NATO Spokesman), 28 Nov 2006, Press conference, NATO ONLINE LIBRARY, NATO SPEECHES, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061128f.htm>

You will see, for example, of course, that the progress in democracy is quite clear. There has been an election with nine million voters. There is a parliament, a president, regional councils. There is progress in terms of the economy, which has doubled; per capita incomes have doubled. There is the number of children in school has gone up by six times to six million, of which two million are girls. The number of people in higher education has gone up by ten times. The number of people with access to health care in the last five years has gone up by ten times as well from 9 percent to about 77 percent. I could go on, but you get the picture. The solution for Afghanistan is reconstruction and development. Our security forces are there to help provide the conditions for that in support of the Afghan authorities. And what we are seeing is reconstruction and development is working.

15. Status Quo is adding more troops, more money, and fewer restrictions

Sarah Edmonds and Mark John (Reuters news service), 29 Nov 2006, "NATO leaders determined to succeed in Afghanistan," <http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-11-29T004527Z_01_L27793177_RTRUKOC_0_UK-NATO-SUMMIT.xml>

A NATO spokesman said three countries had pledged more troops and that a majority had agreed to ease restrictions on where and how their forces could fight in Afghanistan. He declined to name the countries, but said they were in addition to Canada, Denmark and the Czech Republic, which have already made public pledges to increase troop levels. "A number of nations said they will look to increase, in some cases substantially, their financial commitments to the civilian efforts in Afghanistan -- development assistance, reconstruction," he added.

16. Allies are united and contributing to the Afghan mission

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-17 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

The allies have maintained a basic unity of purpose in Afghanistan. Their desire to stabilize the country to prevent the return of a terrorist state has led to an ongoing general consensus. Member states that refused to contribute troops to the U.S. effort to bring order to Iraq are present in Afghanistan. The allies believe that there is a tangible benefit to ISAF.

INHERENCY

1. NATO is increasing development of Afghan Army and Afghan Police

NATO Online Library, 29 Nov 2006, Riga Summit Declaration, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

Moreover, the Afghan Government and NATO are working together to develop democratically-controlled defence institutions. We have agreed today to increase our support to the training and further development of the Afghan National Army, and decided to make stronger national contributions to Afghan National Police training.

2. Afghan National Army will soon be prepared to take on more work

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

We will step up our efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan National Army. These brave soldiers have fought side by side with us in recent months and are the key to our eventual exit strategy. We are therefore deploying additional staff in Helmand, and to the regional Army headquarters for the south. Great strides have been made already in this essential task and, following the forthright discussions I had with Afghan Defence Minister Wardak, additional Afghan troops have been sent to Helmand. More will follow. There are also around 2,300 Afghan police and military in Helmand, building to 4,800 or so in 2007.

3. NATO is reforming itself based on lessons learned from experience in Afghanistan

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

Three decades of conflict have stripped the south of all signs of governance and robbed many Afghans of hope. And in that uncontrolled space, violence, criminality, narcotics and extremism have flourished. We have confronted these threats and learnt much about them since we deployed. As with any deployment, these experiences have allowed us to review our forces and our approach. That is what we have been doing in recent weeks.

SOLVENCY

1. Military force can't solve in Afghanistan

Klaus Kleffner (Head of the Defence Capabilities Section in the Defence Policy and Planning Division at NATO Headquarters), 13 Oct 2006, "NATO on the Eve of the Riga Summit" international conference, [www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm](http://www.atlcom.nl/verslagenbijeenkomsten/SeminatNATOtransformation.htm)

Terrorism has such deep roots that you have to win it basically by political means. Win the hearts and minds of the local population, win the peace. If you cannot defeat your enemy, make him your friend. These are all principles that are not new. We just have to reach them and understand them, and to see the limit of military power. Afghanistan you cannot win by military force. You have to change the way in which people live. And if we fail on the political level to do so, then we will see our soldiers in ten years time still there, still being attacked by the Taliban and losing soldiers. So therefore I have a lot of sympathy for what you are saying, but don’t just blame the terrorists, blame also those who don’t have the imagination on how to change the political equation.

2. Infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan won't reduce drug trafficking

Vanda Felbab-Brown (Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 13 Oct 2005, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 4, <http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=13692#>

Improvements in infrastructure, for example, although crucial for any development, actually help traffickers whose transaction costs fall as they are able to transport drugs faster. Thus, Afghan drug traffickers heartily welcomed the rebuilding of the Ring Road, the main circular artery connecting Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif and the pride of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Although essential, alternative development is a long-term process that has rarely been successful in improving rural conditions to the point of substantially reducing a country's drug cultivation.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL

HARMS

1. Net benefits: Afghanistan is better off with intervention than without it

Embassy of Afghanistan in the United States, 10 Oct 2006, Press Release: "AFGHANISTAN FIVE YEARS LATER; ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES" [www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html](http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html)

On October 7, 2001, the US-led Coalition forces reengaged Afghanistan, and the Afghan people have benefited greatly in the intervening five years. Commenting on the fifth anniversary of Afghanistan’s liberation from the tyranny and oppression of the Taliban, Ambassador Said T. Jawad stated: “Five years after the Coalition reengaged Afghanistan, we and our international partners have achieved many goals towards peace-building in Afghanistan. Today, Afghanistan has the most progressive Constitution in our region, which enabled the Afghan people to elect their president and parliament in free and fair elections.

2. Intervention helps consolidate democracy in Afghanistan

Ambassador Said T. Jawad, Embassy of Afghanistan in the United States, 10 Oct 2006, Press Release: "AFGHANISTAN FIVE YEARS LATER; ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES" [www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html](http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html)

At the same time, our security forces are fighting along with the NATO-ISAF troops to secure south and east of Afghanistan. We call on our international partners to double their efforts to help us build the capacity of our security, military and governance institutions to compensate for the slow progress of the past five years. I strongly believe that a combination of political, economic, and military efforts along with sincere regional cooperation should help consolidate our democratic gains towards sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan, in our region, and in the world.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Withdrawal from Afghanistan = Totalitarian oppression

Pres. George W. Bush, 28 Nov 2006, "Address by the President of the United States George W. Bush to the participants of the Young Leaders Forum and of the Rīga Conference," [www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/51/](http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/51/)

The battles in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of a struggle between moderation and extremism that is unfolding across the broader middle east. Our enemy follows a hateful ideology that rejects fundamental freedoms like the freedom to speak, to assemble, or to worship god in a way you see fit. It opposes the rights for women. Their goal is to overthrow governments and to impose their totalitarian rule on millions. They have a strategy to achieve these aims. They seek to convince America and our allies that we cannot defeat them and that our only hope is withdrawal and abandoned an entire region to their domination.

2. Return of the Taliban

Canadian Press, 1 Sept 2006, "Layton wants Feb. withdrawal from Afghanistan," [www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060813/afghanistan\_NDP\_060813/20060901/](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060813/afghanistan_NDP_060813/20060901/) (brackets added)

[Paul] Manson [a retired general and president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute] said there is nothing to suggest that the Taliban insurgents want to negotiate anything. "They simply want to return to power.'' The general said a general withdrawal by NATO would leave Afghans "once again facing the horrors they saw when the Taliban was in power.''

Impact: Systemic oppression of women

Richard Lacayo (journalist; Time Magazine senior writer), 3 Dec 2001, TIME MAGAZINE, "AN INSIDE LOOK AT HOW WOMEN FARED UNDER TALIBAN OPPRESSION AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR THEM NOW," <http://jcgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001344,00.html>

If the future is uncertain, the recent past is an all-too-well-substantiated fact. The Taliban made Afghanistan a laboratory for the systematic oppression of women. What it did will haunt that nation and the world for years to come.

3. Crushed hope and lost democracy: Afghans need help

Joseph Cirincione (teaches at Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service, former director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Joshua Williams, 23 Sept 2004, "We Are Losing the War in Afghanistan," Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Proliferation News & Resources, [www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=15861](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=15861)

Millions of Afghans want a secure, democratic future free of Taliban oppression and Al Qaeda terror. Now more than ever, they need American and international help. The October elections are not a cure-all. They should be followed by a renewed presidential commitment to increase U.S. forces and assistance, matched by increased international aid. Afghanistan deserves more. It is the front line in the war against fundamentalist Islamic terrorists. We cannot lose here.

4. Afghan Ambassador says: We can't fight terrorism and drugs without outside help

Ambassador Said T. Jawad, Embassy of Afghanistan in the United States, 10 Oct 2006, Press Release: "AFGHANISTAN FIVE YEARS LATER; ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES" [www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html](http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/10.10.2006.html)

However, Afghanistan and the international community together continue to face many challenges. Terrorism and drug trafficking pose the most serious challenges to the international peace-building effort in Afghanistan. Neither can be fought and eliminated without sincere regional cooperation and the robust support of our friends in the international community.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

INHERENCY

1. 13 nations have developed a plan to create NATO airlift capability

NATO Press Release, 12 Sept 2006, "NATO moves to acquire C-17 strategic airlift aircraft," NATO ON-LINE LIBRARY, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-107e.htm>

In addition to the LOI, the 13 nations have developed a plan to create “NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)” based at Ramstein Air Force Base. Initially comprised of 3 to 4 C-17s, the SAC will be flown by multinational aircrews (pilots and loadmasters) and a multinational military structure will be created to command and control the aircraft. Discussions are underway with NATO’s NAEW&C Force Command, the unit which flies the NATO AWACS, to determine the appropriate military organizational structure.

2. NATO has goal of airlift capability by middle or end of 2007

NATO Press Release, 12 Sept 2006, "NATO moves to acquire C-17 strategic airlift aircraft," NATO ON-LINE LIBRARY, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-107e.htm>

Because of the urgent operational need for strategic airlift, the SAC nations intend to conclude contract negotiations this year, and have the goal of receiving the first C-17 by the middle or end of next year. Plans are already underway to identify pilots for training at US Air Force facilities. Additional planes are called for to be delivered every six months. Thus the initial operating capability is planned for 3rd Quarter, 2007 with full operating capability in 2009.

3. Strategic Airlift Interim Solution is already operational

NATO Online Library, 29 Nov 2006, Riga Summit Declaration, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm)

Multinational initiatives by NATO members and Partners include the already operational Strategic Airlift Interim Solution; the intent of a consortium to pool C-17 airlift assets, and offers to coordinate support structures for A-400M strategic airlift. Nationally, Allies have or plan to acquire a large number of C-17 and A-400M aircraft.

4. More progress on airlift capability is being made in Status Quo

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs and former US ambassador to NATO), 23 Oct 2006, Remarks to the Welt-am-Sonntag Bundeswehr Forum, Berlin, Germany, "Riga and Beyond" [www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm)

Since the Prague Summit in 2002, Allies have made some progress. The U.S. and 13 other Allies have agreed to form a consortium to provide C-17 airlift capacity to NATO on an on-call basis. In addition, the UK has led the way by purchasing their own C-17s.

5. Joint NATO-Sweden airlift capability was demonstrated at Riga Summit in Nov. 2006

NATO Update, NATO official web page, 27 Nov 2006, "C17 airlift capability for NATO displayed," <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/11-november/e1127a.htm>

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the President of Latvia, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, and senior Alliance military officials attended a display of C17 airlift capability in Riga on 27 November. The ceremony, a day prior to the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in the Latvian capital, showcases a joint initiative by 15 NATO member countries and Partner country Sweden to purchase C-17 transport aircraft, in order to provide strategic airlift capability for NATO and other missions.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AUSTRALIA

INHERENCY

1. Riga Global Partnership Initiative already increases cooperation with Australia and Japan

Kathleen T. Rhem, American Forces Press Service, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO Countries Need to Make Strategic Investments, Bush Tells Leaders," <http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2235>

The Riga Global Partnership Initiative will allow NATO to conduct joint training, exercises and planning with non-NATO partners such as Australia and Japan, “countries that share NATO’s values and want to work with our alliance in the cause of peace.”

2. Australia signed agreement to work with NATO on terrorism and weapons proliferation

TAIPEI TIMES, 2 Apr 2005, "Australia, NATO forge closer links," <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/04/02/2003248758>

Australia and NATO signed an agreement yesterday to cooperate in the fight against international terrorism, weapons proliferation and other global military threats, officials said. The agreement, which called for the posting of an Australian defense attache at NATO headquarters in Brussels, was signed during a landmark visit here by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

3. Australia already cooperating with the US for security in the Pacific

TAIPEI TIMES, 2 Apr 2005, "Australia, NATO forge closer links," <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/04/02/2003248758>

Australia has been closely involved in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) designed to counter weapons smuggling by rogue states like North Korea and has led interventions to prop up fragile Pacific states, including the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.

4. Australia already shares intelligence with NATO

TAIPEI TIMES, 2 Apr 2005, "Australia, NATO forge closer links," <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/04/02/2003248758>

The Australian attache in Brussels would ensure that intelligence and other information is shared more easily between NATO and Australia -- one of the US' closest foreign allies, Hill said. Scheffer, the first NATO chief to visit Australia, said the new cooperation would also deal with the spread of banned weapons and the threat of unrest in failing states.

Minor Repair: Improve Status Quo association but don't give membership

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defense), 20 Oct 2006, "Don’t diminish NATO’s effectiveness," interview, WASHINGTON TIMES, [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities\_1/international-organizations\_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato\_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006\_7296.html](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/international-organizations_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006_7296.html)

Geographically, we should indeed acknowledge the contributions made to NATO’s military operations by non-Alliance nations. This is the case, for example, for Australia and Japan in Afghanistan, operating however according to different modalities. It would be desirable to improve the practical modalities of their association with NATO operations without changing the essence of the organization, which I believe should remain a European-Atlantic military alliance.

HARMS

1. Need for security or troops doesn't justify adding Australia to NATO

Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), 5 Oct 2006, "How to keep NATO relevant," International Herald Tribune <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11615/how_to_keep_nato_relevant.html>

Many prominent analysts think NATO should become the go-to organization for the world’s most pressing security challenges. By adding countries as far flung as Japan and Australia to its ranks, some say, NATO would enhance its legitimacy and fortify itself with the troop contributions of its many new members. But such visions are woefully divorced from today’s strategic realities. To be sure, NATO could use a fresh supply of able soldiers, but it does not need to extend its reach to the Pacific to get them.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Status Quo partnership is best policy: Australian membership would interfere with consensus decision-making

Australian Associated Press, 28 Apr 2006, quoted by International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Apr 28th - - Australian Associated Press - NATO debates Australian partnership," <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/april-2006/nato-debates-australian-partnership>

"It's quite right that other countries, such as Australia, have a say in its defence planning," he said. But even if Australia or the other Pacific states become partners, they should not expect NATO membership because the recently expanded Alliance is already struggling with its consensus driven decision-making process, he said. The advantage of associated status, he said, was that "the bigger the pool of force available, the better it is".

2. Adding more members makes NATO more diverse and unwieldy

Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), 5 Oct 2006, "How to keep NATO relevant," International Herald Tribune <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11615/how_to_keep_nato_relevant.html>

Granted, Iraq may prove the exception, not the rule. But on issues ranging from the Palestine-Israel conflict, to Iran and Lebanon, important policy differences exist between the two sides of the Atlantic and among NATO’s European members. Adding more members, especially those from entirely different strategic theaters, would make the alliance only more diverse and unwieldy.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CAPABILITIES GAP

**European defense spending/capabilities fall short compared to USA**

HARMS

1. Soft power compensates: The capabilities gap doesn't mean much

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

Politically, European states possess two of the five permanent member seats on the UN Security Council and are vital and influential members in countless international forums. Indeed, Europeans are portrayed as the alleged masters of “soft power” and are thus perhaps more adept at coping with today’s asymmetrical threats than the United States. In this light, the increasing disparity between American and European military capabilities may not mean much, least of all to a European or, given Europe’s still significant military capabilities, to any potential military adversary.

2. Kagan's "power gap" analysis is wrong, and even if it were right, it proves capabilities gap is meaningless

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm)

In his divisive analysis of American and European relations, Robert Kagan cites the “power gap” as one of the fundamental reasons that America and Europe are drifting further apart. Unfortunately, by exaggerating trends while ignoring nuances, Kagan and others paint a rather negative picture of Europeans as being weak and largely unprincipled, as witnessed by their alleged willingness to cooperate with “evil” regimes for the sake of avoiding violence at any cost. “Europe” is portrayed as an American antithesis, whose divergence with its old transatlantic ally is so pronounced, “they agree on little and understand one another less and less.” Their argument states that Europeans have become dependent upon the United States for security and its implied hegemonic and moral leadership. Were this indeed an accurate portrayal, then of course the capabilities gap would be utterly meaningless, as the Europeans could bask peacefully under American protection while the United States alone sets the declination of the world’s moral compass.

3. Can't generalize about European forces, and they aren't "weak"

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm)

The list of differences is virtually endless: from large and mostly nondeployable legacy conscript forces, to rapidly deployable all-volunteer forces; from states with global military reach through capabilities such as aircraft carriers, to states without naval or air forces. This exercise of comparisons and contrasts presents two clear certitudes: it is meaningless to assign these capabilities a neat “European” label, and it is unmistakably erroneous to characterize these forces as “weak.”

4. Capabilities gap is insignificant - comparison with the US is deceptive

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

If the United States is the standard of measurement used in determining what nations are weak or strong, then one could easily assert that every nation other than the United States is weak. Consequently, using the United States as the yardstick to calculate a state’s absolute military strength is deceptive, especially from a European perspective. To the contrary, qualitative and quantitative comparisons of military capabilities indicate that Europe is second only to the United States. The resulting capabilities gap between the two pales in significance when one considers they are allied with each other, are qualitatively compatible, and have capabilities that complement the other’s shortfalls.

5. European airlift shortfall is not significant

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

European states have been making headway in many critical areas that should cause one to question past affirmations of European feebleness. Assumed shortfalls in military airlift capability continues to be touted as an example of Europe’s inability to get to the battlefield, yet a snapshot of lift assets suggests that the shortfall is not as significant as Europe’s critics would have one believe. European states in NATO cumulatively possess 681 military airlift platforms to the United States’ 819.

6. No quality gap: European arms technology is as good as US

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

By definition, this dominance implies a gap of some sort. But even this technology gap is perhaps not as pronounced as some imply. European armies possess, have access to, or are developing many of the same types of high-tech equipment and munitions that are employed by the United States. The primary difference is that European states do not possess them in quantities comparable to the United States, and the scale of American programs is often much larger than their European equivalents. From a technological standpoint, Europe’s defense industries are capable of producing armaments that are comparable to their American counterparts.

7. No impact: Capabilities gap does not make NATO ineffective

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

Simultaneously, NATO commands a 36-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that provides lower-end peacekeeping capabilities. We have seen a similar scenario played out in the Balkans, where the United States initially provided the bulk of the combat power, but not at the exclusion of European combat forces. The EU has now taken over NATO missions in Bosnia as the focus has shifted to those nation-building areas in which the Europeans have considerable competence. This de facto division of labor grew out of a military necessity precisely because of the capabilities gap. However, the gap has not led to a noninteroperable, ineffective alliance; rather, we have seen a logical migration of capability contributions based on relative strengths and a partnership that recognizes the comparative advantages each side has to offer.

8. No impact: Gap has no effect on US/European military cooperation

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

What, then, is the significance of this capabilities gap? Have the disparities in accessible military might caused the members of the alliance to perceive threats differently and their security interests to diverge? Has the gap prevented US and European forces from being interoperable? Are the differences in power so pronounced that the United States’ only choice is to go it alone? In a word, no.

9. No impact: Conventional wars will be waged by the US alone or by a coalition of the willing, not NATO

Christoph Bertram (holds the Steven Muller Chair for German Studies at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Spring 2006, NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, "Operations Old and New," [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html)

Nor is NATO politically suited to fighting conventional wars, which will likely take place beyond Europe, if at all, thereby affecting the Alliance's ever-growing membership to different degrees of intensity. In such circumstances, Alliance consensus would be elusive. Conventional war-fighting would not unite NATO but rather expose its disunity and undermine its credibility. Conventional campaigns will therefore likely be waged either by the United States alone or by a coalition of the willing, comprising fewer members than the Alliance total as well as non-NATO countries.

10. NATO doesn't need more high-end fighting capabilities - Stabilisation is the most important task right now

Christoph Bertram (holds the Steven Muller Chair for German Studies at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Spring 2006, NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, "Operations Old and New," [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html)

Stabilisation is also what NATO is best suited for politically and militarily. Politically, recent experience has demonstrated that members tend to agree quite readily on stabilisation operations. Militarily, while no European armed forces can keep up with the United States in expenditure and high-end fighting capability, many are experienced in stabilisation operations. Moreover, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe in Mons is uniquely qualified to provide the necessary preparatory work, for members and Partners alike, to deploy forces on crisis-containment and peacemaking operations. Despite this, the myth maintained in Brussels is that the Alliance's primary task still lies in being ready to defeat any direct military threat to the territorial integrity of its members.

INHERENCY

1. Programs already in place to address European shortfalls

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm)

To be sure, there are certain critical capabilities or enablers that European states still need to develop or procure in greater quantities, either under the auspices of NATO’s Reaction Force (NRF) or the EU’s Headline Goal Force. However, there are sound plans and procurement programs at national levels, at bilateral and multilateral levels, at NATO, and at the EU to assist in correcting these capability shortfalls.

2. US and Europe are working together to develop capabilities to meet today's threats

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

The relevance for each of these comparatively vague and asymmetrical threats in determining required strategies and military capabilities is each distinct, and hence perceived with differing criticalities between allies. While the United States tends to view these threats with a greater sense of urgency, several European states do not see the immediacy of the threats—a scenario somewhat reminiscent of times during the Cold War. Yet despite these differences, the United States and Europe have forged ahead through NATO to recognize the new threats, develop new strategies, and identify and implement new programs and capabilities required to cope with them.

MINOR REPAIR: Close the gap by cutting US spending, not increasing Europe's spending

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism have ensured an accelerated divergence of defense budgets well into the foreseeable future, which may cause one to wonder whether it is not really a matter of the United States spending too much on defense, rather than the Europeans spending too little.

SOLVENCY

1. Simply not possible for Europe to adjust spending to make up for the shortfall

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

The United States commits twice as much national treasure for defense as its NATO European partners and outspends them on a per capita basis of over 3:1. It is simply not possible for Europe to readjust spending priorities to make up for this shortfall.

2. No real benefit to increase European capabilities: US can do it all

Christoph Bertram (holds the Steven Muller Chair for German Studies at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Spring 2006, NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, "Operations Old and New," [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html) (ellipses in original)

For reasons that according to Andrew J. Bacevich in The New American Militarism (Oxford University Press, 2005) reflect the strategic ambition of the last superpower as well as domestic dynamics, Washington has built and maintains so great a war-fighting capability that there is no need for the Allies to do likewise. Indeed, writing about the 1999 Kosovo campaign and the 2001 Afghan War in Simon Sefarty's edited Visions of the Atlantic Alliance (CSIS Press, 2005), James Dobbins of the Rand Corporation concluded that: "Both military campaigns demonstrated that the United States has more than enough capability for conventional combat and little military need to depend on material help from its allies... Looked at from a transatlantic perspective, improved European conventional capability is largely redundant, except in so far as it also improves Europe's capacity to deploy and sustain larger forces for stabilisation operations at greater distances."

DISADVANTAGES

1. Net benefits: Economic and political costs outweigh benefits of closing defense spending gap

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

Furthermore, to many European governments, the fiscal constraints required by Europe’s monetary union, coupled with a demographics trend that threatens many of Europe’s social programs, must make the capabilities gap appear to be insurmountable. Even if the closure of the gap were desirable, European leaders, as a whole, could hardly seek to make comparable expenditures in defense as the United States without causing a cataclysmic change to Europe’s social and political landscape. And many, either begrudgingly or not, are at least realizing that the effort required to overcome this gap is not worth the economic and political costs.

2. Increased European Union independent military capability

(Cross-apply the first half of this card as Inherency: European politicians are already trying to reduce the gap even though they can't close it)

Link: Closing the gap provides EU with military capability to act autonomously outside NATO

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Coonen (US Army European Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants, in Washington, D.C), Autumn 2006, PARAMETERS, "The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?" <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/coonen.htm>

Despite this challenge, European politicians and scholars view the capabilities gap as a trend whose wider growth can be limited through the implementation of policies that increase defense expenditures on certain key capabilities, and lead to better resource allocation through economies-of-scale consolidation of the defense industry, research and development, and acquisition agencies, and through mutually advantageous transatlantic defense cooperation in armaments arrangements to access American technologies. These policies are being implemented not to close the gap per se; rather, they are being implemented with varying degrees of success to militarily reinforce the European pillar of NATO while simultaneously providing the European Union (EU) with a military capability to act autonomously of NATO.

Impact 1: Troops not available if committed to EU and NATO at the same time and two different crises occur

Impact 2: Overlap and waste of resources

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), 4 Jan 2005, "NATO and the European Union," CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, p. CRS-6

The EU is developing its own rapid reaction forces for crisis management. Some of these units are “double hatted” for use either by the EU or by NATO. The EU also has embarked on an initiative to enhance its military capabilities and equipment procurement, including, for example, greater strategic lift and weapons for suppression of enemy air defenses. The issue of which organization, NATO or the EU, could use national forces if there were simultaneous crises has not been resolved. An issue raised by the NATO and EU capability initiatives is the problem of possible overlap or wastage of resources.

Impact 3: EU troops not trained to NATO standards -- can't be used by NATO

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), 4 Jan 2005, "NATO and the European Union," CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, p. CRS-7

In addition, General Jones believes that the EU places more restrictions on use of its forces than does NATO, and that these restrictions are reflected in the training of those forces. In his view, NATO and the EU train their forces to different standards, and EU forces have a different “language” of command and operations; these hurdles must be cleared for forces trained for the EU to be useful to NATO.

Impact 4: Independent EU force is the most serious threat to the future of NATO

Aparna Mukherjee (journalist, Bloomberg News; fellow with Robert Bosch Foundation in Berlin) and William B. Swarts (journalist), 2004, "Negotiating NATO's Future in the New Europe," BUILDING A NEW TRANSATLANTIC GENERATION, p. 54

Despite the collapse of the constitution draft negotiations and powerful Anglo-American resistance, EU leaders managed to take a step towards establishing an autonomous European military command: the creation of an independent planning cell to plan crisis missions. Whether this unit specializes in peacekeeping operations, such as the Union's takeover of the mission in Macedonia from NATO, or develops into a full-fledged counterpart or even rival to NATO, is the central question. The outlook for a non-NATO primacy, however, is doubtful. Nonetheless, U.S. envoy Nicholas Burns described the plan as posing the 'most serious threat to the future of NATO.'

3. Alliance strength turn: Accepting the gap and doing a division of labor would actually strengthen NATO

Christoph Bertram (holds the Steven Muller Chair for German Studies at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Spring 2006, NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, "Operations Old and New," [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html)

There is fear that a division of labour between military "stabilisers" and "fighters" would undermine Alliance cohesion and lead to a two-tier organisation in which some countries would only do one, not both. Moreover, in this way, nations would be able to renege on their commitments to the higher end of military engagements in favour of what are supposedly cheaper stabilisation tasks. Two-tier forces would soon produce a two-tier mindset. The gap between European and US levels of military preparedness would widen still further. Such fears are, however, unfounded. In practice, a resolute embrace of the stabilisation priority would both strengthen the Alliance and offer the framework in which a number of its current problems can be approached with a greater prospect of success.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CAVEAT REMOVAL

HARMS

1. NATO troops are "more useable" now because of recent caveat removal

Reuters news service, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO nations pledge emergency Afghan forces," <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L28129357.htm>

One NATO official said Supreme Allied Commander James Jones estimated that 26,000 of the total 32,000 troops in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force were now "more useable" as a result of restrictions being eased.

2. Where's the harm? -- NATO troops are able to fight effectively in Afghanistan

Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer, US State Department, 25 Oct 2006, "NATO's Jones Urges Focus on Afghan Reconstruction, Rule of Law," <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=October&x=20061025171329MVyelwarC0.6853144> (ellipses in original)

On September 2, NATO launched Operation Medusa, an offensive that killed roughly a quarter of the estimated 5,000 Taliban and insurgent fighters who opposed NATO and U.S. efforts to provide stability while the government of Hamid Karzai oversees the reconstruction of the war-shattered country. The “successful execution of Operation Medusa … answered once and for all whether NATO would have the capacity to stand and fight if challenged,” Jones said. “I think Medusa was a larger defeat for the Taliban than they’re letting on. … They took some pretty serious losses. They will, probably as a result of Medusa, be very careful about a conventional or near-conventional fight and will resort to their normal hit-and-run tactics.”

3. Enemies can't exploit weaknesses: The caveat list is secret

Paul Wiseman, 5 Dec 2006, "Troops needed to fight Taliban - U.S. general calls on NATO countries," USA TODAY, p. 1

The full list of caveats is secret to prevent Taliban militants from exploiting NATO weaknesses.

INHERENCY

1. Riga Summit removed caveats on 2500 troops

BBC News, 29 Nov 2006, "Nato hails shift on Afghan combat," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6195102.stm>

Nato leaders at a summit have hailed the relaxation of curbs on deployment of some members' troops in Afghanistan. Nato commanders say they believe they can move an extra 2,500 troops around the country now some smaller members have relaxed their mission conditions.

2. Status Quo has made "real progress" on caveats

BBC News, 29 Nov 2006, "Nato hails shift on Afghan combat," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6195102.stm>

Nato chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed the relaxation of "caveats" on deployment in Afghanistan. He said about 20,000 of the 32,000-strong Nato force were now more usable for combat and non-combat missions. "We have made real progress on caveats," he said.

3. Some NATO countries have given commitments to lift caveats in Afghanistan

Associated press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html)

U.S. Gen. James L. Jones, NATO's supreme allied commander, said he had commitments from some of the nations that have imposed restrictions on the use of their troops that could free up about 2,000 additional soldiers for possible duty in the south. Italy was expected to lift restrictions in extreme circumstances.

4. Caveats are becoming "a thing of the past" in Afghanistan

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Paul Drayson, quoting the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 2006, "Afghanistan: UK Forces," Debate in the British House of Lords, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60710-0889.htm)

There have been questions raised about the capability of NATO, and of the intentions of the US. NATO now has many more troops, to reflect the greater challenge in the south. Rules of engagement have been made more robust. This morning I spoke to Commander ISAF, General David Richards. He told me that in the south there were effectively no caveats placed by nations on the use of their forces. Across Afghanistan he was seeing a “new NATO” where such caveats were becoming a thing of the past.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CAPABILITIES-BASED DEFENSE PLANNING (CBP)

INHERENCY

1. US already uses CBP

Naval Studies Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2005, National Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning, p. 1

In the past 15 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has faced a constant stream of new challenges. Now, rather than being prepared to face a major Soviet threat and a few major regional contingencies (e.g., North Korea) in conventional warfare scenarios, the United States must be prepared both to deal with a larger number of more diverse threats with varied attributes and to do so in circumstances involving complex and uncertain risks. Many of the challenges were laid out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which introduced the emphasis on capabilities-based planning.

US Defense Department has adopted CBP

Naval Studies Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2005, National Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning, p. 2 (brackets added)

As follow-up to the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], the Secretary of Defense commissioned a task force--the Joint Defense Capabilities Study team--lead by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which recommended 'a capabilities-based process for identifying needs, creating choices, developing solution, and providing capabilties.' In October 2003, the Secretary of Defense accepted many of the recommendations that appeared soon thereafter in the final, published repot of the task force and issued implementing guidance for adopting CBP in the budget development process.

Impact: Europe is only 15% of NATO capabilities -- therefore, CBP for NATO is already 85% impelemented

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. (senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation), 2006, "The Future of NATO: Facts, Figures & Recommendations (Issues 2006)", The Heritage Foundation, [www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm)

After 1989, Europe quickly cashed its peace dividend, further heightening already existing disparities. The European allies as a whole spend roughly two-thirds of what the U.S. spends on defense while accounting for only 15 percent of NATO’s overall capacity.

SOLVENCY

1. CBP does not help resolve nuclear/non-nuclear targeting decisions

James A. Russell, Lashley Pulsipher, and Barry Zellen, 21 Sept 2004, Conference Report, Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: Building a 21st Century Force, A Workshop hosted by the Center for Contemporary Conflict and the Cebrowski Institute for Information Innovation and Superiority, Naval Postgraduate School, sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation, p. 5 <http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:oQQj07l-L6QJ:www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/cbpOct04_rpt.pdf+%22capabilities-based%22+%2B+defense&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1> (brackets added)

Other discussion focused on the problems facing the defense planning community on deciding the trade offs between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in making decisions on striking against the infrastructure or defenses of an adversary. Mr. [Ted] Warner [former Assistant Secretary of Defense] noted that these problems as are difficult as ever, and that the decisions on these vital issues are certainly not made any easier in CBP.

2. CBP is irrational, doesn't work, and is just an excuse to increase defense spending

Dr Paul Robinson, University of Hull, 24 Mar 2006, Sandhurst Defence Forum, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, "Doing Less with Less: Why Britain Needs a New Defence Policy," p. 7

In the first place, the Ministry of Defence should return to threat-based planning. I have particular objections to the principle of capabilities-based planning. This is an abomination in terms of defence planning principles. Models of how defence policy should be made vary, but in a much simplified form tend to look like this. You determine the national interests, the threats to those interests, and from there a strategy to defend the interests. From that strategy you can work out the capabilities you need. As you can see from this, capabilities are the end of the planning process. Capabilities-based planning is thus about as far from rational policy making as you could ever imagine. It is not surprising, therefore, that it did not exist before the end of the Cold War. Its sudden appearance in the 1990s when all the other approaches dictated massive cuts in military expenditure indicates that it is not a logical method of planning but rather a bureaucratic mechanism to justify continued spending.

3. CBP is difficult to implement

Naval Studies Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 2006, "C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups," National Academies Press, <http://newton.nap.edu/books/0309096006/html/24.html>

Unfortunately, while capabilities-based planning is easy to describe, it can be difficult to realize. Even reaching agreement among planners about what constitutes genuine capabilities-based planning can be complex.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Capabilities-Based Planning is cumbersome and self-defeating

James A. Russell, Lashley Pulsipher, and Barry Zellen, 21 Sept 2004, Conference Report, Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: Building a 21st Century Force, A Workshop hosted by the Center for Contemporary Conflict and the Cebrowski Institute for Information Innovation and Superiority, Naval Postgraduate School, sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation, p. 4

<http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:oQQj07l-L6QJ:www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/cbpOct04_rpt.pdf+%22capabilities-based%22+%2B+defense&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1> (brackets added)

In short, CBP and the implementation process provide an opportunity to focus the “trade-off” discussion at the levels in the organizational planning structure. He [Commander Ron Boxall] emphasized that a particularly challenging problem is that the process itself can be cumbersome, time consuming, and self-defeating – since the objective is to make the planning system more responsive to rapidly changing requirements and missions.

2. CBP = wasteful defense spending and net reduction in security

Ivan Oelrich PhD. (Vice President for Strategic Security at the Federation of American Scientists, has held senior research staff positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univ.; the Office of Technology Assessment, an agency of the US Congress; and the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency), Feb 2006, "No Questions on Military budget" Strategic Security Blog, A project of the Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/02/>

So the Administration has created military requirements that it freely admits are unhinged from any real threats. The Pentagon calls this moving from “threat-based” to “capabilities-based” planning, on the theory that threats in today’s world change too quickly. But capabilities-based planning also means that, if Iran, North Korea, and China were taken over by Quakers tomorrow, our military budget would not go down by a nickel. This is more than a question of wasting money. The wrong spending can actually undermine our security. We are confused by our own euphemisms. We call the military budget the “defense” budget. Without question, the military is the cornerstone of our defense and we have learned that we must be ready for war to ensure peace but our defense requires more than military might.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CHINA

HARMS

1. China will be no more than a poor regional power

Zbigniew Brzezinski (former National Security Advisor), 2004, THE CHOICE: Global Domination or Global Leadership, p. 3

China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an imporverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide.

2. Warnings about China threat are silly

Doug Bandow (Washington-based political writer and policy analyst and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 26 May 2006, "Searching for the Next Enemy" [www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043)

Viewed objectively, these hysterical claims and dire warnings look silly. China today is more prosperous, accessible, and responsible than ever before. Although Beijing is not a close ally, it is not hostile either.

3. China is no threat to US interests in Asia

Eric Marquardt (analyses have been printed in many publications. His work has been used by various organizations, such as the U.S. Army's Counter-Terrorism training division. He has degrees in political science and English from Purdue University), 8 Sept 2003, "'China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia'', POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_report&report\_id=87&language\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=87&language_id=1)

However, other than increasing the costs to the U.S. of assisting Taiwan in any such attack, China's military modernization poses no threat to U.S. interests in all of Asia. While the U.S. Department of Defense claims that China has over 3,000 combat aircraft, only about 100 of those are modern aircraft such as the recent purchases from Russia. On the other hand, the United States currently has more than 3,000 combat aircraft and all of them are modern, fourth-generation aircraft. The U.S.' naval fleet is also unprecedented in power, composing 12 large aircraft carriers. In addition, despite China's modernization program, the U.S. is modernizing at an even faster pace.

INHERENCY

1. Other Asian countries will promote stability with China

Doug Bandow (Washington-based political writer and policy analyst and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 26 May 2006, "Searching for the Next Enemy" [www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043)

But Munro writes as if America was alone and there were no other nations in Asia – but India is also a rising power, Russia maintains a sizable nuclear deterrent, Japan is prosperous and fields a capable military, South Korea is growing in influence, Australia is a regional leader, the ASEAN states are developing new cooperative ties, and more. In fact, Beijing faces substantial regional challenges, and its neighbor nations are capable of cooperating to promote regional stability.

SOLVENCY

1. Other countries don't want to form an alliance against China

Doug Bandow (Washington-based political writer and policy analyst and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 26 May 2006, "Searching for the Next Enemy" [www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043)

An equally important objective for the China threat lobby is constructing a containment ring of allies. This, however, is proving to be difficult, since even America's friends have a different view of China's intentions and are not interested in turning themselves into permanent enemies of a growing power with a long memory. South Korea and Australia, in particular, have distanced themselves from U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Treating China as hostile will make China more hostile

Doug Bandow (Washington-based political writer and policy analyst and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 26 May 2006, "Searching for the Next Enemy" [www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9043)

Unfortunately, Washington's attempt to engage in containment (often packaged with engagement and called "congagement") makes contentious regional relations more likely. Pushing nations to choose sides may not redound to America's benefit. Most important, treating China as hostile is more likely to turn it hostile.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: DARFUR INTERVENTION

### HARMS/SIGNIFICANCE

1. No racial genocide: Atrocities on all sides

Dr Paul Moorcraft (former British Ministry of Defense policy expert, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis; has been visiting Sudan regularly for 10 years), 6 Apr 2006, "A Replay of Iraq Beckons in Darfur if We Send in Troops," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper), [www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author)

The 2003 rebellion in Darfur caught Khartoum by surprise, and it acted aggressively to crush the insurgents, who claimed their region had been marginalised. Atrocities have been committed by all sides; banditry and warlordism is widespread. Darfur has been consumed by a brutal conflict, but it is not genocide - the US's stated motive in acting. Khartoum is accused of arming Arab militiamen - the Janjaweed - to wipe out non-Arabs. The war's complex origins are tribal and political , but not racial. Darfur's Arabs are black, indigenous African Muslims - just like Darfur's non-Arabs.

INHERENCY

1. Sudan has agreed to accept UN intervention

Noel King (reporter in Khartoum, Sudan), 5 Oct 2006, VOICE OF AMERICA, "Sudan Accepts UN Support Package for Darfur," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-voa03.htm>

Sudan has agreed to accept an offer from the United Nations to support the African Union mission in Darfur. The move is a badly-needed compromise following Sudan's refusal to allow the AU to transfer its mandate to the U.N., despite intense international pressure. Sudan has agreed to accept a U.N. support package, which is said to include about 100 U.N military advisors and help with communications, transportation and staffing in the embattled Darfur region.

2. African Union/UN compromise means AU can be strengthened and continue its work

Noel King (reporter in Khartoum, Sudan), 5 Oct 2006, VOICE OF AMERICA, "Sudan Accepts UN Support Package for Darfur," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-voa03.htm>

Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ali Sadiq told VOA that the move is a compromise aimed at keeping the AU in Darfur. "This means what Sudan has suggested earlier: that the African Union should be strengthened and supported to continue its mandate in Darfur," he said. Sudan's acceptance of U.N. support is a much needed compromise.

3. African Union has reduced large-scale violence

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 9 May 2006, Remarks at the United Nations Security Council Ministerial on Sudan, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66025.htm>

We applaud the heroic efforts of the African Union mission in Sudan, which has helped to reduce large-scale violence. This is an extremely difficult job and the AU troops have performed admirably.

4. Minor Repair: Help transfer the Darfur mission from AMIS to UN

Michèle Alliot-Marie, (French Minister of Defense), 30 May 2006, "Address by Mrs Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defence, France" NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961)

And finally, in Darfur, we must help with the transfer of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the United Nations. The Abuja Agreement is a success, but it is fragile. We must also take African sensitivities into account. The Alliance's action, like the EU's action, must be strengthened in some areas where African capabilities (transport, planning) are very weak.

SOLVENCY

1. There is no military solution in Darfur

Dr Paul Moorcraft (former British Ministry of Defense policy expert, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis; has been visiting Sudan regularly for 10 years), 6 Apr 2006, "A Replay of Iraq Beckons in Darfur if We Send in Troops," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author>

There is no military solution. Neither side can win in Darfur; nor can peacekeepers impose peace where there is none. It will take several months for the AU to be beefed up. This precious time should be used to enforce the AU-brokered Abuja peace talks. Despite some useful US assistance there, the ceasefires in Darfur have been relatively ineffective. What is required is the same sort of international political effort invested in Sudan's north-south peace agreement, signed in January 2005. Meanwhile, western military involvement must be kept to a minimum. Otherwise, a replay of Iraq or Somalia beckons.

2. Doesn’t matter how many troops you send – can’t protect all those civilians

Alex de Waal (Fellow at Global Equity Initiative, Harvard Univ. and advisor to the African Union, personally involved with Darfur negotiations), 8 Sept 2006, " Darfur: Interview With Alex de Waal," Democarcy Now, <http://coalitionfordarfur.blogspot.com/2006/09/darfur-interview-with-alex-de-waal.html>

The reality is that, however many troops we bring into Darfur, they are not going to be able to protect all those civilians. They’re not going to be able to assist in the disarmament of the Janjaweed unless there is a political solution on the table that everyone has signed up to. And so, let us begin to get the politics, the politics of crafting a peace deal that actually involves everybody, that gets everybody around the table agreed on what the future of Darfur should look like. Let's put that first, and then let's put the international force that will be there for peacekeeping as an adjunct to that.

Even 100,000 NATO troops could not solve Darfur

Alex de Waal (Fellow at Global Equity Initiative, Harvard Univ. and advisor to the African Union, personally involved with Darfur negotiations), 8 Sept 2006, " Darfur: Interview With Alex de Waal," Democarcy Now, <http://coalitionfordarfur.blogspot.com/2006/09/darfur-interview-with-alex-de-waal.html>

No solution can be imposed by any amount of arm twisting, any amount of bluster, any amount of military force. Even if we sent 100,000 NATO troops, we would not be able to impose a solution. The solution has to come through political negotiation."

3. Not enough military resources to carry out Darfur mission

Christopher Preble, 15 Apr 2006, "Let the African Union Intervene in Darfur," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353>

Now is not the time, and Darfur is not the place, to add yet another peacemaking mission to our military's already-long list of responsibilities. The reasons for this are straightforward. It is true that the United States spends considerably more on its military than any other country on the planet, and it is frustrating to spend so much money and yet to feel powerless in the face of great human suffering. However, our men and women in uniform cannot be everywhere, and they cannot do everything. Ambitious goals, no matter how well-intentioned, are not always matched by the resources to carry them out.

Can’t do NATO intervention without US troops

Christopher Preble, 15 Apr 2006, "Let the African Union Intervene in Darfur," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353>

The advocates of NATO intervention claim that no such trade-offs are needed. According to Susan Rice of the Brookings Institution, NATO's Response Force includes 17,000 troops and "is ready to take on the full range of missions." Rice concedes, however, that a NATO deployment should include "at least a small U.S. presence."

DISADVANTAGES

1. Holy war

A. Link: NATO intervention in Darfur will be perceived as an attack on Islam

THE ECONOMIST (respected British news magazine, does not give the names of individual authors of its stories), 23 Nov 2006, [www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story\_id=E1\_RPTJPQG](http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_RPTJPQG)

Sometimes it may be right for NATO to go to war without the UN's approval, as it did in Kosovo. At other times it would be right for it to make its forces available for UN operations. There are, though, limits to what it can do in that respect. In places like Sudan's western region of Darfur, for example, a direct NATO intervention would probably provoke accusations that the West was once again "attacking" Islam.

B. Impact: NATO intervention in Darfur won’t work, triggers backlash like Somalia in '93

Dr Paul Moorcraft (former British Ministry of Defense policy expert, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis; has been visiting Sudan regularly for 10 years), 6 Apr 2006, "A Replay of Iraq Beckons in Darfur if We Send in Troops," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper), [www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author)

NATO is already assisting with logistics for the 7,800 African Union peacekeepers in Darfur. Bush is pushing for a large UN force - perhaps 20,000 troops - to replace the AU, arguing that this would end the fighting there. This sounds good but won't work. Putting white, western, Christian troops in Darfur would unite all those fighting each other - in a holy war against outsiders. Defense officials in London and Brussels cautioned Washington by invoking the 1993 debacle in Somalia.

2. Western intervention would play into the hands of the jihadists

Dr Paul Moorcraft (former British Ministry of Defense policy expert, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis; has been visiting Sudan regularly for 10 years), 6 Apr 2006, "A Replay of Iraq Beckons in Darfur if We Send in Troops," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author>

While the conflict is mainly a struggle for grazing lands and water, it is also about national politics: Islamist extremists in Khartoum, disciples of the sidelined firebrand Hassan al-Turabi, have stirred the pot in Darfur. Western intervention would play into the hands of the jihadists.

3. Risks collapsing Sudan into a “failed state” and reversing other peace initiatives

Dr Paul Moorcraft (former British Ministry of Defense policy expert, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis; has been visiting Sudan regularly for 10 years), 6 Apr 2006, "A Replay of Iraq Beckons in Darfur if We Send in Troops," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2006/0406replay.htm#author>

There is, however, a framework for peace. Sudan ended Africa's longest war in 2005: the 50-year on-off struggle between Islamic governments in Khartoum and the largely Christian/animist south. Washington, aided by London and Oslo, invested much time and political energy in securing the peace deal, which will see over 10,000 UN troops being put in the south. This was a rare foreign-policy success for Bush. While accepting 13,000 UN-directed humanitarian workers in Darfur, Khartoum violently opposes UN military intervention. The new government of national unity - including former warring parties from north and south - is already under considerable internal strain; many in the former ruling Islamic leadership argue that too much has already been given away. They say the "Christian" south was granted too many concessions because of international pressure; now Washington demands even more in the Islamic west of Sudan. The government could implode, taking with it the north-south peace. Sudan has all the potential to become a failed state.

4. Net benefits turn: Trying military solution will fail and kill more people

Alex de Waal (Fellow at Global Equity Initiative, Harvard Univ. and advisor to the African Union, personally involved with Darfur negotiations), 8 Sept 2006, " Darfur: Interview With Alex de Waal," Democarcy Now, <http://coalitionfordarfur.blogspot.com/2006/09/darfur-interview-with-alex-de-waal.html>

I don't believe there is a military solution. It will not defeat the holdout rebel groups. What it will do is, it will kill more people, create more hunger, create more displacement and make the situation even more intractable.

5. Lose the war in Afghanistan

A. Link: Darfur mission would draw resources away from Afghanistan

Christopher Preble, 15 Apr 2006, "Let the African Union Intervene in Darfur," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353>

On the other hand, Afghanistan is already a priority for NATO, and a Bush administration official told The Washington Post that some NATO allies "think Darfur could potentially become a distraction" from a mission that has clear security implications for all NATO member states. Americans also should be extremely wary about a NATO mission that has the potential to draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan.

B. Link, Brink and Impact: Afghan is on the brink of collapse due to lack of resources

Human Rights Watch, July 2006, "Lessons in Terror Attacks on Education in Afghanistan - V. The Inadequate Response of the Afghan Government and its International Supporters to Attacks on Education" [www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm)

How is it, then, that Afghanistan is near collapse once again? To put it briefly, what has gone wrong has been the invasion of Iraq: Washington's refusal to take state-building in Afghanistan seriously and instead waging a fruitless war in Iraq. For Afghanistan the results have been too few Western troops, too little money, and a lack of coherent strategy and sustained policy initiatives on the part of Western and Afghan leaders.

6. Reduce democracy and peace in Africa by weakening the African Union

A. Link: Darfur intervention would weaken the African Union

Christopher Preble, 15 Apr 2006, "Let the African Union Intervene in Darfur," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353>

The neighboring African countries recognize what is at stake. Although no one has known for certain what the United States and NATO might do, this uncertainty did not stop Nigeria and Egypt from sending peacekeepers to Darfur last year. The African Union force currently numbers some 7,000 troops, but two to three times that number might be needed to secure a region the size of Texas. Leaders in Chad, Kenya, and even Libya have expressed a willingness to help resolve the conflict. The deployment in Darfur is an important test case of the African Union's credibility. Given the many urgent demands on American and European troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, the United States and its allies should do nothing to discourage Sudan's neighbors from taking the initiative; unfortunately, that is exactly what NATO involvement would do.

B. Impact: African Union is critical to peace and democracy in Africa

Jacques Chirac, President of France, 3 Dec 2005, Speech at the opening of the 23rd Africa-France summit of heads of State and government, published by Embassy of France in the US, <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2005/africa_france_conference_opening_speech120305.asp>

The primary responsibility of Africa is to put an end to the murderous upheavals which are rocking it. We cannot tolerate, the Africans can’t tolerate, a situation in which the law of the jungle, schisms of another era, the tragedy of child soldiers and the suffering of millions of refugees becomes permanent. This is in no way inevitable, it is not in the African nature. Due to the unprecedented commitment of the African Union and the United Nations, peace and the rule of law are making progress. Democracy is taking root.

7. Civil war turn: Military intervention risks destroying a separate Sudan civil war peace agreement

Guy Dinmore (journalist), 12 Dec 2006, FINANCIAL TIMES, "Blair backs no-fly zone over Darfur," [www.ft.com/cms/s/aa7683f2-8a1f-11db-ae27-0000779e2340.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/aa7683f2-8a1f-11db-ae27-0000779e2340.html)

Opposition from the US military is said to be strong. Analysts and diplomats are also sceptical the US and UK will conclude that military intervention against Khartoum’s wishes would rescue a complex situation. Armed action would also risk destroying a separate North-South agreement that ended decades of civil war last year.

8. NATO No-Fly Zone disad: Bypassing the UN = international confusion

A. Link: No-Fly Zone is not authorized by the UN

Agence France Press, 13 Dec 2006, "US mulling Darfur no-fly zone at urging of Blair," [www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=155255](http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=155255)

A US- and British-led push for military action in Muslim Sudan less than four years after the invasion of Iraq could face significant opposition from Arab states and in the UN Security Council, where China -- which buys most of Sudan's oil -- holds veto power. Past UN resolutions on Darfur have included provisions barring Sudan from using its military aviation in the region, though they did not explicitly allow for imposition of a no-fly zone.

B. Impact: Military action without UN acceptance = international confusion

Jonathan Chait (senior editor), 21 Mar 2003, "THE SECURITY COUNCIL MYTH", THE NEW REPUBLIC, <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030331&s=chait033103>

"There is a principle here, a basic principle," Vladimir P. Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the United States, asserted this month, "that, if someone tries to wage war on their own account, without other states, without an international mandate, it means all the world is confusion and a wild jungle."

NEGATIVE BRIEF: DECISION-MAKING CHANGES

HARMS

1. Consensus on out-of-area missions is easy to get, and getting easier

IRA STRAUS (U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO), United Press International, 4 Dec 2006, "Outside View: The meaning of global NATO" [www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20061204-030508-3236r](http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20061204-030508-3236r)

Concern has been expressed that there is reduced consensus in NATO when operations are out-of-area. However, this is an optical illusion. The underlying consensus -- to be allies on global affairs -- has actually increased; that is why it is becoming easier to act out-of-area.

2. Daily consensus issues are nothing to be alarmed about

IRA STRAUS (U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO), United Press International, 4 Dec 2006, "Outside View: The meaning of global NATO" [www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20061204-030508-3236r](http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20061204-030508-3236r)

It is only the surface consensus -- on daily policy issues and individual out-of-area operations -- that is often lacking, and that is nothing to be alarmed about. There is less need for such consensus.

3. Root cause: Not decision-making process but political differences

John Kriendler (Professor of NATO and European Security Issues, George C.Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany), July 2006, Transforming NATO HQ: The Latest Hurrah, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, p. 9

While it is useful to pursue ways to speed up decision-making and far-reaching NATO HQ reform, I strongly believe that the main impediments to making decisions are political differences among allies, not the structures and procedures for decision-making. Allies can take decisions, even very sensitive and complicated ones, quickly when the pressure of external events is greater than the internal differences among them.

4. No impact: Consensus is not hurting NATO effectiveness in Afghanistan

Jack Segal (chief political advisor to the Commander, NATO Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum, The Netherlands), 10 Aug 2006, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon by a NATO/EU force," Bitterlemons-international, Middle East Roundtable, <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=589>

In Afghanistan, where this month NATO moved beyond the calmer regions of the north and west to the strife-torn southern provinces, NATO has already shown itself able to field an effective fighting force. Detractors who argue that NATO lacks the decision-making agility necessary for high intensity conflicts are being proven wrong in Hilmand, Kandahar and the like.

5. NATO expansion to new members has not caused a problem: "Consensus without agreement" solves

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier (Ivo Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. James Goldgeier is Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.), "Global NATO." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, September/October 2006

The addition of ten new members over the past decade has not affected NATO's ability to act, even though skeptics feared that it would. Part of the reason enlargement has not bred irresolution is that NATO has developed a decision-making process that allows for the emergence of consensus without agreement: rather than blocking a decision, dissenting member states may append a footnote to it or abstain from contributing to whatever operation may ensue.

INHERENCY

1. Minor Repair: Try harder to search for consensus

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier (Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Goldgeier is Professor of Political Science at George Washington Univ. and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), "Global NATO." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept/Oct 2006 [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html)

The search for consensus can also be enhanced if the major countries, starting with the United States, invest the time and energy necessary to reach agreement. Leaders must try, and try again, to bring alliance members together rather than abandon the process and go it alone.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Eliminating consensus reverses the process that has secured democracy for 60 years

Daniel Hamilton PhD (doctorate from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, with a concentration on U.S. Foreign Policy, European Studies and International Economics), 18 Apr 2006, FOREIGN POLICY IN DIALOGUE, "Merkel, Bush, and German-American Relations," Quarterly E-Newsletter on German and European Foreign Policy published by University of Trier, Germany, p. 47

For the past 60 years the transatlantic relationship has been the world’s transformative partnership. More than with any other part of the world, America’s relationship with Europe has enabled both partners to achieve goals together that neither could alone. This is what still makes the transatlantic relationship distinctive: when we agree, we are the core of any effective global coalition; when we disagree, we are the global brake. Harnessing this potential means paying attention to both legitimacy and effectiveness. The genius of the American-led system constructed after the collapse of Europe, following two world wars, was that it was perceived to be legitimate by its members. We have not enjoyed the West’s sixty-year peace just because our countries are democracies (although democracy is a major contributor!), but because we built our success on a dense network of security, economy and societal interaction, and because all partners came to believe that, by and large, they had a voice in the overall direction of the transatlantic community.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

HARMS

1. New NATO members make English a priority and steady improvement is occurring

Mark Crossey (testing coordinator for the British Council’s Peacekeeping English Project), "Improving linguistic interoperability," Summer 2005, NATO REVIEW, [www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html)

While language-policy issues have been traumatic for many defence ministries, a huge amount has, nevertheless, been achieved in this field in a short period of time. This is largely because language learning has been viewed as critical to NATO integration in all accession countries and accordingly made a priority. In this way, there has been a steady improvement over the years in the standard of both English teaching and soldiers’ language skills.

2. Language barrier isn't a problem for current missions

Gen. James L. Jones (NATO Supreme Commander), 4 Oct 2006, "NATO’s Role in Afghanistan," Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos\_role\_in\_afghanistan\_rush\_transcript\_federal\_news\_service.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11605/natos_role_in_afghanistan_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html) (brackets added)

But there’s no question that when—as we’ve seen in the aftermath of Medusa with the forces that have just really arrived, coming together from eight or nine different nations, managed to pull everything off reasonably well: air-to-ground tactics, ground-to-ground coordination, working with the ANA [Afghan National Army], overcoming language difficulties. As you know, the most common language in NATO is English—English and French. But people come ready to do the job, and that’s been less of a problem than the idea of raising forces is—the concept of force generation is difficult.

3. Language requirements for NATO posts are set too high

(Impact: This means the problem is exaggerated because it sounds like there are lots of people not meeting the English standards, when the real problem is that the English standards are simply set too high.)

Mark Crossey (testing coordinator for the British Council’s Peacekeeping English Project), " Improving linguistic interoperability," Summer 2005, NATO REVIEW, [www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html)

There have also been other problems. In some instances, foreign language requirements for posts have been set without sufficient research. This has led to problems, such as high-profile posts being filled by senior staff with poor language skills, or conversely, difficulties in filling posts with unrealistically high linguistic requirements. Moreover, this has directly contributed to the demoralisation and haemorrhaging of quality personnel in several NATO accession states.

INHERENCY

1. No barrier: Slovakia has been reforming and increasing English training

Pamela Pohling-Brown (NATO, Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood), NATO official web page, 2003, "Preparing for NATO membership," [www.manw.nato.int/manw/pages/update/envision\_2\_03/expansion.htm](http://www.manw.nato.int/manw/pages/update/envision_2_03/expansion.htm)

Slovakia has installed a modern ASOC, deployed new 3D radars, and is improving the capacity for secure communications at all levels of military operations. Training, including English language training and officer professional development, is much broadened and improved. Overall, the country is making significant progress in personnel reform, especially in establishing a competent NCO cadre.

2. No barrier: Romania established English language training as a priority in 2002

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, International Secretariat, 21 Jan 2002, Secretariat Report, DEFENCE AND SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE ON FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES - Visit to Romania and Bulgaria, <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/trip/av007dscfc-bulrom.asp>

In his briefing to the Sub-Committee, Gen. Mihail Popescu, the chief of the general staff, noted that Romania must prepare for military threats coming from the spread of regional conflicts in South-eastern Europe or from asymmetric threats, like mass terrorism. Romania also faces threats to its security from transnational risks like drug trafficking and organised crime. He noted that the MAP programme addresses areas like compatibility with NATO structures, participation in Partnership for Peace activities, training, planning, communications, and logistics. English-language training is a priority for officers.

3. MAP (Membership Action Plan) already requires English skills for NATO applicant countries

David Price (Rapporteur), 2003, "INVITED NATO MEMBERS' PROGRESS ON MILITARY REFORMS," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Annual Session, Committee Report, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=364

The MAP defence and military issues focus on the ability of the aspirant country to contribute to collective defence and overall NATO capabilities. Effective information-security procedures are an important component of this, including secure communication links; the ability to receive and store NATO classified material; and a system for vetting officials with access to classified information. Likewise, applicant countries must have a sufficient number of qualified military personnel with a knowledge of English who can serve on NATO staffs and work with the Alliance and their counterparts in other allied countries.

4. US Defense Language Institute and the Peacekeeping English Project in former Warsaw Pact countries

Mark Crossey (testing coordinator for the British Council’s Peacekeeping English Project), " Improving linguistic interoperability," Summer 2005, NATO REVIEW, [www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html)

While soldiers in all Allied armed forces benefit from language training, the need has been particularly acute in former Warsaw Pact countries where historically people and soldiers had not had the same opportunities to learn and practise English as in Western Europe. As a result, organisations such as the US Defense Language Institute, and my own, the British Council, through its Peacekeeping English Project, have been working to help improve English language skills in prospective member states and Partner countries since the mid-1990s.

5. Office of Defense Cooperation supplies English training books to Albania

(cross apply same card)

6. English achievement levels already required for NATO membership

US Embassy in Tirana, Albania, PRESS RELEASE, 18 Mar 2005, "U.S. Department of Defense Donates over $60,000 in English Language Books to Ministry of Defense," <http://tirana.usembassy.gov/press20050318b.html>

The U.S. Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) provided $63,000 worth of English-language training books and portable language labs to the Albanian Ministry of Defense this month. The books and labs will help the Albanian Armed Forces reach standard NATO language levels in English, a key requirement for future NATO membership.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: EXPANSION IS BAD

SOLVENCY

1. No net benefit: Non-NATO countries already contribute to NATO operations in Status Quo

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier (Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Goldgeier is Professor of Political Science at George Washington Univ. and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), "Global NATO." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept/Oct 2006 [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html)

NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have benefited greatly from contributions made by non-NATO members. Australia, Japan, and South Korea have sent substantial numbers of troops to Iraq in support of efforts by NATO members to stabilize the country. Together with other non-NATO democracies, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, they have also contributed significantly to peacekeeping operations around the globe.

2. No net benefit: US allies not formally in NATO are protected anyway by other security guarantees

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier (Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Goldgeier is Professor of Political Science at George Washington Univ. and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), "Global NATO." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept/Oct 2006 [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html)

The principle enshrined in Article 5, that an attack on one is an attack on all, must remain at the core of the alliance. For the United States, this may not be much of an issue, perhaps even less so than was its undertaking to defend Latvia and Poland, countries that prior to joining NATO were not covered by the U.S. security umbrella. After all, whether formally or informally, the United States already guarantees the security of countries such as Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.

3. No net benefit: Article 5 doesn’t add much – countries will come to the aid of a nation under attack whether it is a formal ally or not

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier (Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Goldgeier is Professor of Political Science at George Washington Univ. and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), "Global NATO." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept/Oct 2006 [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509-p20/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html)

Even though Article 5 considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all members, each member is required only to take "such action as it deems necessary" -- a provision that effectively ensures that the use of force is never automatic. In fact, Article 5 has only been invoked once -- following 9/11 -- and only a handful of NATO members participated in the subsequent military action (which was conducted under U.S. rather than NATO command). Article 5 is designed to apply only in exceptional circumstances -- when an ally is attacked militarily -- and one would hope that any NATO member would come to the assistance of a friendly country under attack, whether it was a formal ally or not. After all, in August 1990, all NATO countries contributed to the grand coalition that responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a state that is not even a democracy.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Global expansion leads to clash of civilizations

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defense), 20 Oct 2006, "Don’t diminish NATO’s effectiveness," interview, WASHINGTON TIMES, [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities\_1/international-organizations\_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato\_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006\_7296.html](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/international-organizations_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006_7296.html)

The development of a global partnership could in fact not only dilute the natural solidarity between Europeans and North Americans in a vague ensemble, but also, and especially, send a bad political message: that of a campaign launched by the West against those who don’t share their ideas. What a pretext we would offer to those who promote the idea of a clash of civilizations. It would be perfectly incompatible with our vision of a multipolar world based on dialogue and respect for others.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: FRANCE IS GOOD

HARMS

1. French are capable and courageous peacekeepers - they save lives

Jeremy Kahn, 25 Aug 2006, THE NEW REPUBLIC online, "Project Runaway - Why Italy shouldn't lead the U.N. mission in Lebanon," <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060821&s=kahn082506>

Contrary to their reputation for being, in the immortal words of The Simpsons, "cheese-eating surrender monkeys," the French have proved themselves to be capable and courageous peacekeepers in recent years. After an initially reprehensible performance in Rwanda--where they failed to stop the genocide--the French acted decisively, sending in a large force to establish and protect safe zones that ultimately saved lives.

2. French aren't afraid to fight

Jeremy Kahn, 25 Aug 2006, THE NEW REPUBLIC online, "Project Runaway - Why Italy shouldn't lead the U.N. mission in Lebanon," <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060821&s=kahn082506>

And the French aren't afraid to confront force with force, as they have shown repeatedly in their peacekeeping efforts in Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. If the U.N. mission to Lebanon will work, it will need to be prepared to act forcefully, the way the French have in their operations in Africa.

3. France is upgrading its military capabilities

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-16 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

Since the late 1990s, NATO has urged member governments to construct more “deployable,” expeditionary forces, and gave the notion a concrete base in the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) in 2002, when allies pledged to develop capabilities such as strategic lift, aerial refueling, and more special forces. Among the European allies, France has made considerable progress along this path.

4. France is giving significant military support to Afghan mission

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-16 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

French aerial tankers refuel not only French aircraft in the Afghan theater, but U.S., Dutch, and Belgian aircraft as well. French Mirage jets based in Tajikistan gather intelligence over Afghanistan and provide close air support to both ISAF and OEF. These capabilities have contributed to the improving integration of NATO forces in the Afghan theater, according to U.S. officials, and to the ability of ISAF and OEF to share capabilities and command.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lose the war in Afghanistan

A. Link: France is playing a leadership role in Afghan mission

Associated press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html)

France is preparing to assume an expanded role in the Afghan mission. Officials said President Jacques Chirac would propose forming a contact group on Afghanistan to ensure that a global strategy guides NATO action in the country. "The Europeans have relied on their American allies for too long," Chirac said in a statement. "They have to shoulder their share of the burden."

B. Brink: Forces are desperately needed in Afghanistan: We lose the struggle if we are indecisive now

Associated press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html)

"Other NATO nations have troops there, but have imposed caveats on the use of them and on the use of their equipment -- this at a time when NATO's commanders on the ground urgently require additional manpower," said Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga. "NATO cannot afford to lose this crucial struggle against the regressive forces of a resurgent insurgency by being indecisive or lacking commitment," she said.

C. Impact: Losing Afghanistan hurts NATO credibility and the world is less secure

Associated press, 28 Nov 2006, "NATO eyes Afghan handover in 2008," [www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/28/nato.afghan.ap/index.html) (brackets added)

"The important thing is that we recognize the operation in Afghanistan is of crucial importance to our own security," he [British Prime Minister Tony Blair] added. "NATO's credibility is at stake here, and if we don't succeed in Afghanistan, the whole of our world will be less secure."

2. Lose the effectiveness of the NATO Response Force (NRF)

A. Link: France contributes essential airlift capabilities to NRF operations

Embassy of France in the US, 14 Mar 2006, "Franco-German relations," Sixth Franco-German Council of Ministers - Statements made by the Franco-german Defense and Security Council, (excerpts), [www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2006/franco\_german\_defense\_security031406.asp](http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2006/franco_german_defense_security031406.asp)

By successfully carrying out the joint European Union/NATO initiative to find an interim solution for strategic air transport (SALIS – Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution), the two countries have made an essential contribution to the efforts to achieve full operational capacity for the battlegroups of both the European Union and the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF).

B. Uniqueness: NRF is effective today and should be used

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs, former US ambassador to NATO), 23 Oct 2006, Remarks to the Welt-am-Sonntag Bundeswehr Forum, Berlin, Germany, <http://riga.usembassy.gov/EN/site/Z/a_nato/archive/nato20061031>

NATO must fulfill the Prague Summit promise to fund and empower the NATO Response Force. The NRF, the linchpin in NATO's development of an expeditionary culture became operational in 2004. Now we must use it. The LiveEx exercises showcased how effective the NRF can be.

C. Impact: NRF performs vital missions that would be lost if NRF were disabled

NATO On-Line Library, July 2006, "Backgrounder: Interoperability for joint operations - 6. Combined Joint NATO Response Force," [www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html\_en/interoperability06.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html_en/interoperability06.html)

The NRF, which is driven by the underlying principle: "first force in, first force out", has different missions:

* as a stand-alone force for Article 5 collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as evacuation operations, disaster consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events), and support in a humanitarian crisis situation and counterterrorism operations
* an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-on forces
* to show NATO determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required)

NEGATIVE BRIEF: GLADIO ACCOUNTABILITY

HARMS

1. No "stay behind" terror in Greece

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html>

In December 2005, misinformation resurfaced in Greece claiming, falsely, that a secret “stay behind” network, which the Greek government had set up with CIA assistance, had committed acts of terrorism. During the Cold War, West European countries set up clandestine “stay behind” networks, which were designed to form the nucleus of resistance movements if the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Western Europe. The Greek writer making the claim – and a Swiss researcher who wrote a 2005 book on the “stay behind” networks – both give credence to a Soviet forgery from the 1970s, which has long been publicly identified as a phony document.

2. Absurd claims discredit anti-Gladio allegations

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html> (brackets added)

Some of the claims are clearly absurd. [Greek Journalist Kleanthis] Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network, known as “Sheepskin” or “Red Sheepskin,” which he says was “organized by Greek special forces and the CIA,” of assassinating CIA station chief Richard Welch in Athens in 1975. Thus, Grivas bizarrely accuses the CIA of playing a role in the assassination of one of its own senior officials.

3. False accustions: Terrorists were responsible for terrorism, not "stay behind" teams

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html> (brackets added)

[Greek Journalist Kleanthis] Grivas also accused “Sheepskin” of the assassination in Athens of British military attaché Stephen Saunders in 2000, despite the fact that the Greek government stated it dismantled the “stay behind” network in 1988. In reality, the Greek terrorist organization “17 November” was responsible for both assassinations.

4. Grivas and other Gladio researchers were deceived by Soviet forgery

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html> (brackets added)

[Greek Journalist Kleanthis] Grivas and other prominent “stay behind” researchers appear to have been influenced by a bogus text that first surfaced in 1976, a Soviet forgery purporting to be Supplement B to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 30-31. The U.S. Army did have a Field Manual (FM) 30-31 in the 1970s, and a “Supplement A” to it existed, but not a “Supplement B.” The purported “Supplement B” was a forgery apparently concocted by the Soviet disinformation service.

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html> (brackets added)

[Greek Journalist Kleanthis] Grivas and other “stay behind” researchers have treated the Soviet forgery as if it were a real document. In Grivas’ book, Terrorism: a Privileged Means of Policy Making, he reportedly treats FM 30-31B as if it were authentic. An August 4, 2002 article in the Greek communist weekly Rizospatsis, which stated that it obtained its information from Grivas’ book, saw FM 30-31B as evidence that the United States had been behind the upsurge of radical leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the mid-1970s.

5. Ganser was deceived by the Soviet forgery

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html>

Swiss researcher Daniele Ganser, who works at Zurich’s Center for Security Studies, has also been fooled by the forgery. Ganser treats the forgery as if it was a genuine document in his 2005 book on “stay behind” networks, Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe and includes it as a key document on his Web site on the book. Ganser writes, “FM 30-31B is maybe the most important Pentagon document with regard to the stay-behind armies.” He goes on to speculate that the bogus document may provide the blueprint for terrorist acts that occurred during the Cold War in Western Europe.

6. No subversion: Scandinavian governments cooperated with "stay behind" plans

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html> (brackets added, ellipses in original)

[Former CIA director William] Colby makes it clear that the NATO allies with whom he worked in Scandinavia were full partners in such plans: … the governments themselves would build their own stay-behind nets, counting on activating them from exile to carry on the struggle. These nets had to be coordinated with NATO’s plans, their radios had to be hooked to a future exile location, and the specialized equipment had to be secured from CIA and secretly cached in snowy hideouts for later use.

7. No US-instigated West European terrorism

US State Department, Jan 2006, "Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2006/Jan/20-127177.html>

A thirty year-old Soviet forgery has been cited as one of the central pieces of “evidence” for the false notion that West European “stay-behind” networks engaged in terrorism, allegedly at U.S. instigation. This is not true, and those researching the “stay behind” networks need to be more discriminating in evaluating the trustworthiness of their source material.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: GLOBAL SCOPE

GOALS

1. "Peace and stability" are vague terms, not adequate goals

Harlan Ullman (Senior Adviser at Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, sits on the advisory boards of the U.S. European Command and the NATO Defence College), 20 July 2006, "THE ROAD TO RIGA: ANCHOR POINTS, EFFECTS BASED THINKING AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY," A Paper Prepared for the RUSI Conference, p. 2

The terms peace and stability are frequently used in the alliance. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer defines them in terms of “projecting stability.” Allied Commander Operations General Jim Jones uses these terms as foundations for his five anchor points about which more will be said. And Allied Commander Transformation General Lance Smith embodies peace and stability as the raison d’etre for NATO and offers up the framework of effects based approaches to operations that are vital in advancing these objectives by putting them into operational and practical terms for the capabilities needed by the alliance to achieve these and other outcomes. However, “peace and stability” by themselves are vague terms---a political advantage in not being pinned to down to overly rigid definition---and convey a general but not specific sense of where the alliance should be headed.

HARMS/SIGNIFICANCE

1. We don't need a global NATO

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 6 Nov 2006, "Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?" NATO On-Line Library, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm)

So let me focus on the theme of the conference, and offer you my views on both the terms “global” and “overstretch”. I have said it on many occasions, and I will say it again here today: we don’t need a global NATO. That is not what our transformation is all about.

INHERENCY

1. NATO already has more troops committed at greater distances than ever before

R. Nicholas Burns (U.S. Ambassador to NATO), June 2004, "NATO Remains Our Essential Alliance," US FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA, US Dept of State Bureau of International Information Programs, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0604/ijpe/ijpe0604.htm>

Today, NATO has more troops committed to missions at greater distances than ever before in its history. In addition to ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia, and supporting the Polish-led multinational brigade in Iraq, NATO has embarked on a historic mission in Afghanistan where it commands the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Global partnerships dilute the alliance and promote clash of civilizations

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defense), 20 Oct 2006, "Don’t diminish NATO’s effectiveness," interview, WASHINGTON TIMES, [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities\_1/international-organizations\_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato\_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006\_7296.html](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/international-organizations_1100/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato_2095/interview-of-michele-alliot-marie-washington-times-october-20-2006_7296.html)

The development of a global partnership could in fact not only dilute the natural solidarity between Europeans and North Americans in a vague ensemble, but also, and especially, send a bad political message: that of a campaign launched by the West against those who don’t share their ideas. What a pretext we would offer to those who promote the idea of a clash of civilizations. It would be perfectly incompatible with our vision of a multipolar world based on dialogue and respect for others.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HUMAN RIGHTS/AFGHAN PRISONERS

TOPICALITY

1. US-held prisoners in Afghanistan are not under NATO’s control

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

NATO today took over the command of security operations across Afghanistan – including counterterrorism missions by U.S.-led coalition forces in the east of the country. But despite the command handover, the U.S. military remains in charge of the Bagram prison and other smaller detention facilities at forward operations bases across the country.

GOAL/CRITERIA

1. Values are the wrong focus: NATO should be judged on what it actually achieves, not what it "represents"

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 6 Nov 2006, "Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?" NATO On-Line Library, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm)

This tight sequence of Summits will maintain some healthy pressure on moving NATO’s transformation forward – and that is just as well. Because in a world of global challenges, institutions are no longer judged by what they represent. They are judged by what they actually achieve.

INHERENCY

1. NATO has developed new detention policy and is working on even more safeguards

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division) Congressional Research Service, 22 Aug 2006, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," p. CRS-9 [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf)

These allies insisted that the communiqué explicitly address the issue of treatment of prisoners. The final document contains the statement: “In addition to NATO’s agreed detention policy for ISAF, which is and remains consistent with international law, we welcome initiatives by Allies to assist the Afghan authorities in the implementation of international standards for the detention of prisoners.”

2. No barrier: Afghan Reconciliation Commission is allowed to inspect Bagram, hundreds of prisoners being released

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

Military and human rights experts say U.S. forces in Afghanistan have wrongly detained many Afghans on the basis of faulty information -- often provided by rival Afghans trying to settle vendettas. Most are never charged with a crime. But hundreds have been released after mediation by Afghanistan's Reconciliation Commission. The commission is due to visit the U.S. military's detention center at Bagram Air Field on October 7 in a bid to get more detainees released.

3. Bagram will release innocent detainees and Afghans are building improved new prison

Ron Synovitz, 5 Oct 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, "Afghanistan: Kabul Seeks Release Of More Bagram Detainees," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/10/mil-061005-rferl01.htm>

Mujadidi says his commission has mediated in the release of 462 innocent Afghan detainees from Bagram during the past 18 months -- including Amanullah -- and 17 from Guantanamo Bay. "We are sending our delegates to Bagram again," Mujadidi says. "It has been agreed that this delegation will be allowed to look at the case files of all of the Afghan detainees. Those who are innocent will be released." Mujadidi says most Afghans still in detention at Bagram are expected to be transferred to Afghan custody by the summer of 2007. By then, a new high-security wing and staff training should be completed at Kabul's Pul-e Charki prison.

4. International Committee of the Red Cross is visitng Bagram prisoners

Amnesty International EU Office (international human rights advocacy organization), 6 June 2006, "Amnesty International recommendations to the EU," EU-US Summit, p. 4

According to a recent report in the New York Times, based on interviews with current and former administration officials, the number of detainees held in the Bagram facility has been increasing since 2004 and holds about 40 non-Afghan prisoners, some of whom were previously held by the CIA in secret interrogation centres in Afghanistan and other countries. As of May 2006, the ICRC was visiting approximately 560 detainees in Bagram.

5. Minor Repair: Negotiate human rights guarantee agreement with Afghan authorities, like Netherlands did

Frederik Naert (Legal advisor, DG Legal Support & Mediation, Belgian Ministry of Defence, and researcher, Institute for International Law) , Catholic Univ. of Leuven Institute for Internaional Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No 94, May 2006, "Detention in Peace Operations: The Legal Framework and Main Categories of Detainees," p.23

One way to obtain some guarantees is to conclude an arrangement with the local authorities intended to ensure correct treatment and including some follow-up mechanisms. This approach has been adopted in Afghanistan, where some ISAF participating nations have concluded arrangements on this issue with the Afghan authorities and NATO is also negotiating such an arrangement. At least one of these agreements is in the public domain, namely that concluded by the Netherlands.

DISDADVANTAGES

1. Reduced intelligence gathering: Prisoners are more effectively debriefed if all held by CIA

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Sept 2006, Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, p. 3

Unraveling the network of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative Hambali and foiling future US operations. This network's unraveling is an example of how detainees all held by CIA can be more effectively debriefed than if they were held by a variety of different governments.

Impact: Terrorist plots have been stopped by intelligence from detainees

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Sept 2006, Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, p. 5 (bracjets added)

In addition, detainees have provided us locational information on al-Qa'ida managers and operatives. As a result, we have been able to provide leads to our CT [counter-terrorism] partners around the world that have helped them root out al-Qa'ida safehavens. Subsequent detainees have reported that attempts to mount additional attacks in the US Homeland have been set back by these counterterrorism operations.

Impact: Detainees have given intelligence that leads to capture of Al-Qa’ida terrorists

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Sept 2006, Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, p. 3

Captured al-Qa'ida training manuals indicate that al-Qa'ida operatives receive counter-interrogation training; detainees in CIA's program have provided valuable information despite their efforts to apply this training. Detainees have provided lead information that has aided the US and its allies in capturing al-Qa'ida operatives who pose a serious threat.

Impact: Detainee information leads to removal of al-Qa’ida operatives

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Sept 2006, Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, p. 4 (brackets added)

Detainees have provided names [of] approximately 86 individuals -- many of whom we had never heard of before -- that al-Qa'ida has deemed suitable for Western operations. We have shared these names broadly within the US intelligence and law enforcement communities and with key partners overseas. Nearly half these individuals have been removed from the battlefield by the US and its allies.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: IRAN

HARMS

1. Iran has a right to develop civilian nuclear program and wants a stable region

Ruprecht Polenz (Rapporteur of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations), 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

According to the NPT, Iran has a right to develop a civilian nuclear programme. Tehran also has a legitimate interest in a stable and secure neighbourhood. Therefore, the Allies need to devise a policy that meets Iran's legitimate demands and explicitly avoids the rhetoric of regime change, which only stirs up nationalistic feelings in the country.

**2. Iran and the NATO allies need to cooperate to solve mutual problems**

Ruprecht Polenz (Rapporteur of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations), 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

Despite their differences, the Allies and Iran share a number of important security interests. They share a common interest in border security, particularly as Iran remains a transit country for South-western Asian heroin to Europe. Iranian domestic narcotics consumption remains a persistent problem and, according to official statistics, there are at least 2 million drug users in the country. The Allies and Iran, which has given refuge to thousands of Afghan refugees, also share an interest in the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq.

3. Iran does not have advanced nuclear capabilities

M. K Bhadrakumar (former Indian diplomat), 18 Apr 2006 ASIA TIMES, "China, Russia welcome Iran into the fold," [www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD18Ad02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD18Ad02.html)

Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's nuclear power agency and a former prime minister, said Iran was simply not capable of enriching uranium on an industrial scale. "It has long since been known that Iran has a 'cascade' of only 164 centrifuges, and obtaining low-grade uranium from this 'cascade' was only a matter of time. This did not come as a surprise to us." Yevgeniy Velikhov, president of Kurchatov Institute, Russia's nuclear research center, told Tier-TASS, "Launching experimental equipment of this type is something any university can do."

4. Harms don't justify action: Best policy is wait and see

Edward N. Luttwak (senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 18 July 2006, "Before Bombing: A Three-Year Plan for Iran" CATO UNBOUND, [www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/18/edward-n-luttwak/before-bombing-a-three-year-plan-for-iran/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/18/edward-n-luttwak/before-bombing-a-three-year-plan-for-iran/)

There is therefore no compelling reason to use force before then, while there are very good reasons to wait. One may still hope that diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to abandon uranium enrichment will succeed, however unlikely that now seems. A more solid reason to wait is that the United States is already over-committed, and one hopes that it will regain some freedom of action once U.S. troops are disengaged from active operations in Iraq. An even better reason to wait is that the next three years could used very productively to weaken Iran's regime. Even if the UN Security Council fails in the end to impose sanctions, so long as the United States can preserve its entente with the European Union over Iran, punishing measures could still be implemented to dissuade investments in Iran, to deny international banking services, and prohibit the travel of leaders broadly defined and their families to their favorite European destinations.

MINOR REPAIR

Europeans impose trade restrictions on key technological exports

Edward N. Luttwak (senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 18 July 2006, "Before Bombing: A Three-Year Plan for Iran" CATO UNBOUND, [www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/18/edward-n-luttwak/before-bombing-a-three-year-plan-for-iran/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/18/edward-n-luttwak/before-bombing-a-three-year-plan-for-iran/)

In the meantime, the new intelligence now available should be used to slow down Iran’s nuclear program by finally, at long last, stopping exports of electron-beam welders, balancing machines, vacuum pumps, flow-forming machines, and such from the West, chiefly Germany and Switzerland. For that was the startling discovery made by the IAEA inspectors: although Iran’s nuclear program critically depends on equipment imported from Europe—a well known fact in itself—the Iranians had not even bothered to remove the manufacturers’ labels.

SOLVENCY

1. Deterrence doesn't solve: Iran is already surrounded but not deterred

Edward N. Luttwak (senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 18 July 2006, "Before Bombing: A Three-Year Plan for Iran" CATO UNBOUND, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/18/edward-n-luttwak/before-bombing-a-three-year-plan-for-iran/>

U.S. forces are present on both sides of Iran in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well to their south in the Persian Gulf and Indian ocean, Iran’s own armed forces are outdated in structure, training and equipment. Nevertheless, instead of being deterred, the rulers of Iran feel free to attack U.S. policies world-wide in the most violent terms, to form alliances with any and all enemies of the United States from Chavez of Venezuela to North Korea, and to foment actual violence against the United States and its allies.

2. US would have to use nuclear weapons to stop Iranian nuclear weapons

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.) 11 July 2006 "A Cure Worse than the Disease" CATO UNBOUND Reaction Essay <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/>

There could be many other covert facilities, since Tehran has had nearly three decades to pursue its nuclear activities. Worst of all, some of the installations may be in reinforced, underground locations. Taking out such sites with conventional weapons would be problematic at best. Although some ultra-hawkish types have mused about using nuclear “bunker busters” for the required strikes, crossing the nuclear threshold is a momentous step that could come back to haunt the United States in multiple ways.

3. Iranian regime won't change without a major war

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.) 11 July 2006 "A Cure Worse than the Disease" CATO UNBOUND Reaction Essay <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/>

According to them, there is so much Iranian public opposition to the mullahs that a U.S. propaganda offensive combined with financial and logistical assistance to prospective insurgents would be sufficient to topple the regime. Such a thesis might seem more plausible if we had not heard similar arguments in the years leading up to the Iraq war. Those arguments were quietly buried when the time for action arrived. Saddam Hussein’s overthrow was carried out by a massive application of U.S. military power. If the United States adopts a strategy of regime change in Iran, it is likely that an even greater military effort would be required.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Military strike on Iran wouldn't work and would cause terrorism and international economic crisis

Richard N. Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations), "The New Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html>

Nor would carrying out a preventive strike on Iranian nuclear installations accomplish much good. Not only might an attack fail to destroy all facilities, but it might also lead Tehran to reconstitute its program even more covertly, cause Iranians to rally around the regime, and persuade Iran to retaliate (most likely through proxies) against U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Iraq and maybe even directly against the United States. It would further radicalize the Arab and Muslim worlds and generate more terrorism and anti-American activity. Military action against Iran would also drive the price of oil to new heights, increasing the chances of an international economic crisis and a global recession. For all these reasons, military force should be considered only as a last resort.

2. Net benefits: Waiting will produce better results than military intervention

David Ignatius, 12 Apr 2006, "An Iranian Missile Crisis?" WASHINGTON POST, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/iran/general/2006/0412crisis.htm>

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, makes a similar argument about Iran. "I think of war with Iran as the ending of America's present role in the world," he told me this week. "Iraq may have been a preview of that, but it's still redeemable if we get out fast. In a war with Iran, we'll get dragged down for 20 or 30 years. The world will condemn us. We will lose our position in the world." Brzezinski urges President Bush to slow down and think carefully about his options -- rather than rushing to stop Iran's nuclear program, which by most estimates is five to 10 years away from building a bomb, even after yesterday's announcement. "Time is on our side," says Brzezinski. "The mullahs aren't the future of Iran, they're the past." As the United States carefully weighs its options, there is every likelihood that the strategic picture will improve.

3. Military strike would kill thousands of innocent Iranians

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.) 11 July 2006 "A Cure Worse than the Disease" CATO UNBOUND Reaction Essay <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/>

There are numerous nuclear-related sites in Iran–many of which are in or near major population centers, maximizing the probable number of civilian casualties in an attack. Indeed, thousands of innocent Iranians would perish in U.S. air strikes.

4. Military strike would unleash Iranian terrorism backlash or attack on Israel

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 11 July 2006 "A Cure Worse than the Disease" CATO UNBOUND Reaction Essay, [www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/)

Even launching conventional strikes would be extremely dangerous. At the very least, Tehran would be tempted to cause even more trouble than it is already doing for U.S. and British occupation forces in Iraq. The infiltration of a few thousand dedicated Revolutionary Guards could accomplish that goal. The Iranian regime would also be tempted to unleash its terrorist ally, Hezbollah, on American targets throughout the Middle East. And there is always the risk that an attacked and humiliated Iran might do something incredibly rash, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching attacks against Israel, triggering a massive regional crisis.

5. War with Iran = global war of civilizations: No rational policy maker would do it

Ted Galen Carpenter, (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 11 July 2006 "A Cure Worse than the Disease" CATO UNBOUND Reaction Essay <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/>

Finally, there is the probable impact on the rest of the Muslim world. If the United States attacks yet another Muslim country (which would make three in the last five years), there will not be a Muslim from Morocco to Malaysia who will not believe that Washington is out to destroy their culture and religion. America’s troubles with the Islamic world do not yet constitute a war of civilizations, but Gerecht’s strategy could well produce that result. The military option is one that no rational U.S. policymaker should consider.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

HARMS

1. Despite different technologies/capabilities, new members are still helpful

Helle C. Dale (Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies) , 8 Sept 2004, "Defense Transformation and the New Allies," Heritage Lecture #853, [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm)

The expansion of NATO has brought the United States new and very important allies, but it has also exacerbated the difficulties of managing forces with very different technologies. This is particularly true because many of our new NATO allies are even less engaged in the race for defense transformation than our traditional European partners.The pace of American defense transformation is unlikely to change: Indeed, it will likely accelerate in the years ahead. At the same time, I would argue that our new East European allies will become even more important to the United States--both in ensuring peace and stability in Europe and in addressing unconventional challenges in the global war on terrorism, as well as other military missions that may see U.S. and European forces standing side by side around the world.

2. New members are a huge boost to morale

Helle C. Dale (Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies) , 8 Sept 2004, "Defense Transformation and the New Allies," Heritage Lecture #853, [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm)

In April 2004, NATO received an infusion of new blood. At this time in the half-century of the old alliance's lifespan, this is exactly what NATO needs. The inclusion of seven new members, most from the old Warsaw Pact and some formerly part of the Soviet Union, was a huge boost to morale. If anyone remembers why NATO still has a purpose after the end of the Cold War, it is the Bulgarians, the Romanians, the Estonians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, the Slovakians, and the Slovenians.

3. Hungary and Czech Republic making contributions to NATO missions

Helle C. Dale (Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies) , 8 Sept 2004, "Defense Transformation and the New Allies," Heritage Lecture #853, [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl853.cfm)

# Hungary has equipped three Afghan National Army battalions with armaments and supplies (medical, clothing, etc.). Hungary has also granted $1 million in aid to Afghanistan. Additionally, Hungary has provided the United States with bases to train Iraqi opposition forces.

# The Czech Republic installed a nuclear/biological/chemical defense unit in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and a field hospital in support of the International Security Assistance Force. The Czechs are involved in training Iraqi diplomats in Prague and are training Iraqi police in Jordan.

4. NATO is about protecting weak countries

Duray Polat (Turkish Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia), 15 Sept 2006, speech at Cesis Secondary school, [www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/20/](http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/20/)

I recall the words of Her Excellency the Madam President, Dr Vaira Vike-Freiberga at the last NATO Summit in 2004 held in Istanbul. She said, “Sitting here as a representative of Latvia around this round table, with you, representative of the other nations, I feel safe and secure and I can say so in the name of my people. That sense of solidarity, of mutual support is crucial to us. We have known what it means to have our country erased from the maps of the world and our flag disappeared from the international scene. We are back, we would like to stay back and we thank you for accepting us in your midst. We look forward to the security that NATO provides; and for us it is not theoretical, it is not illusionary, it is very real.”

5. Each new member is making important contributions to the alliance

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs and former US ambassador to NATO), 23 Oct 2006, Remarks to the Welt-am-Sonntag Bundeswehr Forum, Berlin, Germany, "Riga and Beyond" [www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/75422.htm)

NATO has enlarged successfully five times, first with Greece and Turkey, then with Germany in 1952, and after the end of the Cold War, with our new partners in Central Europe. Each new NATO member is making important contributions. We need to self-consciously keep the door open to new members.

INHERENCY

1. Pre-membership programs PFP and MAP are improving candidate countries' militaries

Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent (US Navy, Director of European Plans and Operations Center, U.S. European Command), 10 Mar 2005, Written statement to THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION, [www.eucom.mil/english/Transcripts/20050310.asp](http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transcripts/20050310.asp) (Note: United States European Command=EUCOM)

Partnership for Peace (PfP), a successful NATO outreach program, has increased stability and built stronger security relationships in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through political consultations and individual national programs. EUCOM involvement and leadership in PfP training, exercises, and bilateral programs with participating nations help make this program a success. Thirty nations have joined the PfP since it was launched in 1994, with 10 achieving NATO membership. Seven of these 10 nations were accessed via the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP provides for concrete feedback and advice from NATO to aspiring countries on their own preparations directed at achieving future membership. Currently, EUCOM continues to help three MAP nations (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) meet membership requirements, especially in the areas of civil-military relations and making appropriate military contributions to the Alliance.

2. Southeast Europe Clearinghouse is helping countries qualify for NATO membership

Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent (US Navy, Director of European Plans and Operations Center, U.S. European Command), 10 Mar 2005, Written statement to THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION, [www.eucom.mil/english/Transcripts/20050310.asp](http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transcripts/20050310.asp) (Note: United States European Command=EUCOM)

The Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, aimed at the three Adriatic Charter nations (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia) plus Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, is open to all NATO, European Union, and partner countries (Russia and Ukraine specifically) that have engagement programs in Southeastern Europe. The objectives of this clearinghouse are to assist the Adriatic Charter nations in their efforts toward NATO membership and to speed the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro into the Euro-Atlantic Community.

SOLVENCY

1. Voters unfamiliar and uncertain about complex issues in public referendums

Lawrence LeDuc (Department of Political Science, University of Toronto), 2004, The European Constitution Referendums: What We Already Know, p. 1

But with these political benefits come certain costs. Holding a referendum on an issue such as the EU constitution introduces an element of uncertainty less likely to be found in parliamentary ratification processes. This is largely because constitutional matters tend to be the exclusive preserve of political elites. When they are introduced into the realm of mass electoral politics, voters must begin a complex learning process in order to become familiar with the underlying arguments and issues. We know from the study of referendums at other times and in other places that this process of opinion formation is complex and highly uncertain. Referendums on issues with which the mass public is largely unfamiliar thus tend to be highly volatile and therefore unpredictable events.

2. New democracies cannot effectively do defense reform

Dr Thomas-Durell Young (Naval Postgraduate School) and Dr Todor Tagarev (G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Bulgaria), Spring-Summer 2006, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, CONNECTIONS: The Quarterly Journal Vol. V No. 1, Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation, p. 4

One should note, for example, that, based on recent experiences with defense reductions in Great Britain and the Netherlands, defense reforms can be confusing to the public and painful to execute from within the defense community, even when these advantages are present. Consider, therefore, the plight of a young democracy with weak institutions, insufficiently educated and trained defense officials and senior military officers, legacy bureaucratic structures, an imperfect codex of defense legislation, and a dysfunctional inter-ministerial consultative process. Given the extent of the challenges presented by defense reform, it is little wonder that the effort to undertake such reforms is likely to appear all but insurmountable in such a state, and for good reason.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: MIDDLE EAST ROLE FOR NATO

TOPICALITY: Not a significant reform

1. NATO has been increasing Middle East involvement for more than a decade

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

A different type of NATO involvement in the Greater Middle East comes in the form of an expanded political-military dialogue with Middle Eastern, North African and Gulf countries. Acknowledging the growing importance of the Greater Middle East to the security concerns of its members, NATO has for more than a decade sought to increase its interaction with the governments and peoples of the region.

2. NATO has already made the decision to get more involved in the Middle East

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

If NATO were to restrict itself to the old agenda of defending Western Europe it would wither and die. Therefore, it appears that its members have decided to use the organization to deal with a wider range of challenges and threats, which is why it is becoming increasingly involved in the Greater Middle East.

INHERENCY

1. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) are expanding NATO relationships in the Persian Gulf region

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm) (brackets added)

Perhaps more promisingly, NATO leaders also launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) at the summit--the first formal relationship between NATO and the Arab states of the Gulf. In some ways similar to the MD [Mediterranean Dialogue], the ICI is designed to expand dialogue and to provide a forum for practical cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Gulf region.

2. Riga Summit announced Training Cooperation Initiative with Middle East

NATO official web page, 29 Nov 2006, NATO UPDATE, "NATO launches training initiative for Mediterranean and Middle East," <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/11-november/e1129f.htm>

At the second day of the Riga Summit, NATO leaders launched a Training Cooperation Initiative offering to share its training expertise with partners in the Mediterranean and in the broader region of the Middle East. The Alliance declared itself ready, in the spirit of joint ownership, and taking into account available resources, to share its training expertise with its Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries.

3. No barrier: If Middle East countries want increased relationship with NATO, they can have it today using MD and ICI

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm) (brackets added)

The MD [Mediterranean Dialogue] and ICI [Istanbul Cooperation Initiative] will only advance as far as their participants -- and NATO members -- are prepared to take them. They are, however, potential steps toward greater NATO interaction with a number of states in a region where NATO itself is clearly becoming more involved. If the MD and ICI states want to develop their cooperation with NATO beyond these initial steps, they are likely to find NATO a willing partner.

4. Status Quo trend is toward growing NATO involvement in the Middle East

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

Many of these operations are limited in scope and political discussions in and about the Greater Middle East are still in their early stages. Nonetheless, the trend toward greater Alliance involvement in the region is clear and NATO's role in this area is likely to continue to grow. NATO is in the process of fitfully transforming itself into a global security organization in terms of its missions, its participation and possibly even its future membership.

5. NATO is expanding security cooperation, training and education in the Middle East and Africa

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs), 3 May 2006, testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe, <http://georgia.usembassy.gov/releases/2006/transcript20060503NATO_Riga.htm>

We are also exploring ways that NATO can support increased security cooperation with its neighbors in the broader Middle East and in Africa through greater access to NATO training and education resources. Working with Italy and Norway, we have initiated these discussions at NATO and with countries in the region.

SOLVENCY

1. Democratic reform in the Middle East won't solve for terrorism

Richard N. Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations), "The New Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2006, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html)

Democracy is not the answer to terrorism, either. It is plausible that young men and women coming of age would be less likely to become terrorists if they belonged to societies that offered them political and economic opportunities. But recent events suggest that even those who grow up in mature democracies, such as the United Kingdom, are not immune to the pull of radicalism. The fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah fared well in elections and then carried out violent attacks reinforces the point that democratic reform does not guarantee quiet. And democratization is of little use when dealing with radicals whose platforms have no hope of receiving majority support.

2. Long-term NATO involvement in the Middle East may not be accepted by inhabitants of the region

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

Also, where the Greater Middle East is concerned, it remains unclear whether the inhabitants of the region will be willing to accept NATO's long-term involvement--unlike that of the former colonial powers or more recently the Unitd States.

3. Israel/Palestinian issues unlikely to be settled due to multiple problems

Richard N. Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations), "The New Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2006, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html)

In the aftermath of Israel's controversial operation in Lebanon, the Kadima-led government will almost certainly be too weak to command domestic support for any policy perceived as risky or as rewarding aggression. Unilateral disengagement has been discredited now that attacks have followed Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza. There is no obvious partner on the Palestinian side who is both able and willing to compromise, further hindering the chances of a negotiated approach. The United States has lost much of its standing as a credible and honest broker, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, Israel's settlement expansion and road building will continue apace, further complicating diplomacy.

4. Middle East involvement must be limited because of controversy among alliance members

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

Many of the missions undertaken so far are quite limited in scope and have all led to serious controversy among NATO members. There is still no consensus within the Alliance on the precise role it should play in the Greater Middle East and on major challenges that must be met if NATO's role is to continue to grow.

DISADVANTAGES

1. New missions increase risk of clash of civilizations

Michèle Alliot-Marie, (French Minister of Defense), 30 May 2006, "Address by Mrs Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defence, France" NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961)

By seeking to adapt our Alliance to new realities, we must also be careful to avoid blunders: a poorly thought-out extension of our missions - there, I said it - or inappropriate political messages. So in Riga we must be cautious not to present ourselves as an organization responsible for promoting democracy throughout the world, in opposition to the Greater Middle East, China or Russia. This would be counterproductive and might give rise to a clash of civilizations, which is exactly what we are seeking to avoid.

2. "Nonindigenous" (outside) powers attract terrorism in the Middle East

Richard N. Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations), "The New Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2006, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html)

Ninth, terrorism, defined as the intentional use of force against civilians in the pursuit of political aims, will remain a feature of the region. It will occur in divided societies, such as Iraq, and in societies where radical groups seek to weaken and discredit the government, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Terrorism will grow in sophistication and remain a tool used against Israel and the presence of the United States and other nonindigenous powers.

US hegemony/intervention link: US is driving security agenda in the Middle East even with NATO

(link to Blue Book's Intervention Disad brief)

Richard N. Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations), "The New Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2006, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85601-p10/richard-n-haass/the-new-middle-east.html)

The rise of new media, and above all of satellite television, has turned the Arab world into a "regional village" and politicized it. Much of the content shown -- scenes of violence and destruction in Iraq; images of mistreated Iraqi and Muslim prisoners; suffering in Gaza, the West Bank, and now Lebanon -- has further alienated many people in the Middle East from the United States. As a result, governments in the Middle East now have a more difficult time working openly with the United States, and U.S. influence in the region has waned.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NATO IS IRRELEVANT

Nothing else matters about NATO except Afghanistan

Michael Moran (award winning journalist), 29 Nov 2006, "NATO Pins Future to Afghanistan," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/12056/natos\_fateful\_afghan\_wager.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/12056/natos_fateful_afghan_wager.html)

These problems must be overcome or NATO may not survive as a useful entity, writes Robert Hunter, a former U.S. ambassador to the alliance. NATO has “bet the alliance” on Afghanistan (Project Syndicate), he says. “No amount of ‘transformation’ or ‘partnerships’ or anything else will matter much if NATO fails for the first time in its history.” As Afghan expert Barnett R. Rubin told CFR.org’s Bernard Gwertzman, the country risks falling back toward anarchy. Adds a Christian Science Monitor editorial, "the subject highest on the summit agenda—stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan—is the very one that demands an answer to NATO's existential question."

NATO can't solve transatlantic problems, Iran nukes, proliferation, terrorism, relations with Russia, stabilization of Europe

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf)

NATO is no longer the most appropriate institution to solve the transatlantic problems and tension we have today, just because most of these tensions or problems are no longer NATO-related, they are not on the NATO agenda. The transatlantic problems we have today are, to just name the most important ones of the past month, the EU arms embargo against China, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, the problem of proliferation, terrorism, the common policy/ approach towards Russia, the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood and questions like whether or not Turkey, the Balkan countries or eventually Ukraine should join the EU (in short: a common transatlantic strategy for the European neighbourhood).

NATO cannot do anything about development policies, climate protection, the Millenium Agenda or the ICC

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf) (brackets added, parentheses in original; the Millenium Agenda is a UN policy to reduce hunger and disease in poor countries)

Also, yet to a lesser degree, we are facing questions regarding development policies, the ‘Millenium Agenda’, climate protection or the ICC [International Criminal Court]. When examining these issues, NATO is not really (let alone exclusively) relevant for any of these questions as NATO has no solutions or tools to fix the problems.

NATO is increasingly irrelevant to the current generation of Europeans

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf)

It is my simple feeling, working in the foreign policy environment – but polling data suggest that this feeling has empirical evidence – that people that are as of today below the age of 40/ 45 are rather EU-socialised, whereas the ‘NATO security community’ is often 55/ 60 years or older. In addition, for all born after 1989, having missed the strategic importance of NATO, in their youth, NATO is probably increasingly irrelevant, whereas the EU, basically because of daily contact (i.e. the Euro) is at least somehow visible. The annual study the German Marshall Fund of the United States issued just a couple of days ago entitled, ‘Transatlantic Trends 2005’, confirms this trend.

European Union can fight terrorism and increase stability better than NATO

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf)

If one considers that even for the fight against terror, military solutions are not solely sufficient, NATO’s activities seem to be reduced even in the latter area. In comparison, even though lacking strength and often unity, it seems that it is – or at least could and should be – the EU that can provide answers. The EU can decide on the lift of the arms embargo against China (or not); the EU negotiates in Iran; the EU can offer full-membership to Turkey (and ultimately to Ukraine and other countries) or not. In addition, it seems increasingly clear that the future of the Western Balkans, in connection with political stability, lies in the hands of the EU as opposed to NATO.

NATO is inappropriate for global security policies: Violates the will of European citizens through US dominance

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf) ("primus inter pares" = "first among equals")

Why is NATO today also in institutional terms insufficient as a place for a broader geo-strategic discussion? The answer is that within NATO, the US is basically in a ‘primus inter pares’ position, and since NATO is consensus-driven and consensus-imposing in its decision-making structure, it seems to me that it misses an important reality of today: And that is that all polling data (including our own, Transatlantic Trends) point to the fact that the EU would like less US leadership in international relations (58%, with some 80% being against the foreign policy of the Bush administration).

NATO is a waste of time for improving US-Europe relationship: Use the EU instead

Dr. Ulrike Guérot (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States), 23 Sept 2005, CONFERENCE REPORT: Changing landscape in Transatlantic relations - New EU member states and candidate countries between Brussels and Washington, Under the auspices of Mr Cyril Svoboda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, [www.europeum.org/doc/arch\_eur/Conference\_Report\_final.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Conference_Report_final.pdf)

In this context, and I’ll be very short on this point, as it is again a logical consequence of what I have been saying before, we should rethink the whole business of our EU-NATO relationship. I think this is to a large extent a bubble, where 25 countries try to reach a common position to then speak to another institution of 26 members, in order to find a common position in this other institution, although the very fact is that we basically talk to ourselves. If I leave out Canada for a second, and Turkey (that is however likely to join the EU at some point), and if I pass over some – sorry to say – not so relevant countries like Malta or Norway – NATO is basically the EU minus the US. And these two are, in a way, on many issues, the antipodes of discussion. Therefore, it seems legitimate to me, again, to rather think of a US-EU discourse than about improved NATO-EU relations.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NEW MISSIONS

COUNTERPLAN/MINOR REPAIR: US should increase spending on non-military security tools - These should be tried first using Status Quo methods, before we engage in any significant reform of NATO

Status Quo is only spending a little bit more on non-military security tools

Marcus Corbin, (Senior Analyst on military strategy & forces, Center for Defense Information), and Miriam Pemberton, (Peace and Security Editor for Foreign Policy In Focus), May 2005, " A Unified Security Budget for the United States 2006," [www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb\_body.html](http://www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb_body.html)

The security debate has shifted during the past year, toward broad agreement that the United States needs to invest more in nonmilitary security tools. The actual, proportional shift in resources in the budget request, however, is barely perceptible.

Non-military security tools need a lot more funding

Marcus Corbin, (Senior Analyst on military strategy & forces, Center for Defense Information), and Miriam Pemberton, (Peace and Security Editor for Foreign Policy In Focus), May 2005, " A Unified Security Budget for the United States 2006," [www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb\_body.html](http://www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb_body.html)

The broad-based support during the past year for devoting more resources to nonmilitary security tools is welcome. Mostly the case for this shift has been framed as a need to increase the budget for international affairs, or the 150 budget. This is an important part of the task. The slice of the budgetary pie allocated to international affairs has been shrinking for four decades. The small increases during the last two years primarily from the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account still leave the percentage of the discretionary budget allotted to the 150 account at less than 2 percent of the total. Unacceptable tradeoffs are the result: forced choices between secure embassies and modern communications systems for diplomats or adequate funding for peacekeeping, and between adequate funding for the Middle East peace process, or safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials in Russia. Increases, as outlined, need to be made to both parts of the international affairs budget: to the State Department budget, which includes the cost of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. assessed contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping, and to the foreign operations budget, which includes bilateral development and humanitarian aid.

Foreign policy experts say: Non-military tools must be tried first, to win the "war of ideas"

Tom Regan (staff writer), 16 June 2006, "Experts: US must win 'war of ideas'," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/dailyUpdate.html>

In a survey of 117 of America's leading foreign-policy experts, both conservative and liberal, The Toronto Star reports that a large majority of those polled (84 percent) believe that the US is not winning the war on terror. And most of the experts surveyed believe that if the US is to win that larger war, it must first win the 'war of ideas' through the use of 'non-military tools' like diplomacy and multilateral organizations.

SOLVENCY

1. Even missions justified on principle cannot be done right now - NATO is overloaded

Michèle Alliot-Marie, (French Minister of Defense), 30 May 2006, "Address by Mrs Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defence, France" NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961)

A second objective for a successful adaptation of our Alliance is to make sure that our assets match our ambitions. Let us be frank: some of us are mightily tempted to try to go beyond our capabilities, by giving the Alliance a whole series of missions for which it is not equipped. The difficulties encountered in the Pakistan mission should bring us back to reality. It is not a question of ruling out some missions on principle, missions that are sometimes justified by their urgency, but we must not overload the boat lest we sink it.

NATO is struggling to fulfill even its current commitments

Ivo Daalder (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) and James Goldgeier (Professor of Political Science at George Washington University), Sept/Oct 2006, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Global NATO," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html>

At the same time, with U.S. forces stretched thin in Iraq and European states failing to invest enough to participate significantly in operations far away from home, NATO is struggling to fulfill even its current commitments.

2. NATO cannot do civil reconstruction nor training missions

Michèle Alliot-Marie, (French Minister of Defense), 30 May 2006, "Address by Mrs Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defence, France" NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=961)

Civil reconstruction, for example, is not the Alliance's responsibility. Other organizations are responsible for that and have the necessary resources. Training should not become one of NATO's main missions either. We must take care not to weaken our operational capabilities - our raison d'être - by seeking to expand our missions too much. What we are seeing is an escalation in costs that is untenable over time. Too many missions might kill our essential mission. The vital equipment effort must not be compromised by a profusion of secondary activities.

3. New missions will fail with lack of European support

A. European nations won't support new missions: Too expensive and too risky

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

Moreover, it is unclear whether NATO member states are willing to devote the defense resources necessary for the Alliance's missions to continue to expand, both geographically and functionally. In particular, many European members of NATO are unwilling to spend the amounts of money and take the kind of risks that might be necessary to ensure NATO's future success.

B. Participation is not automatic - NATO members can decline to join approved missions

Ivo Daalder (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) and James Goldgeier (Professor of Political Science at George Washington University), Sept/Oct 2006, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Global NATO," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html>

Even though Article 5 considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all members, each member is required only to take "such action as it deems necessary" -- a provision that effectively ensures that the use of force is never automatic. In fact, Article 5 has only been invoked once -- following 9/11 -- and only a handful of NATO members participated in the subsequent military action (which was conducted under U.S. rather than NATO command).

The impact to these cards are that the Affirmative plan will not solve because even if the Affirmative fiats that a new mission is approved, there's no NATO rule that forces them to participate. Without participation, the plan fails.

DISADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGE 1. New missions likely to lead to NATO's demise

Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), 5 Oct 2006, "How to keep NATO relevant," International Herald Tribune <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11615/how_to_keep_nato_relevant.html>

Many of the ideas on the table are impressively bold, envisaging a NATO that not only continues to take in Europe’s new democracies, but also extends its membership and missions well beyond the European heartland. Such expansive proposals might be alluring in their ambition, but they are more likely to lead to NATO’s demise than its renewal. With the alliance already overextended in Afghanistan, NATO’s current agenda should focus on consolidation, not on pursuing a global agenda that promises only to saddle the organization with an unsustainable range of commitments.

DISADVANTAGE 2. Economic harms and national security risks from diverting money away from energy independence toward military spending

1. Link - U.S. has 85% of NATO's military capabilities

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. (senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation), 2006, "Future of NATO: Facts, Figures & Recommendations, ISSUES 2006, Heratige Foundation, [www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm)

Consequently, the United States now represents 85 percent of NATO’s military capabilities. As NATO considers the possibility of further enlargement or the emulation of missions in troubled states such as Afghanistan (ISAF), the alliance’s robust and flexible nature could well be under threat if these massive discrepancies in defense spending are not addressed adequately.

2. Link - NATO cannot afford to take on any new missions

Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), 5 Oct 2006, "How to keep NATO relevant," International Herald Tribune <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11615/how_to_keep_nato_relevant.html>

Moreover, NATO can hardly afford to take on global responsibilities. Its plate is already full, with the mission in Afghanistan hanging in the balance. Even with a reinforced contingent, bringing peace and stability to the country will prove a daunting challenge. Failure in Afghanistan could well call the future of the alliance into question. Now is not the time for NATO to be contemplating a mission in the West Bank.

The impact to these cards is that new missions will require new US defense spending.

3. Link - Increased US defense spending forces cuts to programs for quality of life and energy independence

Marcus Corbin, (Senior Analyst on military strategy & forces, Center for Defense Information), and Miriam Pemberton, (Peace and Security Editor for Foreign Policy In Focus), May 2005, " A Unified Security Budget for the United States 2006," [www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb\_body.html](http://www.fpif.org/papers/0505usb_body.html)

The overemphasis on security by means of military force has begun to register in our quality of life. The major escalations of the U.S. military budget in recent years, exacerbated by increases for current military operations, and compounded by a series of major tax cuts, has increased the pressure on spending for our citizens’ education, health care, environmental protection, social security, and other public services. Within the security portfolio, cuts to the budgets for energy efﬁciency and renewable energy sources take us further away from the goal of energy independence, and tie our security to a volatile world oil market and to undemocratic regimes.

4. Impact #1: Economic impact and national security risk

Sen. Richard Lugar, 24 Apr 2006, "America Needs a Handle on Energy," The Lugar Energy Initiative, <http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/index.html>

While our constituents feel the economic impact most directly, energy is not just a pocketbook issue. Energy is the albatross of U.S. national security, as I called it in a recent Brookings Institution speech. Last year’s energy bill, with the leadership of Senator Domenici and Senator Bingaman, recognized the importance of a diverse energy portfolio. To build upon that progress, we need robust government action not only to promote research into alternative fuels and energy efficiency, but also to deploy these oil saving technologies into the economy rapidly.

5. Impact #2: Energy dependence hurts war on terror

Tom Regan (staff writer), 16 June 2006, "Experts: US must win 'war of ideas'," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/dailyUpdate.html> (brackets in original)

And the survey also noted that the single most important thing that America can do to win the war on terror, is reduce its dependence on foreign oil. 'Eighty-two percent of the experts said that policymakers should make ending America's dependence on foreign oil a higher priority. And nearly two thirds said that current US energy policies are actually making matters worse, not better. "We borrow a billion dollars every working day to import oil, an increasing share of it coming from the Middle East," says index participant and former CIA director James Woolsey. "[F]or example in Saudi Arabia, billions are transferred to the Wahhabis and like-minded groups who then indoctrinate young people to hate Shiites, Sufis, Jews, Christians, and democracy, and to oppress women horribly." '

NEGATIVE BRIEF: RUSSIA COOPERATION/NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL (NRC)

HARMS

1. Vladimir Putin says NATO-Russia cooperation and dialogue are working fine today

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 Oct 2006, "Russia: NATO Chief Holds Moscow Talks," <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/bc2a6fcb-6968-4e29-9eb1-3b2a6f2fbec7.html> (first brackets added, others in original)

[Russian President Vladimir] Putin gave an equally upbeat assessment of ties between Russia and NATO, which in 2002 signed a partnership agreement outlining cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and peacekeeping. "We continue [NATO-Russia] cooperation in assisting NATO countries in Afghanistan, we have now joined your work in the Mediterranean Sea, our Emergency Situations Ministry is cooperating [with NATO] on emergency response planning," Putin said. "I would also like to note our political dialogue, which is maintained constantly and at the highest level."

2. Russia considers relations with NATO good today

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” [www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n\_id=24488](http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488)

A paradox just several years ago, but as a result of this “Cool War” with the US and the EU, Moscow’s relations with NATO are much better and far less confrontational and painful for Russia, then its relations with the US, EU and OSCE. This would have been totally unthinkable just a couple of years ago. As a result of Moscow’s deepening international isolation from the West the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs is already speaking of NATO-Russia relations, not the OSCE, as the “corner stone” of the European security.

3. NATO-Russia cooperation is good and getting better

James Appathurai (NATO Spokesman), 28 Nov 2006, NATO Speech: Press Conference by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, Riga, Latvia, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061128f.htm> (ellipses in original, brackets added)

We have had, for example, quite open discussions where not all of the 27 [NATO+Russia] countries necessarily agreed on issues like Georgia. Sometimes where they do agree, for example, during the crisis in Ukraine recently. So it... it is a good relationship. It is a vital strategic bridge across Europe. All the 27 countries recognize that this is a relationship that has to work, that is working. Can it work better? Yes, it can work better, and we're certainly working to do that.

INHERENCY

1. NRC cooperation is large and new collaboration steps are being taken

NATO official web page, 30 Aug 2004, NATO TOPICS, "Key areas of NRC cooperation," [www.nato.int/issues/nrc/cooperation.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nrc/cooperation.html)

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states is directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees. Key areas include the fight against terrorism, crisis management, theatre missile defence, non-proliferation, military-to-military cooperation and defence reform. Collaboration is also being taken forward in the areas of airspace management, logistics, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security. Hardly a day goes by without an NRC meeting at one level or another, leading to an unprecedented intensity of contacts and informal consultation in many different fields, conducted in a friendly and workmanlike atmosphere.

2. NATO-Russia Council has program of cooperation

James Appathurai (NATO Spokesman), 28 Nov 2006, NATO Speech: Press Conference by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, Riga, Latvia, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061128f.htm>

Through the NATO-Russia Council, NATO nations sit around the table as 27 equal states. We have a program of cooperation in terms of cooperative air support where we share a picture, shared picture of airspace. For example, that has moved quite a bit forward, where a Russian ship has sailed, for a limited period, with NATO forces in the Mediterranean, where we have a joint project to train counternarcotics officials in Afghanistan, in neighbouring countries, where we have discussions on the terrorist threats, where we have discussions on cooperation when it comes to Theatre Missile Defence.

SOLVENCY

1. NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is unproductive

Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Report of an Independent Task Force, Additional and Dissenting Views, Walter B. Slocombe, Robert D. Blackwill, Dov S. Zakheim, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," p. 73-74

Similarly if the NATO-Russia Council, having served its purpose of helping Moscow acquiesce in NATO's inclusion of the Baltic states, has been unproductive of dialogue, much less cooperation, on security issues, NATO should let sleeping committees lie, dealing with issues affecting Russia's neighbors only in a NATO forum that includes those neighbors.

2. NRC is a weak foundation for cooperation

Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Report of an Independent Task Force, chaired by former Sen. John Edwards and former Rep. Jack Kemp, Project Director Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," p. 40 (brackets added)

This consultative body [the NATO-Russia Council] was created with special status in the aftermath of September 11, in large part to ease Russian concerns over the pending round of NATO enlargement. Allaying resentment is not, however, a strong basis for cooperation if it is not at the same time reinforced by common interests. Integration on a weak foundation simply produces empty multilateral mechanisms that do not work as well as they should.

3. NRC only justified if Russia shares democratic principles and perspectives on major security issues

Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Report of an Independent Task Force, chaired by former Sen. John Edwards and former Rep. Jack Kemp, Project Director Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," p. 40

Over the long term, the existence of the NATO-Russia Council needs to be justified on terms that parallel NATO membership. Its members should be committed to democratic principles, share a common perspective on major security issues, and be ready and able to cooperate to meet common challenges.

4. NRC is already doing a lot (Cross apply under inherency) – but it is inefficient

Dmitry V. Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia), 25 Jan 2005, "The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious," Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Vol. 1, No. 2: “Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas” <http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24488>

Definitely, the NRC was a good step forward and a progressive alternative to the previous Permanent Cooperation Council. At the NRC Russia is participating in the deliberation, decisionmaking and implementation of decisions on all agenda issues on an equal basis with other NATO members. While in the PCC, Russia and NATO met only when decisions had already been adopted by the both sides separately, and thus it was very difficult for Moscow to alter any decision already taken by the then 19-member Alliance. Russia had to either agree or be expelled. Secondly, NRC is a good sign of Russia-NATO rapprochement after the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and symbolizes a fresh start in relations. But the NRC is vividly inefficient, taking into account the fact that the Cold War ended 15 years ago - not yesterday.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Increased Russian participation in international bodies hurts human rights in Russia

Anton Steen (ARENA Centre for European Studies, Univ. of Oslo, Norway) , 2005, National Elites in the Post-national Era: Ethno-politics and Internationalization in the Baltic States, p. 42

Another possibility, in line with the rationalist argument I argue, is a negative relationship. Here internationalism triggers restrictive attitudes to citizenship through recruiting national oriented elites and appealing to nationalist oriented elites. If this is the case the ‘rational-choice’ thesis also seems to prevail, suggesting that protecting ethnic sovereignty is a main incentive in the elites’ desire for international integration. This argument is in accord with Mendelson (2002) who analyses the effects of international human right networks on Russian domestic politics. In the case of Russia participating in international bodies may produce mixed or even negative outcomes for human rights implementation. The author argues that international norms and networks have elements of ‘organized hypocrisy’. Human rights and democratic norms are on both sides of the table basically regarded as ‘strategic interests’.

2. Deference to Russia limits economic opportunities and rights of Russia's neighboring states

Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Report of an Independent Task Force, chaired by former Sen. John Edwards and former Rep. Jack Kemp, Project Director Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," p. 48

The United States should not cede a veto or undue deference to Russia over American relations with the states of the Russian periphery. Russia's legitimate interests deserve respect, but there is nothing legitimate about limiting the opportunity of its neighbors to deepen their integration into the international economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic political transformation.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)

HARMS/SIGNIFICANCE

1. SCO is not very important

Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2006, "The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/>

"The basic picture is the SCO is not as important as people in Washington think," says Daniel Kimmage, an expert on Central Asia at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The SCO serves more as a forum to discuss issues of trade and security than a fully-developed counterpoint to NATO. "If you take NATO as your standard for organizational effectiveness," Kimmage says, "the SCO is not even close yet." Plus, unlike NATO, there are no mutual defense pledges.

2. Divisions among members hold back SCO's effectiveness

Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2006, "The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/> (brackets added)

Also holding back the [SCO] organization's effectiveness are internal divisions and tensions between its member states, particularly China and Russia over issues of energy and the construction of ports in the region. Finally, multilateral institutions historically have a poor track record in the region.

3. No reason for concern: SCO members will stay friendly with the West

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 July 2006, "U.S. Sees No Threat From SCO," <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/713FF1A9-FA10-41B6-BF56-445D3B17A672.html>

A U.S. State Department official has said the United States should not be overly concerned about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann said on July 25 that institutions like NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should have enough allure to keep SCO members friendly to the West.

4. Iran won't be allowed to join SCO

Prof. Stephen Blank (US Army War College), 21 June 2006, "THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: CRACKS BEHIND THE FACADE," EURASIA NET, [www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml) (brackets added)

Concerning Iran, both Russia and China withheld support for Tehran’s full membership out of a desire not to enrage Washington at a particularly delicate time in the effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear program crisis. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Beyond that, however, it is clear several other SCO members, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, strongly oppose membership for Iran. Both believe that Iran, given its confrontation with the United States on the nuclear issue, could drag the SCO into a global crisis in which the organization is not directly interested.

5. Even if Iran did join SCO, it is not a problem: might make SCO weaker

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 Aug 2006, "The Limits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," <http://www.rferl.org/releases/2006/08/428-070806.asp> (brackets added)

The most recent meeting of the SCO included Iran as an observer. Addressing concerns that a potential Iranian membership could transform the SCO into an "OPEC with bombs," [Daniel] Kimmage [Regional Analyst for Central Asia at RFE/RL] and [Richard] Weitz [Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute] reiterated the above-mentioned weaknesses of the alliance and dismissed the possibility that Iran would join the organization in the near future. Kimmage noted that the alliance is hesitant of extending membership to a Middle Eastern state with its own collection of regional problems,including tense relations with the West; while Weitz said that a membership expansion could "just as easily weaken the SCO as strengthen it."

6. Iran and Pakistan won't be accepted into SCO

Prof. Stephen Blank (US Army War College), 21 June 2006, "THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: CRACKS BEHIND THE FACADE," EURASIA NET, [www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml)

One of the SCO’s chief weaknesses is connected with the expansion dilemma that the organization is currently facing. The SCO’s rapid emergence has made it attractive to other states in the region: both Iran and Pakistan, for instance, are openly eager to join. But many existing members are reluctant to accept these two controversial states, both currently observer members, believing that they could be a source of future geopolitical headaches.

7. SCO is not "NATO's evil twin" - SCO members disagree on important issues

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 Aug 2006, "The Limits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," <http://www.rferl.org/releases/2006/08/428-070806.asp> (brackets added, ellipses in original)

[Richard] Weitz [Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute] rejected claims by some observers that the organization was "NATO's evil twin." In particular, Weitz said that, despite its "potential strengths... the SCO lacks the internal coherence and capacity of NATO or other strong multilateral security institutions." Weitz outlined three areas where SCO members "disagree over important issues," including "the desirability of the Western military presence in Central Asia," "the SCO's role in traditional defense matters," and "the extent to which member governments should assist one another to suppress future 'colored' revolutions and other domestic unrest."

8. SCO will not become an anti-NATO alliance

Prof. Stephen Blank (US Army War College), 21 June 2006, "THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: CRACKS BEHIND THE FACADE," EURASIA NET, [www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062106.shtml)

Thus, behind the shared anti-American feelings, China, Russia and the other SCO members and observers harbor serious differences of opinion. Given these, it is unlikely that the SCO can develop anytime soon into an anti-NATO-like grouping along the lines of the Warsaw Pact. The SCO’s consensus is a negative one, in which the parties agree only on what they don’t like.

9. NATO should cooperate with SCO, not oppose it

Harlan Ullman (Senior Adviser at Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, sits on the advisory boards of the U.S. European Command and the NATO Defence College), 20 July 2006, "THE ROAD TO RIGA: ANCHOR POINTS, EFFECTS BASED THINKING AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY," A Paper Prepared for the RUSI Conference, p. 5

Finally, NATO should look to other potential partnerships. One of note is the Shanghai Cooperative Organization that consists of Russia, China and four Central Asian states. Both organizations have shared interests reflecting General Jones’ anchor points particularly regarding energy and infrastructure security, countering terrorism and proliferation and WMD and consequence management and are in line with the interests of each member state and the broader alliances.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

INHERENCY

1. Riga Summit increased SOF cooperation and NRF has SOF

James Appathurai (NATO Spokesman), 28 Nov 2006, Press conference, NATO ONLINE LIBRARY, NATO SPEECHES, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061128f.htm>

In terms of special operations forces, this Summit will see an initiative to promote cooperation between special operations forces within the Alliance. And that, for special operations forces, as you know, is something quite special. They don't often work together in a multinational way. But to share best practices, to be able to train and work together, is something that has been put on the agenda, and agreed amongst NATO nations, so it's a very good thing. And of course, the NATO Response Force has a special operations forces element to it and that will have to be continually resourced as the NRF goes forward.

2. Riga Summit launched new NATO SOF initiative

Pres. George W. Bush, 28 Nov 2006, "Address by the President of the United States George W. Bush to the participants of the Young Leaders Forum and of the Rīga Conference," [www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/51/](http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/51/)

We created a new NATO response force to ensure that our Alliance can deploy rapidly and effectively. Here in Riga we are taking new steps to build on this progress. At this Summit, we will launch a NATO special operations forces initiative that will strengthen the ability of special operations personnel from NATO nations to work together on the battlefield.

3. Riga Summit created plan for SOF forces to train together

Mark John, Reuters news service, 29 Nov 2006, "NATO rapid-reaction force gets final green light," <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L29436487.htm>

The NRF launch was one of a number of decisions taken at the Riga summit aimed at transforming NATO from the monolith that protected Europe during the Cold War to a nimble provider of security around the world. They included plans for national special operations forces to train together, the launch of an intelligence-sharing centre and a move by a consortium of 15 NATO nations plus Sweden to jointly buy three large C-17 transport plans from Boeing.

4. SOF transformation was created at Riga Summit - creates new training and capabilities

NATO On-Line Library, 29 Nov 2006, Riga Summit Declaration ( Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga) <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (ellipses added)

We have endorsed a set of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to address contemporary threats and challenges. These include:

...the launch of a special operations forces transformation initiative aimed at increasing their ability to train and operate together, including through improving equipment capabilities;

NEGATIVE BRIEF: TERRORISM - Foreign Occupation is the Root Cause

Foreign occupation causes suicide terrorism, not Islamic fundamentalism

Prof. Robert A. Pape (professor of political science at the University of Chicago), 11 Sept 2006, "What We’ve Learned About Suicide Terrorism Since 9/11," CHICAGO TRIBUNE, [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6679](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6679)

Amid prognostications of doom, we lost sight of the truth: that suicide terrorism is a tactic, not an enemy, and that beneath the religious rhetoric with which it is perpetrated, it occurs largely in the service of secular aims. Suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation rather than a product of Islamic fundamentalism.

Foreign occupation motivates Al Qaeda terrorism

Prof. Robert A. Pape (professor of political science at the University of Chicago), 11 Sept 2006, "What We’ve Learned About Suicide Terrorism Since 9/11," CHICAGO TRIBUNE, [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6679](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6679)

To make sense of Al Qaeda's campaign against the United States and its allies, I compiled data on the 71 terrorists who took their own lives carrying out attacks sponsored by Osama bin Laden's network between 1995 and 2004. These men are drawn from two groups: those who feel harmed and humiliated by foreign military occupation, and those who identify with the plight of a kindred ethnic group under foreign occupation.

Reducing Western troop presence would reduce terrorism threats

Prof. Robert A. Pape (professor of political science at the University of Chicago), 11 Sept 2006, "What We’ve Learned About Suicide Terrorism Since 9/11," CHICAGO TRIBUNE, [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6679](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6679)

Although British authorities thwarted last month's airliner attack plot, the arrest and detention of two dozen individuals in the U.K. reveals that Al Qaeda continues to draw strength from disaffected European Muslims, whose anger over Western combat operations in Muslim lands motivates them to take up arms. If it could no longer draw recruits from the Muslim countries where there is an American and Western combat presence, however, the remaining transnational network would pose a far smaller threat.

Western counter-terrorism efforts actually make things worse if they don't solve for foreign occupation

Prof. Robert A. Pape (professor of political science at the University of Chicago), 11 Sept 2006, "What We’ve Learned About Suicide Terrorism Since 9/11," CHICAGO TRIBUNE, [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6679](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6679)

From 2002 to the end of 2005, Al Qaeda carried out over 17 suicide and other terrorist bombings, killing nearly 700 people – more attacks and victims than in all the years before 9/11 combined. Most Americans would like to believe that Western counter-terrorism efforts have weakened al Qaeda, but by the measure that counts – the ability of the group to kill us – it is stronger today than it was before 9/11. We must understand that suicide terrorism results more from foreign occupation than Islamic fundamentalism, and conduct the war accordingly.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: TROOPS NOT AVAILABLE

Europe is reaching the limits of what it can do with available troops

Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson (Washington Post Foreign Service), 18 Sept 2006, WASHINGTON POST, "NATO Faces Growing Hurdle As Call for Troops Falls Short," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/17/AR2006091700570.html> (ellipses in original)

"There are not many countries with troops that are up to the tasks that they might face in Afghanistan, a high-intensity conflict with the Taliban," said Antonio Missiroli, chief policy analyst at the European Policy Center, a research organization based in Brussels. "If you look at the picture across Europe . . . we are reaching the limits of what we can do."

NATO countries complain their forces are overstretched

Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson (Washington Post Foreign Service), 18 Sept 2006, WASHINGTON POST, "NATO Faces Growing Hurdle As Call for Troops Falls Short," <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/17/AR2006091700570.html>

The United States has 21,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, more than any other NATO member, but only 1,300 are part of the alliance's operation; the remainder are under exclusive U.S. command. Britain is currently the largest contributor to NATO's force in Afghanistan, with 5,000 troops. Other countries have complained that their forces are already overstretched.

US military readiness is in bad shape

Daniel Benjamin (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) and Michèle A. Flournoy (senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction in the Clinton administration) 14 Sept 2006, SLATE, "Won't Deploy? Can't Deploy.There are no more troops to send to Iraq" [www.slate.com/id/2149684/?nav=ais](http://www.slate.com/id/2149684/?nav=ais)

In terms of ground-force readiness, the United States is in worse shape than at any time since the aftermath of Vietnam, when revelations about a "hollow" military sparked defense buildups from the Carter and then Reagan administrations. While most press coverage of the Iraq conflict has understandably focused on loss of life and the damage done in that country by the insurgency, the readiness of the U.S. military has also been a casualty.

US forces are overstretched - new troop deployments are severely constrained

Philip H. Gordon (Director, Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe), Spring 2006, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm)

Moreover, some US army and marine units are now beginning their third tour of duty in Iraq and Reserve and National Guard units have been used far more than plans allowed for, posing serious challenges for future military recruitment. As a result, US military forces are widely considered to be "overstretched" and the prospect of new troop deployments severely constrained.

US Army and Marine equipment will take years to recover from the Iraq war

Daniel Benjamin (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) and Michèle A. Flournoy (senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction in the Clinton administration) 14 Sept 2006, SLATE, "Won't Deploy? Can't Deploy.There are no more troops to send to Iraq" [www.slate.com/id/2149684/?nav=ais](http://www.slate.com/id/2149684/?nav=ais)

Based on information from the Pentagon and estimates by analysts such as former Reagan Pentagon official Lawrence Korb, the costs of restoring destroyed and damaged Army and Marine Corps equipment is now estimated to be close to $30 billion, and it will grow by an additional $14 billion for every additional year we stay in Iraq. Even if these funds were available tomorrow, it would take years to restore the forces to the state they were in at the outset of the conflict.

Despite 2 million personnel, NATO lacks troops that can actually be used for NATO missions

Rep. Doug Bereuter, 16 June 2004, "U.S. INITIATIVES AT NATO’S ISTANBUL SUMMIT" hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, p. 7

I think it is totally unacceptable that these drastic shortfalls exist despite the fact that there are more than two million military personnel in the active and reserve forces of the European NATO allies. Only 2 percent of those forces are deployed on NATO missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Allied countries have no shortage of military personnel, but NATO does lack units that can actually be used for the missions the Alliance now needs to conduct.